Tulsa Race Riot of 1921: Determining its causes and framing by Messer, Chris
   THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921: DETERMINING 
ITS CAUSES AND FRAMING 
 
 
   By 
CHRIS MESSER 
   Bachelor of Science, Sociology  
   Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
  2003 
 
   Master of Science, Sociology 
   Oklahoma State University 
   Stillwater, Oklahoma 
2005 
 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
   July, 2008  
 ii
   THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921: DETERMINING 
ITS CAUSES AND FRAMING 
 
 
 
 
   Dissertation Approved: 
 
 
   Dr. Patricia Bell 
   Dissertation Adviser 
 
   Dr. Gary Webb 
 
   Dr. Beth Caniglia 
 
   Dr. Jason Kirksey 
 
  Dr. A. Gordon Emslie 
   Dean of the Graduate College 
 
 
 iii
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratification to Dr. Patricia Bell for the 
countless number of hours she dedicated to assisting me, not only with my dissertation 
work, but a number of other endeavors as well.  Your kindness, friendship, and humor 
will sincerely be missed.  I would also like to thank my departmental committee 
members, Dr. Beth Caniglia and Dr. Gary Webb.  Both of you are great teachers, 
researchers, and colleagues.  Your participation in my dissertation meant so much to me.  
Thanks also to Dr. Jason Kirksey for stepping in on the project, despite the late request.  
So many students have had nothing but genuinely great things to say about you and your 
contribution to students and the university.  I am also thankful for the several 
contributions Dr. Amilcar Shabazz made prior to his departure.  
There are others deserving of my gratitude as well.  First and foremost, my wife, 
Mandy.  For the past couple of years, this dissertation has often dominated me and my 
time and efforts.  It has taken away from you at times.  Your love, understanding and 
patience are worth so many words, far more than what could fit into a dissertation.  
Thank you, Mandy.  My family has also offered an incredible amount of support.  I wish 
so much that we weren’t so far away (and moving further away).  Thank you always for 
understanding what this degree means to me.  Finally, I must thank my teacher, research 
partner, and good friend, Dr. Tom Shriver.  Mandy and I have grown so close to your 
 iv
family.  Thank you, Tom, for what you have done for me personally.  There are simply 
too many things to list, but you know what they are.
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
 
 Preview of Remaining Chapters ........................................................................... 3 
 
 
II. THE TULSA RIOT .............................................................................................. 6 
  
 Precipitating Event .............................................................................................. 6 
 During the Riot .................................................................................................... 7 
 Underlying Causes............................................................................................... 8 
 Immediate Responses .......................................................................................... 9 
 Reparations Movement ...................................................................................... 10 
 
 
III. RACE RIOT CAUSES ...................................................................................... 13 
 
 Contributing Factors .......................................................................................... 14 
 Jim Crow Laws ............................................................................................ 14 
 Racist Ideologies.......................................................................................... 15 
 Lynching ..................................................................................................... 16 
 Migration and Social Change ....................................................................... 18 
 War.............................................................................................................. 19 
 Police Brutality ............................................................................................ 20 
Theoretical Perspectives .................................................................................... 21 
Breakdown Theories .................................................................................... 22 
Emergent Norms .......................................................................................... 23 
Absolute and Relative Deprivation ............................................................... 24 
Competition ................................................................................................. 25 
Structural Conduciveness and Political (In)Opportunities ............................. 26 
Summary of Theoretical Contributions .............................................................. 29 
An Integrative Model of Race Riots ................................................................... 30 
Structural Factors ......................................................................................... 33 
Cultural Factors ........................................................................................... 34 
Contextual Factors and Triggering Events .................................................... 34 
 
 
 vi
Chapter          Page 
 
IV. RESPONSES AND FRAMING ........................................................................ 37 
 
 Riot as Disaster.................................................................................................. 37 
 Community Formation....................................................................................... 38 
 Framing ............................................................................................................. 40 
 Alignment .................................................................................................... 42 
 Tasks ........................................................................................................... 44 
Resonance ................................................................................................... 45 
 
 
V.  METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 48 
 
 Stage 1: Designing the Case Study ..................................................................... 49 
 Stage 2: Conducting the Case Study .................................................................. 50 
 Sources for Locating the Causes .................................................................. 52 
Sources for Responses and Framing ............................................................. 54 
Stage 3: Analytic Strategy ................................................................................. 55 
Reliability and Validity ...................................................................................... 58 
 
 
VI. CAUSES OF THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 ............................................ 60 
 
 A Diffusion of Riots .......................................................................................... 61 
 Local Contextual Factors ................................................................................... 62 
 Migration ..................................................................................................... 63 
 Segregation .................................................................................................. 64 
 Lynching ..................................................................................................... 66 
 The Black Community and Economic Advancement.................................... 69 
 Structural Factors .............................................................................................. 77 
Population Changes ..................................................................................... 77 
Population Characteristics ............................................................................ 79 
Inadequate Municipal Functioning ............................................................... 81 
Cultural Factors ................................................................................................. 87 
Local Media’s Portrayal of Race .................................................................. 87 
Intelligence ............................................................................................ 89 
Crime ..................................................................................................... 91 
The Manifestation of Culture ....................................................................... 96 
Triggering Events of the Tulsa Race Riot .......................................................... 99 
Conclusion: An Integration of the Factors Contributing to the Riot .................. 103 
 
 
 
VII. RESULTANT FRAMES AND RESPONSES ................................................ 109 
  
 vii
Chapter          Page 
  
Diagnostic Frames ........................................................................................... 109 
 Black Militancy ......................................................................................... 109 
 Inept Law Enforcement .............................................................................. 113 
 Victim Frames ................................................................................................. 114 
 Immediate Responses and Prognostic Solutions ............................................... 117 
 Detention Camps ....................................................................................... 117 
 Competing Prognoses ................................................................................ 119 
 Community Formations ................................................................................... 125 
 Frame Transformation ..................................................................................... 128 
 Attributing Blame ............................................................................................ 128 
Actors ........................................................................................................ 129 
Context ...................................................................................................... 130 
Conspiracy of Silence ................................................................................ 131 
Justifications .................................................................................................... 132 
Impact ....................................................................................................... 133 
Culpability ................................................................................................. 135 
Reconciliation ............................................................................................ 136 
Resonance ....................................................................................................... 137 
Public Framing of Reparations ......................................................................... 142 
Public Support for Reparations ........................................................................ 143 
Rewriting History ...................................................................................... 145 
The Beneficiaries of Reparations ............................................................... 146 
Public Opposition to Reparations ..................................................................... 147 
Avoiding History ....................................................................................... 148 
“Us” and “Them” ....................................................................................... 150 
Denial of Responsibility............................................................................. 151 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 153 
 
 Final Comments .............................................................................................. 153  
 Implications for Future Research ..................................................................... 156 
      Limitations ...................................................................................................... 158 
  
 
 
REFERENCES...................................................................................................... 160 
 
 
APPENDIX ........................................................................................................... 178 
 
 
 
 viii
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table           Page 
 
   Black Business Establishments in Tulsa, 1907, 1909-1914, and 1916-1923 .......... 72 
   
   Black Business Persons in Tulsa, 1907, 1909-1914, and 1916-1923...................... 73 
 
   Population Change from 1910 to 1920 .................................................................. 77 
 
   Population Growth or Decline for Selected Counties 1910 and 1920 .................... 79 
 
   Comparative Sex Ratios ....................................................................................... 80 
 
   Age Distribution by Race and Gender in Tulsa 1920 ............................................ 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure           Page 
 
   An Integrative Model ........................................................................................... 31 
 
   Key Characteristics of an Integrative Approach .................................................. 104 
 
 
  
 
 1 
1 
Introduction 
 
The study of race has been subjected to a countless number of sociological 
inquiries.  Often embedded within these pursuits are issues related to racial conflict.  
Perhaps the most vivid manifestation of this involves race riots.   Recently, in an 
extended episode of civil unrest near the end of 2005, France was host to a disorder that 
consisted of numerous reports of shootings, arson, and looting, resulting in over 4,500 
arrests (Bernard 2005).  Reportedly, the violence was initiated in Clichy-sous-Bois after 
two youths, believed to be of African descent, were electrocuted while fleeing from 
police (Smith 2005).  However, as in most cases of rioting, there were arguably many 
more deeply rooted causes that contributed to the horrendous actions than were initially 
reported.  While one editorial perceived the riots to be related to pervasive unemployment 
in a community largely comprised of an immigrant population from North Africa and the 
sub-Saharan region (Smith 2005), others argued its causes could be linked to racial 
discrimination (Cowell 2005; Roy 2005).  These same factors, discrimination and 
unemployment, were also associated with many of the race-related riots which have 
occurred throughout U.S. history.  The recent riots in France and a rash of riots in the 
U.S., particularly during the 1960s, have strikingly similar features.  There are 
similarities in reported causes as well as individual and organizational responses. 
Much less has been documented in regard to how episodes of racial conflict are 
interpreted by stakeholders and the public at large.  How riots are interpreted, or framed, 
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is a key process involved in the development of immediate responses at both individual 
and organizational levels.  However, riots may much later involve demands for 
reconciliation and restitution, which may involve reframing, or rearticulating historical 
happenings. 
 The global existence of race riots deems them necessary for further research.  
Race riots are often thought to be social phenomena isolated in time and place.  Certainly 
patterns have emerged in which a diffusion of riots characterizes a particular historical 
juncture, such as those prior to the 1920s and during the 1960s, but they have also 
occurred during what appear to be relatively peaceful times and places, at least on a 
macro-level.  In addition, race riots have also been considered events that began one day 
and ended hours, possibly days, later.  Instead, elements fueling their outbreaks were 
there long before and the ashes remain long after.  A riot in Tulsa, Oklahoma provides a 
vivid example. 
 The purpose of this research is to examine the phenomenon of race riots, 
particularly the Tulsa riot of 1921.  Therefore, this is a case study.  The research focuses 
on associated causes or precursors to the riot, organizational and governmental responses 
to the riot, and the issue of framing associated with the same.  It should be noted that 
although the term “race riot” is utilized throughout this research, race is certainly not the 
only factor involved in the formation of riots.  Rather, racial issues play a role in 
conjunction with a host of additional factors.  This research calls for two levels of 
analysis (before and after the riot) and these levels are examined within different 
theoretical schemes using different methodological approaches.  The objective is to 
identify important factors associated with the Tulsa riot which can be used to consider 
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alternative race riots; factors that have not been previously identified or sufficiently 
considered in coming to conclusions about riots from a broader perspective.  Thus, this 
research is largely theoretical through its use of the Tulsa riot to build on existing insight 
as to various forces associated with rioting. 
 The Tulsa riot was selected for two reasons.  First, it represents a similar type of 
conflict which occurred throughout many other cities during the early twentieth century 
and one in which a legacy is still for the taking today.  A recent commission formed to 
study the riot allows researchers to examine present-day impacts of the riot (Oklahoma 
Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 2001).  Thus, the riot can be studied as 
an historical event that has long passed, but also as a process that continues to have 
sociopolitical ramifications today.  Second, there is much historical data on the riot that 
allows it to be more fully understood within its proper context.  Too often riots are not 
considered contextually and they are treated as mere occurrences with key actors and 
events left ignored.   
Preview of Remaining Chapters 
This research includes seven additional chapters.  Chapter two consists of a brief 
overview of the literature on the Tulsa riot.  Specific attention is given to events and 
processes which took place during the riot, as this information is not entirely addressed 
throughout the analysis of this study.  In addition, I offer any insight previously available 
in research regarding causative factors associated with the Tulsa riot.  Finally, I conclude 
with a discussion of the current move for reparations among riot survivors. 
Chapter three provides an overview of scholarship and theoretical insights 
concerning the causes of riots from a general perspective.  I begin by looking at certain 
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contextual factors (i.e., migration, lynching, war, etc.) argued to have contributed to 
certain riots in the past.  Next, attention is lent to theoretical frameworks associated with 
racial disorders.  Finally, an integrative approach to studying the causes of riots is 
presented.  Specifically, I provide an integrative model that is used for the analysis of the 
Tulsa riot, which encompasses not only particular structural factors, but cultural and 
contextual issues as well.  In addition, I integrate these macro-level aspects with micro-
level contributing factors in the form of triggering, or precipitating events.    
The fourth chapter involves the examination of immediate and long-term 
responses to the Tulsa riot, with an emphasis on framing.  The chapter begins with a brief 
discussion of disaster research and community formations, which is later used to identify 
a plethora of responses following the Tulsa riot.  However, a much larger discussion is 
borrowed from social movement literature regarding the process of framing.  Ultimately, 
it is argued that the Tulsa riot has experienced a frame transformation from its original 
frame as a “Negro uprising” to a new frame of “injustice.”   
Chapter five presents an overview of the methodology used in this research, 
which involves a bridging of quantitative and qualitative methods.  Specifically, a 
discussion is presented concerning the use of census records and numerous alternative 
historical archives.  In addition, a framework for conducting case studies is presented in 
conjunction with a brief overview of various methodological techniques incorporated 
within this study.  
Chapter six consists of the analyses, particularly concerning the integrative results 
associated with the causes of the Tulsa riot.  Ultimately, it is argued that the causes of the 
Tulsa riot cannot be captured without grasping its complexity.  This study concludes that 
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the Tulsa Race Riot was caused by a host of factors including, a racist and discriminatory 
historical context; various structural characteristics, including factors related to politics, 
race, and law enforcement; a culture of racism and vigilantism; and a triggering event 
involving the arrest of an African American accused of assaulting a White woman.  This 
section concludes with an application of an integrative approach concerning these factors.   
Chapter seven includes an analysis of framing strategies and techniques.  I 
proceed with a discussion of various organizational responses to the riot and how the riot 
was initially assessed both diagnostically and prognostically among media and 
governmental representatives within the city of Tulsa as well as black victims of the riot.  
Later, I transition into a discussion of the more current framing techniques and strategies 
used by Tulsa riot survivors and representatives in their fight for reparations.   
Finally, chapter eight concludes this research.  The chapter begins with a brief 
summary of the important findings from this research.  In addition, implications of this 
research are presented.  The chapter also discusses areas to build upon in future studies of 
race riots.  Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of limitations. 
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2 
The Tulsa Riot  
 
 Most of the present literature on the Tulsa race riot emphasizes particularities in 
regard to specific events which took place.  Authors such as Wilson & Wallace (1992), 
Carr (2002), and Myers (2002) have provided fictional accounts with significant 
characters renamed, while others have provided more journalistic accounts (for example 
Wheeler 1971; Madigan 2001; Hirsch 2002).  Other accounts focus on personal 
experiences during the riot (for example Gates 1997, 2003; Parrish 1998).  Bob Hower 
(1993) provides numerous historical documents concerning the riot and gives a 
descriptive background on the work of the Red Cross in Tulsa following the riot.  Still 
others best describe the riot in a historical context as well as how it unfolded (for example 
Halliburton 1972, 1975; Williams & Williams 1972; Ellsworth 1982; Johnson 1998; also 
see various authors in Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 
(2001)).  Finally, Brophy (2002) offers not only a historical study of the riot, but also 
legal arguments concerning both the legitimacy and appropriateness of reparations. 
Precipitating Event 
The precipitating event that is widely accepted today to have caused the Tulsa riot 
on May 31 and June 1 was the arrest of a black man, Dick Rowland, and the circulation 
of rumors regarding the details surrounding his arrest.  On May 31, the Tulsa Tribune 
contained at least one report of an alleged assault by Rowland against a white female, 
Sara Page.  This edition no longer exists in public records as a whole because it is 
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missing part of the front page (where the article was printed) as well as an editorial, 
which may have included something in regard to the arrest.  Nevertheless, the article 
referring to the arrest was reprinted by Loren Gill in a thesis for the University of Tulsa 
regarding the riot (Gill 1946).  Though the allegations against Rowland were never 
substantiated, the account was enough to evoke curiosity among many and disgust in 
others.  Shortly after the newspaper was distributed, white citizens throughout the city 
began to gather at the courthouse where Rowland was being held on charges.  Rumors 
and threats of lynching Rowland permeated Tulsa.   
During the Riot  
 Later that afternoon, a group of about 25 black citizens, possibly members of the 
African Blood Brotherhood (Commander, Tulsa Post, African Blood Brotherhood 1921), 
arrived at the courthouse armed to protect Rowland.  They were initially convinced by 
the local sheriff that he was safe and retreated back to the Greenwood district.  Later, a 
larger group of about 75 arrived armed after the white mob had swelled in size.  Upon 
their arrival, an altercation broke out and a shot was fired.  The black citizens who were 
present quickly retreated to their district once again, but this time large groups of whites 
followed.  In fact, they obtained guns and ammunition along the way through a couple of 
different methods.  First, they break into stores.  Law enforcement officers were a second 
way in which guns were obtained by the white mob. 
 As groups of whites entered Greenwood, gun battles ensued between members of 
each race, but the number of whites far surpassed that of African-Americans.  
Throughout the remainder of May 31 and the early morning of June 1, the largely 
successful Black community that had been rather quickly erected was even more rapidly 
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destroyed.  The rioting not only consisted of gun battles, but looting and arson as well.  
Virtually all 35 city blocks that made up Greenwood were torched to the ground, but not 
before valuables were taken out of homes and businesses for private use.  Officially, 
thirty-six citizens died during the riot, including twenty-six blacks and ten whites.  
However, this number has been contested with other estimates ranging from 150 to as 
high as 300.  The reason for a discrepancy in the death-toll is a belief among many that 
victims were buried unsystematically.  Historical evidence suggests many bodies were 
placed in unmarked graves or dumped into the Arkansas River.  These allegations are not 
recent developments, though, as they were addressed very shortly after rioting ceased.  
Property loss during the riot rose to at least $1.8 million (for references to the events 
during the riot, see Halliburton 1972, 1975; Ellsworth 1982; Johnson 1998; Parrish 1998; 
Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 2001).   
Underlying Causes 
 Many accounts of the Tulsa riot have included insights as to why the riot may 
have occurred.  Primarily, one deeply-rooted cause has been offered.  This relates to the 
interconnection of wealth within the Black community and race relations in both Tulsa, 
and more generally, the entire South during the era (for example Ellsworth 1982; Butler 
1991; Johnson 1998).  Previous research contends the community had reached economic 
heights that were unprecedented among other similar communities throughout the era of 
segregation.  These authors (for example Halliburton 1972, 1975; Ellsworth 1982) also 
note that blacks were expected to “know their place” and that racial, political, and 
economic advancement were not among the designated areas.  According to these 
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accounts, many blacks in Tulsa refused to accept the hypocrisy of an American system 
that preached equality worldwide but did not offer the same at home. 
Immediate Responses 
 Similarly, the events which occurred immediately after the riot have been 
documented extensively.  Black survivors who had not fled the city were immediately 
placed under arrest and put into internment camps located at various sites across the city.  
Days, weeks, and months in some cases, would pass before individuals were able to 
leave.  Those who left shortly after their arrival were forced to obtain permission from the 
city, which was accomplished through an acknowledgement among whites that the 
particular survivor under consideration would go directly to work.  Those who weren’t 
able to leave were put into forced labor, which in most cases consisted of sanitation 
duties.   
Many responses to the riot consisted of actions representative of the underlying 
racism and discrimination that existed throughout the era.  These responses were both 
individually- and organizationally-based.  Individually, the blame was largely placed on 
the shoulders of blacks, particularly those who arrived armed at the courthouse.  These 
actors considered the riot to be an uprising, including the mayor and other city officials 
and leaders.   
 Organizationally, responses were similar.  A grand jury was called forth to 
investigate the riot and to establish guilt.  The jury, which was composed entirely of 
white males, placed the direct blame on the same group of blacks.  However, they also 
blamed lax law enforcement.  Weeks later, the Chief of Police would be fired for his role 
during the riot in addition to a few unrelated events (Madigan 2001).   
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 A Reconstruction Committee was quickly established by the mayor to investigate 
the extent of damage and determine the course of action the city would take.  It was 
quickly determined the torched district would be better suited for industrial purposes 
rather than permitting survivors to rebuild in the same location.  In order to accomplish 
this, the city planned to extend fire zones, which would require all future building in the 
district to be at least two stories high, leaving the cost of rebuilding exorbitant for black 
survivors.  Through the efforts of local black lawyers, however, the plan was eventually 
deemed unconstitutional (Ellsworth 1982).  After the riot, several different cities across 
the United States attempted to donate money to help victims rebuild their homes.  
However, the city refused these funds, stating that Tulsa was going to rebuild what it had 
destroyed.  But Tulsa did not fulfill its promise; it provided less than $100,000 in total 
financial assistance to Greenwood citizens toward relief and no help toward rebuilding.   
These responses have to be understood within a broader context.  The specific 
events are certainly important to understand, but one of the goals of sociology is to 
understand how these experiences fit into the larger social structure and to understand the 
historical forces that shaped them (Mills 1959). 
Reparations Movement 
 The riot and its legacy are still up for debate today.  Nearly eighty years had 
passed before a commission was finally formed in 1997 to study the riot.  By 2001, a 
report provided a much more detailed picture of the riot.  Prior to the completion of the 
report, very little had been mentioned and virtually nothing had been done for the 
survivors, many of whom had long passed.  The report by the commission made 
recommendations for the riot’s acknowledgement and suggested reparations for survivors 
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and their descendants.  These recommendations led to a memorial placed near the 
affected area, but reparations were not granted, including those to direct survivors. 
Previous research by Alfred Brophy (2002) provides four compelling reasons as 
to why reparations are a legitimate and necessary answer to these injustices: 1) the city 
was culpable; 2) there were survivors; 3) the harm was concentrated in one time and 
place; and 4) even at the time, some city leaders acknowledged moral responsibility by 
promising that they would rebuild what had been destroyed.  The battle for reparations 
continued, making its way to the United States Supreme Court in 2004, which decided 
not to consider the case, basing their decision on a statute of limitations (Boczkiewicz 
2004).  Today, the fight for reparations has centered not only on the violation of rights by 
the city of Tulsa, but by the U.S. government as well.  Charles Ogletree (2005), a lawyer 
representing the survivors of the riot, has filed suit against the United States by 
presenting the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.   
The Tulsa race riot thus provides evidence that historical forces can shape the 
experiences of contemporary life.  Race riots should not be viewed as isolated historical 
events that affect groups of people in a situated time and place.  They produce lifelong 
effects and are embedded in economic, political, and social situations that persist today, 
albeit through different shapes and forms.   
Race still plays a central role in American society.  This is seen in stereotyping, 
prejudice, discrimination, scapegoating, and producing the sociological other.  Blacks 
still overwhelmingly hold lower-paying jobs and make up much of the poor across the 
United States (Massey 2007).  They continue to be overrepresented in the criminal justice 
system (Alexander 2005).  Inferior educational opportunities linger (Thernstrom & 
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Thernstrom 2003).  And Hurricane Katrina suggests that local and national governments 
are slow to respond when a Black community is shredded to pieces (Hart 2007).     
In summary, there remains a challenge for scholarship on the riot.  The riot should 
be understood at a local level, but it must also be understood through the historical 
context in which it took place.  This chapter has shown that the story is available.  There 
are certainly gaps in these stories that need to be filled, of which some may be in this 
research, but the primary challenge is to understand it in relation to race riots in general, 
and doing so without omitting the stories left by survivors, as much scholarship has a 
tendency to do.   
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3 
Race Riot Causes 
 
 In this chapter, previous research concerned with the causative factors associated 
with race riots is considered.  The determination of the forces that shape a race riot has 
been made difficult because riots are a social construction (Hunt 1997).  One event is 
described as a riot while a similar event at a different time and/or place may be presented 
as a rebellion or a protest.  Mitchell (1970) also identifies three typologies of race riots: 
white riots, black riots, and white-black riots.  However, the exclusion of other races 
leaves this categorization incomplete.  Therefore, a distinct conceptualization of what 
constitutes race rioting for the present research is necessary.  In fact, I implement the 
definition of race-related civil disorders previously offered by Myers and Caniglia 
(2004).  They note that a civil disorder is “an event involving crowd behavior that 
resulted in either property damage or personal injury, defiance of civil authority, or 
‘aggressive disruptions which violate civil law’” (Myers and Caniglia 2004: 523).  
Moreover, to be race-related, a race riot includes themes of aggressiveness or violence 
between members of one race against members of another race.  This conceptualization is 
provided in order to exempt from consideration other forms of rioting, such as 
celebrations after athletic events that do not have race-related issues at center stage.
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Contributing Factors  
Race riots are global phenomena and have what appear to be some universal 
underlying patterns; however, it must also be considered that they take place in distinct 
historical contexts, and there remain both particular micro- and macro-level processes at 
bay within these junctures.  Several contextual issues believed to have contributed to the 
development of race riots are presented.  These are not exhaustive nor are they related to 
each and every race riot throughout history, though it is argued that some are 
interconnected and are historically situated, or at least made manifest in a unique way 
throughout particular historical junctures.  Briefly, these include Jim Crow laws, racist 
ideologies, lynching, migration and social change, war, and police brutality. 
Jim Crow Laws   
In the early part of the twentieth century, the U.S. became increasingly 
characterized by Jim Crow laws that began to gain foothold throughout much of the 
nation, particularly in the South (Franklin 1966).  Segregation laws served to maintain a 
dominant/subordinate relationship between whites and blacks.  These laws affected 
voting, public transportation, schools, hospitals, waiting rooms in railway stations, 
restaurants, bathrooms, residential areas, and phone booths (Woodward 1966).  Referring 
to the status of blacks, Woodward (1966:7) states, “The public symbols and constant 
reminders of his inferior position were the segregation statutes, or ‘Jim Crow’ laws.  
They constituted the most elaborate and formal expression of sovereign white opinion 
upon the subject.”  Williamson (1986:171) adds that segregation was part of a larger 
scheme involving “the depoliticalization of the Negro.”  He contends that although 1889 
marked the beginning of legal segregation, the physical and mental separation of the 
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races took root during the origins of British America.   Despite living in a country that 
preached equality to all and one that engaged in warfare with those who were opposed to 
it, blacks were paradoxically forced into an unequal status, despite valiant efforts by both 
men and women to terminate this coercion (Gilmore 1996).   
The violation of these laws at times served as a precipitating factor in race riots.  
For instance, the Chicago riot of 1919 erupted after a black youth was stoned to death by 
whites while swimming in the part of a lake designated for whites (Tuttle 1978).  The 
Chicago riot, which took place in the midst of the “Red Scare,” was one of a cluster of 
riots throughout the early part of the twentieth century.  Though the direct influence of 
segregation was not always an immediate cause of the riot, segregation served as one of 
many underlying factors to the plethora of racial disorders throughout this era.  
Racist Ideologies 
 Second, coinciding with the creation of Jim Crow laws, blacks were interpreted as 
a sociopolitically and biologically inferior race.  These ideas were prominent amongst 
much of the scientific community.  For instance, in Yale Review, Vernon Kellogg 
(1920:732) described white superiority by stating, “We prefer the characteristics of the 
white race, taken as a whole, to those of any other primary race.”  Furthermore, the 
separation of race was biologically legitimated.  In his discussion of interracial mixing, 
Kellogg (1920: 734) added, “Some of the results of such biological consideration of 
racial crossing are already known…The white and black cross seems usually superior to 
the original black parent type, although inferior to the white parent type.” 
Another belief was that whiteness was a privilege and though blacks had made 
strides since the abolishment of slavery, they should feel content with their lot.  This 
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attitude was clearly demonstrated by President Theodore Roosevelt in one of his memoirs 
in 1906.  He stated that “the race cannot expect to get everything at once.  It must learn to 
wait and bide its time; to prove itself worthy by showing its possession of perseverance, 
of thrift, of self-control” (Roosevelt 1968: 5).   
The perpetuation of the ideology regarding the inferiority of blackness permeated 
the country and has played at least an indirect role in nearly all race riots (Mitchell 1970).  
For instance, the Houston riot of 1917 was largely influenced by racism after black 
soldiers responded to the mistreatment of a black woman and brutality against soldiers by 
a white police officer (Haynes 1976).  The riot in Elaine, Arkansas of 1919 was attributed 
by whites to black insurrection.  Here local black sharecroppers had formed a certain 
“Progressive Union” after becoming “dissatisfied with the prices they were receiving for 
cotton sold through the plantation owners and with the prices charged them for supplies 
bought from the owners” (Waskow 1966: 121).  Similarly, the Tulsa riot itself was 
originally attributed to a “negro uprising.”  The common theme within many of the riots, 
particularly those occurring in the early part of the twentieth century, was white racism 
and the perception of blacks as being naturally inferior.   
Lynching 
 A third important issue associated with race riots is lynching.  According to The 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a lynching is 
defined through the following criteria: 1) evidence exists that someone was killed; 2) the 
person was killed in an illegal fashion; 3) a group of three or more people participated in 
the killing; and 4) the group acted out of a perception of service to justice or tradition 
(Tolnay and Beck 1995).  Between 1880 and 1940, an important form of social control 
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applied to citizens of African descent consisted of violent methods, particularly lynching.  
Throughout this era, lynchings took the form of ritual practices (Inverarity 1976).  In 
general, harsh punishments throughout this period were essentially reaffirmations of the 
larger values of society (Garland 1990).  Moreover, lynching was primarily a public act, 
an informal type of punishment that would eventually give way to an increasing 
privatization and more formal type of punishment (Foucault 1995).  The Tuskegee 
Institute recorded 3,445 known lynchings of black persons throughout this time frame.  
The study also recorded 1,289 lynchings of whites (Linder 2000).  Despite the illegality 
of lynching, which is simply a form of torturous homicide, penalties were largely 
nonexistent (Chadbourn 1933; Inverarity 1976).  Moreover, in many cases, it was 
common knowledge among the community who was responsible for the assault (Black 
1983).  Williamson (1986: 126) stated: 
“The tendency was for the white community to ascribe the actual lynching 
to boys and men of the lower class, but also to say that the victim fully 
deserved his fate.  It seems strange that the active executioners were seen 
clearly enough to establish that they did not represent the quality of the 
community, being merely large boys and barroom toughs, but they were 
seldom seen clearly enough to be convicted in the courts of murder or any 
other serious charge.”   
Many times, lynchings involved an accusation of rape.  White (1929) noted that 
the “press and the pulpit” presented an image of blacks as prone to sexual violence and 
lynching was a legitimate means to preserving the purity of white women.  Reports of 
forthcoming lynchings, or those already executed, were strongly felt to be direct causes 
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of particular race riots as well.  To survive, many blacks turned to collective self-defense, 
which often resulted in physical conflict between the races (Lee & Humphrey 1943; 
Waskow 1966; Smith-McKoy 2001).  Some of the riots characterized by these processes 
include Atlanta in 1906, Springfield in 1908, and Tulsa in 1921.  Usually, the alleged 
offender was black and was believed to have either raped or murdered a white victim 
(Mitchell 1970).  Lynching was predominantly a Southern phenomenon, where 88% of 
such acts took place (Zimring 2003).   
Migration and Social Change 
A fourth important issue involves the geographical shift of the black population.  
During the period known as the “Great Migration,” which lasted from 1910 to 1970, 
millions of blacks left their southern dwellings for northern areas in search of equality 
and increased opportunities for advancement (White, Crowder, Tolnay & Adelman 
2005).  Near the time of its onset, one sociologist noted blacks were becoming 
increasingly tired of the injustices they faced in the South (Woofter 1923).  In addition, 
potential ramifications were hypothesized.  Guy Johnson (1924) predicted three 
consequences of black migration to the North.  First, the race problem of the South would 
become the race problem of the North.  Whites would increasingly come into contact 
with blacks at levels they had not previously experienced.  Second, there would be new 
racial adjustments.  The dominant ideology of preaching equality in the North would give 
way to Southern-like prejudices towards blacks.  Third, these processes would result in 
an emergence of Black Nationalism.  Thus, blacks would have rising expectations of 
where their “place” would be in society.               
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Johnson’s hypotheses were accurate, though this was already apparent at the time 
of his writing.  The migration would create conflict in many institutions, particularly the 
occupational, as blacks offered their labor in return for lower wages than what whites had 
previously earned for similar jobs.  In addition, overcrowding in less than adequate 
housing facilities left many blacks dissatisfied with inferior treatment.  Despite Civil 
Rights legislation aimed to create equality between the races, conflict persisted.  
Bergesen (2003) noted the Newark riot was similar to many other riots that broke out 
around the nation in the 1960s.  He argues a marking feature before the onset of these 
riots was economical deprivation and a lack of political participation among blacks.  
Many studies on the riots of the 1960s focused on these structural inequalities that were 
believed to cause riots, which are discussed in more detail later (for instance Lieberson & 
Silverman 1965; Spilerman 1970).   
War 
A fifth important issue in many riots involves wartime conditions.  World War I 
provided an experience for several thousand black soldiers stationed abroad they had not 
enjoyed at home – freedom.  Sweeney (1919) noted many black soldiers arrived home 
only to find the equal opportunities they had fought for were not granted in the very home 
that had sent them.  Moreover, the war sent even more whites overseas, which opened up 
thousands of jobs in the U.S.  Increasingly, blacks migrated to urban areas where they 
obtained jobs and wages once unavailable to them.  As whites returned from the war, 
many discovered their jobs had been taken, which resulted in much resentment (Waskow 
1966).  Mitchell (1970) argued that in conjunction with a host of factors, military service 
figured prominently in riots from 1917 to the 1960s in cities such as Houston, East St. 
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Louis, Chicago, Washington, Detroit, Harlem, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Newark, and 
Detroit, “Common to all have been tremendous population shifts, occupational upgrading 
for blacks, an intensification of violence, and military service attended by enhanced pride 
and intensified bitterness by blacks” (Mitchell 1970: 50). 
 Participation in the war led to more demands for equal treatment among blacks.  
Moreover, this era witnessed more calls from blacks to embrace self-defense 
mechanisms.  In 1919, Crisis stated, “To-day we raise the terrible weapon of Self-
Defense.  When the murderer comes, he shall no longer strike us in the back.  When the 
armed lynchers gather, we too must gather armed.  When the mob moves, we propose to 
meet it with bricks and clubs and guns” (cited in Ellsworth 1982: 23).  Indeed, the rash of 
riots throughout the early part of the twentieth century would involve increased levels of 
self-defense among blacks unwilling to be victims of pogroms without fighting back.   
Police Brutality 
Despite the eventual decrease of lynching, another form of social control was 
seemingly increasing or at least gaining more national exposure – police brutality.  The 
immediate cause of the Newark riot in 1967 involved the alleged brutality against a black 
cab driver, John Smith.  Police brutality was a becoming a common accusation before the 
riot’s inception, but this was not confined in Newark; rather, it was an accusation heard 
all across the country during this time period (U.S. National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders 1968).  Bergesen (2003) shows that police involved in the riots of Watts, 
Newark, and Detroit in the late 1960s were actually more violent than the black rioters 
themselves, an idea first laid out by Stark (1972), who argued that these riots were 
“police riots.”  In fact, the role of the police is one of the defining differences between 
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early twentieth century riots and those which took place much later (Dahlke 1952; 
Waskow 1966).  Police brutality was also an observable influence on the Los Angeles 
riot of 1992.  Rioting began shortly after a not guilty verdict was reached involving 
members of the Los Angeles Police Department in court on charges of beating a black 
motorist, Rodney King.  Images of this brutality were broadcast across the nation in the 
weeks leading up to the verdict.  Many were infuriated when the verdict was reached 
because for many blacks, it served as just another example of unequal protection of the 
law (Hunt 1997; Bergesen and Herman 1998).     
Theoretical Perspectives 
Research concerned with identifying the causative factors associated with race 
riots has largely considered the effects of local conditions.  A brief commentary on the 
background of these studies is necessary before illuminating on their various findings.  
The findings of these studies have been largely contingent upon three factors: the types of 
riots they have examined, the dimensions they seek to study, and the year(s) of the race 
riots considered.  As shown earlier, different types of race riots have erupted across the 
United States throughout its history.  Therefore, it is important to note race riots are, in 
part, contingent upon the historical context in which they took place and various 
processes are unique to each riot.  Second, these studies vary across the dimensions of 
riots they examine.  For the most part, recent sociological studies have been concerned 
with identifying structural patterns that contribute to the onset of riots.  This current 
project examines what are considered to be other relevant factors as well, particularly 
those that are cultural and contextual.  Finally, most of the recent literature on race riots 
has been concerned with those occurring throughout the 1960s.  Though some of the 
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contributing factors to these riots may have also been present in the Tulsa riot of 1921, it 
is important to keep in mind these are two different historical periods, which this analysis 
will consider.  Having explained these differences, it is necessary to differentiate between 
five perspectives within the literature: (1) breakdown theories; (2) emergent norms; (3) 
absolute and relative deprivation; (4) competition; and (5) political opportunities.  
Though some of these perspectives are interrelated with others, I have categorized these 
separately based on their differences. 
Breakdown Theories 
 One way in which the cause of rioting has been explained is through the existence 
of some collectively-formed, crazed mind.  Classical theorists of collective behavior such 
as LeBon, Tarde, and Robert Park offer that rationality and normative behavior breaks 
down during periods of social unrest such as riots and other civil disorders (Useem 1998).  
That is, during periods of disorganization, actors may join together and partake in 
collective actions that run in contrast to the ordinary normative structure.  These theorists 
have painted the picture of a collective, irrational, and crazed mind.  For example, Mason 
(1984) argued that rioters are typically perceived as either lower-class or “radical.”  In 
addition, Rude (1964) discussed the “aberrant” rioter.  According to his perspective, 
aberrants riot to “live in the moment” rather than to achieve some level of social change.   
Critiques of breakdown theories argue these theorists overstate the extent to 
which nonsensical behavior takes place.  McPhail (1991) argues the breakdown 
perspective, also known as the transformation hypothesis, is problematic on several 
fronts.  First, research has consistently shown that assemblies of collective behavior 
seldom involve anonymous actors.  That is, those who assemble often quickly find 
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family, friends, acquaintances, and others they are familiar with.  Second, collective 
behavior does not involve panic, or unrestrained fear.  Rather, action is more often 
purposive and goal-oriented.  Third, breakdown theories suggest a sense of “collective 
hypnosis”, which research has continually failed to support.  Finally, the behaviors that 
are explained have not been conceptualized or operationalized.  Others have recently 
argued that entirely neglecting the insights of LeBon and others has been a shortcoming 
in recent research (Marx 1970; Useem 1998).  Nevertheless, the bulk of research on 
collective behavior suggests that collective behavior is patterned, goal-oriented, and 
organized. 
Emergent Norms 
 Others have suggested that collective behavior occurs through the formation of an 
emergent norm (Turner and Killian 1987).  That is, riots can be explained through the 
development of new norms that temporally replace existing social norms and guidelines 
for conventional behavior.  Referring to the actor, Turner (1994:317) writes,  
“The emergent norm has provided a lens through which to see and 
understand what they and other participants are doing.  For most of them, 
this is a lens that gives their actions meanings that are different from the 
meanings they would have assigned to such actions at other times.” 
Thus, some of the oddest and most inconceivable behaviors can emerge because of the 
temporary formation of new meanings and interpretations.  Specifically, according to 
Turner and Killian, collective behavior emerges when some aspect of the social order 
results in problems that emerge within its bounds.  The social order consists of the 
normative order, the social structure, and communication channels.  The normative order, 
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established through socialization, consists of names, definitions, and classifications of 
aspects from the world around collectivities.  This order is maintained until it is 
collectively redefined as problematic.  Social structure refers to the pattern of social 
relationships, division of labor, and the resultant expectations among collectivities that 
are formed.  Finally, communication channels provide the nature of the situation, the 
norms that govern that situation, and what roles should be adopted.  As micro-level 
processes (i.e., rumors, convergence on a common location, etc.) emerge to challenge the 
social order, the chance of collective behavior and the formation of an emergent norm is 
argued to increase.   
Though this symbolic interactionist approach helps us to understand why this 
behavior is possible, it provides little insight into some of the more structural conditions 
that make these emergent norms possible.  Its contribution to theories of rioting, however, 
should not be ignored.  I contend that both micro- and macro-level factors contribute to 
the formation of race riots. 
Absolute and Relative Deprivation  
Numerous studies concerned with the causative factors associated with race riots 
have included deprivation arguments (Downes 1968; Gurr 1968; Schulman 1968).  These 
perspectives have been further broken down into absolute and relative deprivation.  
Absolute deprivation positions hold that riots break out in cities in which minorities 
experience higher than usual levels of disadvantage in society (Downes 1968).  On the 
other hand, relative deprivation holds that riots occur in cities where minorities adopt the 
expectations of the majority (Gurr 1968; Schulman 1968).  Both of these perspectives 
contain an embedded assumption that minorities instigate the rioting.  This is a plausible 
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assumption for the riots within the Civil Rights Era, but not as historically accurate for 
the riots occurring around 1920.  Moreover, the conditions required to meet deprivation 
conceptualizations could be found throughout the U.S. throughout the 1960s and were 
present in numerous cities that did not experience race riots.  Finally, it does not explain 
why riots have not involved other minorities, particularly Hispanics, who have large 
populations in many cities across the United States. 
 A related thesis is that riots are caused by rising expectations (Berkowitz 1968; 
Davies 1969, 1970).  Contrary to the aforementioned deprivation perspectives, this work 
suggests riots and revolutions are the product of increased expectations after social 
conditions have gradually improved followed by a brief, but sharp decrease in such 
conditions.  Known as the J-Curve explanation, Davies (1969: 86) stated, 
“The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is 
to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability 
to satisfy needs – which continue to rise – and, during the latter, a mental 
state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from 
anticipated reality.”   
Davies (1970) later argued that the urban riots of the 1960s followed a similar pattern.  
Further research also found that cities with less oppressive conditions and disadvantage 
among blacks than other cities had lower rates of rioting (Spilerman 1970). 
Competition 
Some research contends that desegregation and competition fuel riots (Olzak, 
Shanahan and McEneaney 1996; Myers 1997).  Here, empirical support was found for 
the hypothesis that Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) which experience 
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large decreases in residential segregation and increases in interracial contact lead to a 
higher likelihood of experiencing conflict.  In sum, Olzak et al. (1996: 608) conclude: 
“Racial competition depends on racial solidarity created by enduring 
barriers to interracial contact.  Racial segregation may also result from 
previous racial strife caused by competition.  Residential segregation 
therefore reinforces the salience of Black and White racial identities, as 
geographic boundaries overlap with family, religious, and social networks 
in neighborhoods.  But competition also depends upon the deterioration of 
rigid racial barriers, illustrated by the effect of increased interracial contact 
and exposure on the rate of race riots.”  
Thus, as competition intensifies, so does interracial contact.  In turn, this produces a 
higher likelihood of interracial conflict.  Similarily, an event history analysis by Myers 
(1997) concurs with this research by supporting the contention that ethnic competition 
helps to fuel the likelihood of rioting.  Moreover, Myers’ research (1997) notes that 
diffusion processes also contributed to the rash of riots throughout this same period.   
However, these studies are primarily concerned with the riots of the 1960s.  
Because segregation was fully entrenched, particularly in the South, throughout the early 
part of the twentieth century, interracial contact may have at the least taken a different 
form than that produced by competition.  Therefore, it is important to consider the 
context, location, and specific historical intricacies affecting such riots.    
Structural Conduciveness and Political (In)Opportunities  
Smelser’s path-breaking study, Theory of Collective Behavior (1962), explored 
several factors that come into play throughout various forms of collective behavior.  
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Smelser examined the relationship between precipitating factors and structural strain that 
work together to form conditions of structural conduciveness for collective behavior to 
occur.  Specifically, he maintains that there are six primary determinants of collective 
behavior, which include the following: 1) structural conduciveness; 2) structural strain; 3) 
generalized belief; 4) precipitating factors; 5) mobilization of actors; and 6) social 
control.   
 Smelser’s notion of structural conduciveness refers to structural features 
permissive to collective behavior such as legal segregation.  A second factor, structural 
strain, coincides with conduciveness.  This strain can come in the form of absolute or 
relative deprivation such as a cognitive awareness that an injustice has been incurred.  
Third, generalized beliefs occur when this strain is made meaningful to the prospective 
actors.  Smelser (1962: 16) notes that, “This meaning is supplied in a generalized belief, 
which identifies the source of strain, attributes certain characteristics to this source, and 
specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate.”  A fourth factor 
involves precipitating factors.  These tend to be more immediate events, which trigger 
collective behavior, such as the infamous case of Rosa Parks and the refusal to give up 
her seat in a segregated bus.  Fifth, precipitating factors often result in the “mobilization 
of actors,” whereby participants gather for action.  Finally, over-arching these is a sixth 
factor, social control.  Smelser (1962: 17) adds, “Stated in the simplest way, the study of 
social control is the study of those counter-determinants just reviewed.”   
 Smelser’s theory provides an excellent overview of the structural characteristics 
associated with the facilitation of collective behavior.  Individually, none of these factors 
can produce collective behavior.  However, Smelser’s work has been criticized to some 
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extent.  For instance, Miller (2000) argues that Smelser’s theory may be too broad by 
allowing nearly anything to be considered structural strain.  Others have suggested more 
specific structural conditions that seemingly contribute to riots. 
 Social movement perspectives have also contributed insight.  These theories focus 
on the political process (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994; McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald 1996; Morris 2000).  Morris (2000) notes that political process theorists have 
identified three critical components: mobilizing structures, political opportunity structure, 
and cultural framing.  First, mobilizing structures, or the collective means through which 
others act, must be present.  Mobilization can occur through formal organizations, 
informal networks, and preexisting institutional structures (Oberschall 1973; Morris 
1981).  A second component is political opportunity structure, or “the consistent – but not 
necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provides 
incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectation for 
success or failure” (Tarrow 1994:85).  Thus, the system must be made favorable for 
action (e.g. the state weakens).  Framing processes, which are shared definitions that are 
given to the particular situation, also contribute to the political process.  These are 
discussed much further at a later juncture. 
Finally, another classic study concerned with the effects of political conditions 
argues riots are the product of inadequately functioning municipal political structures 
(Lieberson and Silverman 1965).  Specifically, Lieberson and Silverman argued that a 
predominately white police force composition and other local governmental inadequacies 
contribute to rioting.  They further state that precipitating events can be found anywhere 
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as well as other sources of deprivation such as dilapidated housing and thus cannot be 
considered the general cause of riots.   
Summary of Theoretical Contributions 
Though the Tulsa riot had a long-lasting impact, it cannot be ignored that the 
event took place in a specific time and place.  Furthermore, the riot had distinct structural 
as well as cultural issues at bay.  In essence, it is argued the Tulsa race riot, or any riot for 
that matter, cannot be explained in terms of only one of these factors.  To ignore the 
effects of other contributors in pursuit of the “best” explanation, or the variables that 
produce the highest correlations, ignores the contribution of a variety of other factors that 
might also be in place when a race riot occurs.  They must be studied together.  Finally, it 
is argued that the very reason riots are often avoided is because at least one factor, 
regardless of the magnitude of its impact, is absent.  For example, without a triggering 
event, such as the Rodney King beating, it is most doubtful that the Los Angeles riots 
would have occurred during the time in which it did.  On the other hand, without the 
perception of racial injustice as being part of the culture, the King beating alone may not 
have been enough to incite rioting.  In addition, without the media attention given to the 
case, presumably fewer citizens would have been aware of the perceived or actual 
injustice incurred.  Thus, many elements have to be present.  Though it may be 
considerably exaggerated, Lee & Humphrey (1943: 5) once wrote that, “Riots are the 
products of thousands upon thousands of little events that have affected the habits and 
emotions of thousands upon thousands of people, both future rioters and future innocent 
bystanders.”  An integrative approach is necessary to better understand the cause of 
rioting.   
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An Integrative Model of Race Riots 
 The research examined above provides ample evidence that there exists an 
ongoing debate concerning the cause(s) of race riots.  Most of these are structural 
arguments; however, these perspectives interestingly omit much analysis of cultural 
factors such as racism as well as the historical context in which riots take place.  I argue 
that a more integrative approach to race riots should be taken.  Figure 1 provides an 
illustrative account.  In this model, it is argued that certain triggering events and 
contextual (historical) factors collide with structural characteristics and cultural factors, 
resulting in conditions conducive to race riots.  This model takes into account the various 
factors that previous research has deemed important variables in creating race riots.  
However, this approach is unique because it does not look for isolated structural or 
cultural characteristics that contribute the most to causing riots.  Instead, this approach 
considers race riots to be much more complex social phenomena.  It also allows for a 
clearer understanding of how triggering events and other contextual factors are 
manifestations of structure and culture, which should be considered interconnected 
issues.  These factors will later be analyzed in terms of their influence on the Tulsa race 
riot; however, future research should consider the strength of this model in explaining 
other race riots as well.   
This model is intended to be limited enough to allow for a complex understanding 
of race riots from a more local perspective.  The manifestations of these factors will vary.  
That is, some riots may be characterized by structural factors that are not important 
contributors to others; therefore, the researcher must be able to identify these factors.   
For instance, the structure of segregation will be shown to have contributed to the 
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Figure 1: An Integrative Model 
 
 
Tulsa riot, but other riots may have a different set of structural factors at bay, such as 
increased competition and interracial contact.  Likewise, the context of the riot will 
inevitably differ across many riots.  Triggering events will vary to a large extent, though 
there are certainly broader patterns, or classifications.  Finally, cultural factors will vary 
as well.  Attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, traditions, etc. are not static phenomena, but again 
there are patterns of culture and, furthermore, these are interconnected with structural and 
contextual factors.  Therefore, I argue this model is best suited for a grounded theory 
approach because important contributing factors will be emergent and complex.  A 
grounded theory approach assumes there is not only one answer to the particular issue.  In 
addition, I argue that seemingly contradictory findings between the aforementioned 
theoretical perspectives are actually somewhat compatible.  
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 A brief commentary on the origins of this model is necessary.  McGarrell & 
Castellano’s (1991) Integrative Conflict Model informs the research at hand.  While the 
model was clearly intended to serve the specific purpose of providing a heuristic device 
for the study of criminal law formation, it is argued that their model is flexible enough to 
be applied to this research with a few modifications.  A separate model from that offered 
by McGarrell & Castellano was adopted in order to provide a heuristic device more 
tailored to studying episodes of racial conflict.  In essence, their model suggests that law 
formation develops out of the interconnectedness of structural foundations, triggering 
events, and perceptions of crime.  In this research, I have adopted their conceptualizations 
of structural foundations and triggering events.  Galliher & Cross (1983) first noted that 
structural foundations include both structural and cultural factors.  These are the 
necessary factors for generating conflict and the response to that conflict.  Structural 
factors can include differences in compositions such as race, gender, religious groups, 
etc.  Another factor involves any economic or political inequality, as well as periods of 
economic instability, which can create conflict.  On the other hand, cultural factors 
include prevailing ideologies and more local contextual factors.  I have opted to separate 
these into two distinct categories for analytical purposes and will expand on these below.   
 Finally, triggering events involve the immediate factors that come into play to 
cause the consideration for changes in law.  These come from a variety of sources such as 
interest group activities, Supreme Court decisions, moral entrepreneurs, and media 
attention.  The media can play a particularly important role because of its ability to 
expand crime issues beyond policy and into the political arena.  Triggering events are 
largely interconnected with structural factors.  In addition to structural and cultural 
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factors as well as triggering events, I have added a fourth dimension to consider, which 
consists of micro- and macro- contextual factors, which can be considered local and 
national contexts.  It is now necessary to elaborate on each of these aspects. 
Structural Factors 
By structural factors, I merely refer to those aspects contributing to riots that 
derive from an orderly arrangement of elements.  Structure can refer to locations, roles, 
distributions, organizations, networks, and so on.  Previous research has identified several 
structural characteristics that contribute to riots.  The influences of each of these factors 
will be considered in this research.  For instance, the political process model argues that 
two structural conditions must be present.  First, there must be mobilizing structures, or 
collective means through which people act such as informal networks.  Second, a 
political opportunity structure provides favorable conditions for collective action.  This 
can emerge during periods of instability while grievances are high.  Smelser (1962) 
concurs by arguing that certain structural conditions can be conducive for collective 
behavior and that precipitating factors reflect a larger conflict stemming from structural 
strain.   
Others have provided a more specific account of the types of structural factors 
which are important.  For instance, Lieberson and Silverman (1965) have argued that 
occupational and municipal characteristics are important contributing factors to race riots.  
Therefore, I consider the major occupations held by whites and non-whites in 1921 Tulsa 
and their impacts on the riot.  I also consider the role of local municipal characteristics.  
Further, Olzak et al. (1996) and Myers (1997) contend that competition is an important 
characteristic.  Others suggest the non-white population is an important variable 
 34
(Spilerman 1971; Morgan & Clark 1973).  That is, urban cities with a large minority 
population are more likely to host race riots.  In addition to the aforementioned factors, I 
consider other structural factors, such as segregation, which contributed to the Tulsa riot 
and emerged during the stage of data analysis.   
Cultural Factors 
This stage of the study is unique because it examines an aspect of race riots that is 
often neglected within sociological approaches, or at the very least taken for granted.  
That is, this examines the possible contribution of cultural factors, or elements of 
ideology, beliefs, practices, etc. that impacted the Tulsa riot.  Previous theoretical models 
of riots have unexplainably given scant attention to these elements.  This could be 
because they were either deemed irrelevant or their impacts were merely assumed.  I 
contend much more consideration should be given to their role in episodes of racial 
conflict.  Simultaneously, it is important to understand how the notion of culture shaped 
and was shaped by the structural factors that contributed to the riot.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider how cultural issues such as race relations and ideology influenced 
and were influenced by structural factors such as segregation.  This stage of the analysis 
is largely qualitative and involves the examination of themes such as perceptions of race, 
prevailing beliefs and values, religious influences, and how these ideological components 
were put into practice.  An interrelated issue involves various contextual factors that 
contributed to the Tulsa race riot. 
Contextual Factors and Triggering Events 
 By contextual factors, I refer to those characteristics that contributed to particular 
riots which were embedded within a particular historical juncture and a particular 
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locality.  For instance, research suggests that the heavy migration of African Americans 
to Northern cities beginning in 1910 had at least some impact on the onset of a particular 
cluster of race riots throughout the same time period (Tuttle 1978).  Likewise, acts such 
as lynching, or a threat thereof, were considered to be immediate causes of race riots.  A 
key issue to address here is that contextual factors such as lynching were symbolic 
representations of cultural values and beliefs.  Therefore, to exclude them in an analysis 
of the causative factors of race riots is a serious mistake.  Another pertinent issue 
involves Jim Crow laws, not only in the structural sense of segregation, but the 
uniqueness of this structure in its historical context and how it was manifest in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma prior to and during 1921.  Similarly, it is imperative to consider the media’s 
portrayal of racial issues.  The media has a tremendous impact on shaping perceptions of 
race (Wilson and Gutierrez 1995).  In addition, I consider what role, if any, deprivation 
played in the onset of the riot. 
 Finally, this research considers the role of triggering events, also known as 
precipitating events.  These are the immediate and direct occurrences that lead to riots.  
Presumably, every race riot is ignited by some event, or set of events that are symbolic of 
a larger perceived injustice.  Lieberson and Silverman (1965) reported that riots typically 
start shortly after one was “wronged”, and these events most often consist of crimes.  
Historically, triggering events have become manifest in the form of lynchings, rapes, 
police brutality, crossing segregation boundaries, etc.  Therefore, this research examines 
their role and how they were embedded within larger cultural ideologies and structural 
characteristics.  Another relevant issue to address in the analysis at this stage is the 
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potential role that either emergent norms or even a breakdown of norms may have 
contributed to the riot during the preliminary stages of collective behavior. 
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4 
Responses and Framing 
 
 In this chapter, emphasis is placed on two issues: 1) the immediate and long-term 
responses to riots and 2) the “framing” of riots.  To do so, a discussion of community 
formation is presented, which is drawn from disaster research.  I begin by 
conceptualizing race riots as a form of disaster.  In turning to community formation, an 
examination of therapeutic and corrosive communities is provided.  In addition, this 
section explores individual and organizational responses that may stem from these 
opposing types of community formations.  Later, I address the social movement literature 
on framing and its role in riot response.  This is used to better understand the complexity 
of the discrepancy between short-term responses to the riot and the more current 
reparations movement.  These issues are not unrelated; indeed, the purpose of this stage 
of the research is to show how framing influences, and is influenced by, responses during 
episodes of civil disorder and after. 
Riot as Disaster 
 In order to progress, it is necessary first to offer a conceptualization of disaster 
and to consider the classification of riots as disasters.  Disaster research emerged around 
1950 (Quarantelli 1987, 1994; Dynes 1993; Kreps 1984).  Early disaster research focused 
on wartime situations.  Over the years, this research has made a rather large transition.  
Fritz (1961) was one of the first scholars to provide a formal definition of disaster.  He 
described it as “An event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a 
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relatively self-sufficient subdivision of society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such 
losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure of the society is 
prevented” (Fritz 1961: 655).  Fritz also holds that disasters are social constructions in 
that if an event is disruptive to only a few, then we have not a disaster, but rather an 
accident or a crisis.  Kreps (1984) added that disasters are social catalysts in their ability 
to produce collective reactions.  Moreover, disasters have four defining properties to 
consider: 1) length of forewarning; 2) magnitude of impact; 3) scope of impact; and 4) 
duration of impact. 
 This research will consider race riots to be disasters for several reasons.  First, a 
race riot is an event, situated in a specific time and place that often brings destruction to 
human life.  Most U.S. race riots have lasted between a day and a week and have resulted 
in at least some deaths.  This destruction not only causes danger to human life, but to the 
social structure of the community as well.  Second, collective responses and strategies to 
subside the riotous action characterize most race riots.  These collective responses 
involve not only the police, but various informal networks and organizations as well.  
Third, though race riots are far from being “natural”, there are significant properties that 
can be analyzed such as the length of forewarning (if any), the magnitude of impact, the 
scope of impact, and the duration of impact that further classify the event as a man-made 
disaster.   
Community Formations 
Following a catastrophic event, two types of community formations may emerge: 
therapeutic and corrosive.  Key characteristics of therapeutic communities are 
organization and adaptation.  Referring to recent terrorist attacks, Webb (2002: 91) noted 
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that, “At the community- organizational- and role-level analysis, social structure becomes 
flexible and adaptive, and we see those patterns emerging in response to the attacks of 
September 11.”  Moreover, commonly-held perceptions of disaster include the belief that 
when a disaster hits, a period of panic emerges.  However, these perceptions have been 
attacked by research suggesting otherwise (for example Quarantelli 1960; Fritz 1961; 
Dynes and Quarantelli 1968; Johnson 1987; Webb 2002).  A clear description of a 
therapeutic community was previously offered by Fritz (1961: 689), 
“The widespread sharing of danger, loss, and deprivation produces an 
intimate, primary group solidarity among the survivors, which overcomes 
social isolation and provides a channel for intimate communication and 
expression and a major source of physical and emotional support and 
reassurance.”  
Group formation and performance is a key dynamic in therapeutic communities.  
Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) discuss four types of groups found immediately after 
disasters.  Type I groups are those that have been previously established with fixed, 
regular tasks, such as the police.  Type II groups are organizations that expand, but still 
have fixed and regular tasks, such as the Red Cross.  These are usually voluntary groups.  
Type III groups are organizations that previously existed and extend their tasks to include 
non-routine work.  An example is a group of construction workers who help to clean up a 
disaster site.  Finally, Type IV groups are emergent groups that participate in nonregular 
tasks.  These groups often form immediately after disastrous events.  The group 
responsibilities described by Dynes and Quarantelli suggest that after natural disasters, 
the result typically involves the formation of a therapeutic community. 
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 While therapeutic communities are often linked to natural disasters such as 
earthquakes and tornadoes, corrosive communities are often linked to technological 
disasters that carry long-term consequences such as cases involving chemical exposure 
(Cuthbertson & Nigg 1987).  Several characteristics of corrosive communities have been 
identified including conflict among citizens and organizations, ambiguity toward the 
nature of the disaster (Cutherbertson & Nigg 1987), problems of litigation (Freudenburg 
1997; Picou, Marshall & Gill 2004), and the discrimination of those affected by the 
disaster (Couch & Kroll-Smith 1985; Bullard 1990).  The formation of corrosive 
communities is associated with disasters that require long-term responses.   
 This literature also generates several issues that are analyzed through this research 
such as 1) the types of primary groups responsible for action immediately following the 
riot, 2) the responsibilities of these groups, 3) the performance of these groups, 4) the 
formation of any emergent groups, 6) the evidence of a particular type of community 
formation, and 7) the implications that these findings might have in the larger context of 
riots. 
Framing 
 Early conceptualizations of disasters often suggested they occurred naturally; they 
were from the “hand of God.”  However, researchers such as Dove and Khan (1995) and 
Kreps (1984) have shown these disasters often have roots in the social structure and are 
thus man-made inasmuch as they are natural.  Dove and Khan researched the effects of a 
cyclone that struck Bangladesh in 1992, killing over 100,000 people.  They questioned 
whether the cyclone was the only responsible agent for resultant deaths.  They concluded 
that extreme poverty was a critical contributor as well.  By reviewing internal and 
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external reports, they discovered Bangladeshi officials reported these disasters as a 
natural part of their society and the result of a poor geography.  However, external 
sources showed the majority of the poor were forced to live on the coastline, which was 
the area in which most deaths occurred.  Thus, the ways in which disasters and their 
causes are framed have to be seriously considered.  In the sense that disasters are social 
constructions, they are no different than race riots.  Riots involve framing through a 
plethora of means.  The fact that at least three riots (Rosewood, Florida; Tulsa, 
Oklahoma; Wilmington, North Carolina) in the early part of the twentieth century have 
involved reparation movements decades later illustrates that riots are framed and that 
their interpretations can be temporally relative. 
 A key issue and development in social movement literature is the concept of 
framing, which has gone through introductions, applications, modifications, and critiques 
(e.g., Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986; 
Snow and Benford 1988; Snow and Benford 1992; Benford 1993; Noonan 1995; Swart 
1995; Mooney and Hunt 1996; Nepstad 1997; Steinberg 1998; Benford and Snow 2000).  
Actors within social movements frame, “or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant 
events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow and 
Benford 1988:198).  Put more poetically, Snow and Benford (1992:137) define a frame 
as “an interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by 
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of action in one’s present or past environment.”  Framing permits the 
formation of collective identity and the reinforcement of shared beliefs and values 
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(Klandermans 1988).  Further, framing points to collective injustices (Tarrow 1994).  
Though a variety of issues central to the framing process have been introduced, I lend 
attention to three core ideas: frame alignment, framing tasks, and frame resonance.  These 
issues are interconnected and are chosen in order to illustrate a clearer idea of how 
framing processes operate. 
Alignment 
 Snow et al (1986:464) note that a crucial aspect of frame construction and 
maintenance is the link between social movement organizations (SMOs) and the 
individual in terms of a congruency between values, beliefs, and goals, which is known 
as frame alignment.  Further, they propose the involvement of four particular alignment 
processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame 
transformation. 
 Frame bridging refers to “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but 
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Snow et al 
1986:467).  This involves the creation of a collective avenue whereby actors 
ideologically merge on a particular issue or set of issues.  This can be accomplished 
through a variety of means such as postal mail, email, telephone calls, etc.  For instance, 
Jenness (1995) has noted that gay and lesbian SMOs have disseminated statistical 
information concerning hate crimes through a variety of means including pamphlets, 
press kits, and flyers to show the extent to which hate crimes occur, which in turn has led 
to an increased awareness among recruits.  Frame bridging can be initiated by the group 
or organization itself (Gerhards and Rucht 1992), or simply by activists (Robnett 1996). 
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Second, frame amplification refers to “the clarification and invigoration of an 
interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events” (Snow et al 
1986:469).  Moreover, this process involves the amplification of both beliefs and values.  
Therefore, actors within the movement are actively engaged in construing values and 
beliefs that resonate with potential adherents.  Frame extension is a third type of 
alignment process.  Snow et al (1986:472) propose that movement organizations,  
“Extend the boundaries of its primary framework so as to encompass 
interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but 
of considerable salience to potential adherents.  In effect, the movement is 
attempting to enlarge its adherent pool by portraying its objectives or 
activities as attending to or being congruent with the values or interests of 
potential adherents.”  
Finally, frame transformation is a fourth type of alignment process.  Here, an entire new 
frame emerges that overlaps an already existing frame in order to garner support.  For 
instance, Noonan (1995) shows that frame transformation among women’s groups played 
a pivotal role in Chile’s transition to democracy.  Despite agenda differences among 
women’s human rights groups, survival organizations, and feminists, the demand for 
democracy gained ideological ascendancy and became a master frame.   
 Snow et al (1986) do not propose that each of these processes is involved in every 
frame construction.  Rather, they contend that “frame alignment, of one variety or 
another, is a necessary condition for movement participation, whatever its nature or 
intensity, and that it is typically an interactional accomplishment” (Snow et al 1986:467).  
Though I concur that frame alignment is a necessary condition, I further argue and will 
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demonstrate that these types can operate in conjunction with one another throughout the 
social movement.  Moreover, competing SMOs do not have to emerge in order for these 
alignment processes to proceed.   
Tasks 
 Another crucial process associated with framing relates to the tasks performed to 
construct and maintain a particular frame.  Specifically, Snow and Benford (1988:199-
204) propose that social movement actors must engage in diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational framing.  Diagnostic framing involves the establishment of blame or 
causality.  Here, the root of the problem is identified.  For instance, White (1999) argues 
in a study involving a feminist SMO, which particularly protested against rape, that the 
crux of the issue was attributed to the “misunderstanding of the seriousness of rape in the 
African American community.  This problem is due to an oversimplified analysis of 
oppression (racism as primary), the acceptance of rape myths, and other forms of sexism 
that silence rape survivors” (White 1999:85).   
 Prognostic framing refers to the identification of remedial strategies and tactics, or 
the solution to overcome the problem.  In addition, the “evil” is identified and a 
“common target” is located.  Snow and Benford (2000) contend that prognostic framing 
is a primary source of differentiation between SMOs.  They point to a case study by 
Haines (1996), which examines two movement wings within the U.S. anti-death penalty 
movement which adopt competing strategies to remedy the issues at hand.  A third task 
involves motivational tactics.  Motivational framing is the “call to arms” or “rationale for 
action”.  For instance, in a study on music in El Salvador, Almeida and Urbizagástegui 
(1999) note that efforts by the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional 
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(Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front – FMLN) were aimed largely at 
motivational tactics through music to create active participation in the protest of 
insurgency.  Further, Benford (1993) notes the effect of “vocabularies of motive,” which 
are described as accounts that persuade others to engage, or continue engaging, in 
collective action.   
Resonance 
 A rather widespread concern for scholars of social movements is the method in 
which actors transform into members of a particular movement.  In other words, what are 
some common strategies and tactics used to recruit members or garner support for social 
movements?  How do social movements “sell” their story?  Snow & Benford (1988:619) 
have called this “frame resonance,” or the ways in which SMOs attempt to legitimate 
their particular movement, or make their movement resonate with potential members.  In 
other words, to what degree does the framing “strike a responsive chord” with the 
audience?  They argue that two variables affect frame resonance: frame credibility and its 
relative salience. 
 Snow and Benford (2000) argue that the credibility of the frame is affected by 
three variables: frame consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of those who 
designed the frame.  First, the frame must be consistent; that is, narratives, claims and 
actions must line up with one another and be congruently patterned.  Second, empirical 
credibility points to the validity of frame.  That is, the frame must be testable and 
verifiable.  Observable evidence must be out there.  Third, the articulators of the frame 
should be credible sources.  Benford and Snow (2000:620) add, “It is a well-established 
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fact in the social psychology of communication that speakers who are regarded as more 
credible are generally more persuasive.” 
 A second variable of frame resonance is its salience.  Three variables affect this 
salience: centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity.  Centrality 
points to the requirement of congruency between the frame and the beliefs, values and 
actions of potential adherents.  Experiential commensurability refers to the degree to 
which the frame directly affects people.  Potential adherents must have experienced the 
phenomena that the frame centers around.  Finally, the frame must have narrative fidelity.  
The frame must “resonate with cultural narrations, that is, with the stories, myths, and 
folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural heritage and that thus function to 
inform events and experiences in the immediate present” (Snow and Benford 1988:210).  
Babb (1996) describes the importance of frame resonance and the implications for a lack 
thereof.  In a study on the U.S. Labor Movement from 1866-1886, she examined 
greenbackism and found that experiences of potential adherents to the labor movement 
did not line up with proffered frames, which was a critical detriment to the movement’s 
success.    
Moving beyond social movement literature and to an extension of the study at 
hand, I argue that framing was crucial long before the reparations movement began.  
Indeed, its framing beforehand may be largely to blame for the long discrepancy between 
the riot itself and when large-scale attempts for reparations were made.  I examine these 
frames, particularly those proffered by media, city officials and leaders, and black 
survivors.  Because the frames developed in 1921 are drastically divergent from those 
that exist today, a comparative approach is beneficial.  Therefore, I consider the 
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transformation of frames concerning the riot by examining current frames offered 
through both the media and riot survivors and representatives in the legal system.  I more 
fully elaborate on this idea in the next chapter.   
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5 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 This research involves a case study of the Tulsa race riot, 1921.  Stake (2003) 
identifies three case study varieties: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective.  This research, 
if categorized, is an instrumental case study.  That is, the Tulsa riot was selected for 
theoretical purposes.  Stake (2003:88) adds, “the case is often looked at in depth, its 
contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, but because this helps us pursue the 
external interests.”  The Tulsa riot was chosen because it represents an episode of 
collective behavior in which there exists a rather large compilation of historical data 
pertaining to the riot, and thus lends itself to a much richer contextual analysis.  However, 
there is a hint of an intrinsic approach as well.  That is, I am clearly interested in gaining 
a much deeper understanding of the Tulsa riot itself.  Therefore, there are both 
instrumental and intrinsic goals to this study.  Tellis (1997) notes that case studies can be 
advantageous if conducted properly through triangulation and following some general 
methodological procedures.   
 According to Yin (1994), a case study consists of four stages: (1) designing; (2) 
conducting; (3) developing an analytic strategy; and (4) reaching conclusions, offering 
recommendations, and providing implications of the research.  These steps are also 
indirectly addressed and corroborated in other discussions of case studies as well (Feagin, 
Orum & Sjoberg 1991; Yin 1993; Stake 1995, 2003; Tellis 1997).  The remainder of this 
chapter elaborates on the first three stages and illustrates how the specific case of the 
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Tulsa riot is examined through this procedure.  The fourth stage, which involves 
conclusions, recommendations and implications, is included at the end of this research. 
Stage 1: Designing the Case Study 
 A case study begins with the research design, which is “an action plan for getting 
from here to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be 
answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions” (Yin 
1994:19).  Yin further argues that some very important components to case study 
research designs should be considered.  These include research questions, units of 
analysis, and the role of theory.  A few specific research questions help guide the 
remainder of this study.  Though some subsets to these questions remain, the following 
could be considered the core inquiries: 
 1.  What factors contributed to the Tulsa race riot of 1921?  In other words, what   
      caused the riot? 
 
 2.  What were the various responses, both individually and organizationally, to the 
       riot?  How was the outcome of the riot impacted by these responses? 
 
3. How has the riot been framed in both a historical and contemporary 
perspective?  Are these frames markedly different?  If so, how?      
 
 The primary unit of analysis is the city of Tulsa itself.  That is, I examine 
numerous issues associated with the city, including but not limited to, municipal 
characteristics, the social climate as it related to issues of race, population characteristics, 
key leaders within the community (both the black and white), and key historical 
events/processes affecting the onset of the riot.   
 This research is inductive, at least in the first stage of the research, and largely 
consists of a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  In order to determine 
the causes of the Tulsa riot, I have argued for the use of an integrative approach that 
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incorporates structural and cultural factors, in which contextual factors and triggering 
events are also embedded.  However, this theory is not tested inasmuch as it emerged 
through the stage of data collection and analysis.  Some factors have been introduced in 
previous research, but in this project, various themes are synthesized with each other as 
well other emergent thematic categorizations. 
 A similar approach was taken to examine the organizational responses and 
resultant frames associated with the riot and the ensuing reparations movement.  Though 
I largely borrow from a social movement framing perspective, I explore how these factors 
have been made manifest in the movement to obtain reparations.  In addition, new themes 
emerged to help build upon the existing perspective. 
 Finally, another imperative step in designing the case study involves deciding on 
an appropriate methodological technique.  Primarily, this research involves content 
analysis.  Stated simply, this is an approach in which “the many words of the text are 
classified into much fewer content categories” (Weber 1990: 12).  One of the first steps is 
to define what is being recorded.  This research is concerned with themes, rather than 
merely words or sentences.  That is, emergent and recurring patterns concerning the 
causes and framing associated with the Tulsa riot were developed.  Next, I explain more 
fully how this research is content analyzed and conducted.   
Stage 2: Conducting Case Studies 
 Yin (1994) points to two key issues associated with conducting a case study: data 
collection and collecting evidence.  The investigator must require certain skills such as 
the ability to ask further questions, listening or observing intently, being flexible and 
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adaptive, having a deep understanding of the issues being studied, and lacking a biased 
perspective.   
 Data sources are imperative to case studies as well, preferably those that are 
triangulated with other sources (Yin 1994; Stake 1995, 2003).  This research relies 
primarily upon three types of primary and secondary sources of data for analysis.  These 
include data from the U.S. Census Bureau for the years 1910 and 1920, newspaper 
articles from 1920-21 and other archival records, and narratives.  
All of these sources are existing data and include numerical as well as qualitative 
data.  As such, the methodology of the study combines quantitative and qualitative 
analysis.  In addition, statistical analysis were performed throughout various stages of the 
research.  Rank (2004) contends that bridging both quantitative and qualitative methods 
is a useful technique that can enhance validity.  Taken separately, each method has 
particular strengths and weaknesses, but when united and blended in research, they can 
help overcome some of the weaknesses associated with using only one approach.  For 
instance, quantitative methods have the strength of generalizability by allowing for an 
understanding of a general population.  Reliability is also more easily developed in 
quantitative research, but these approaches don’t often deal well with contextual issues.  
On the other hand, qualitative methods allow for a deeper understanding of the 
phenomena being studied and validity is strengthened, though sometimes at the expense 
of reliability (Rank 2004).  Hence, by bridging the methods, the researcher is able to add 
validity, while still maintaining a certain level of reliability.  Because the use of these 
methods alternated throughout various stages of the research, I look more fully at the 
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different methods used within each level of analysis.  This includes not only the sources 
of data, but the purpose of those sources as well. 
Sources for Locating the Causes  
 The integrative model developed in this study calls for three levels of analysis.  
The first level, consisting of structural factors, first warrants the study of 1910 and 1920 
census records to determine structural characteristics such as the racial composition, 
gender composition, primary occupations, etc.  How these structures interact with one 
another is also very important.  The census records allowed for a more descriptive 
approach to show how these distributions painted a picture of what Tulsa looked like 
prior to the 1921 riot.  By examining both 1910 and 1920 records, it also allowed for an 
investigation of how these structures had changed throughout the decade.  In addition, 
1920 census microfilm was used.  This allows for not only the general investigation of 
those demographic characteristics available through the 1910 records, but it also 
permitted a more complete examination of particular families, housing units, occupations, 
and literacy rates existing in 1920.  Thus, the 1920 microfilm data allowed for a richer 
micro-level analysis.  Statistical analyses were performed on significant changes in the 
population characteristics of the population, such as race compositions, age structures, 
gender structures, employment structures, etc.   
 In addition to census records, newspapers sources were used to more deeply 
understand the cultural factors such as perceptions of race within Tulsa, city politics, and 
other attitudes towards social issues such as crime and class.  The primary method used 
for conducting this portion of research was content analysis.  Because the newspapers are 
used more for determining cultural and contextual aspects, the consideration of 
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interpreting text is imperative.  Hodder (1998) argues that the researcher must be aware 
of the context in which texts are created and should strive for internal and external 
coherence (findings do not contradict each other and findings relate to theory, 
respectively).   
Primarily, three sources were used during this stage.  These include the Tulsa 
Tribune, Tulsa Daily World and Tulsa Star.  The first two newspapers allowed for the 
examination of issues for the years 1920 and 1921, while the latter, Tulsa Star, was 
examined for the years 1914-1919.  Tulsa Tribune and Tulsa Daily World were both 
white-owned newspapers.  Tulsa Star was a black-owned newspaper that circulated 
weekly, but the office was destroyed during the riot, and therefore, records are limited.  
This newspaper was used in conjunction with the others in order to more deeply 
understand the black experience in everyday Tulsa life, which was not of much concern 
for white-owned papers.  Needless to say, there is a gap in this experience because issues 
of The Tulsa Star released just prior to the riot are not available.  However, it was quickly 
discovered during the initial analysis of this periodical that themes were rather recurrent 
and could be safely assumed to be themes one would have found in 1920 and 1921.  
Nevertheless, the bridging of quantitative data from the census records with qualitative 
data from the newspapers provides a much deeper understanding of the elements that 
caused the riot including structural, cultural, and contextual factors as well as triggering 
event(s). 
Finally, to address important contextual factors, it was more suitable to identify 
key events, people, and other historical processes important at both the national and local 
levels.  Therefore, this stage of the analysis included a review of secondary sources.  The 
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analysis begins with a discussion of Oklahoma and Tulsa history using these secondary 
sources.  However, local newspaper accounts were also consulted to better understand the 
intricacies of key processes.  Once again, a more qualitative approach was taken at this 
stage of the analysis.   
Sources for Responses and Framing 
 To examine the key events, processes, and actors involved in the response to the 
riot, a qualitative approach was used.  This stage of the analysis calls for examining not 
only the original responses and resultant frames immediately following the riot, but 
current framing strategies and techniques among riot survivors and representatives in 
order to investigate the ways in which the story of the riot has transformed.  To examine 
immediate responses and frames, the local newspapers, Tulsa Tribune and Tulsa World, 
were examined and compared.  In addition, other journalistic accounts outside of the city 
were referred to in order to obtain the general perception of the riot.  This approach 
enables a better understanding of the general individual and organizational responses to 
the riot.  Emergent themes associated with city government responses, state government 
responses, the framing of the riot at the local level, and individual actions and perceptions 
among both races were analyzed.  Also, narratives were reviewed which provide personal 
experiences associated with the riot from black survivors.  These narratives mostly came 
from Eddie Faye Gates (1997, 2003) and Parrish (1998), and include not only themes 
concerning experiences, but prevailing attitudes and perceptions following the riot as 
well.   
 In order to examine contemporary and extant cognitive schemas concerning the 
riot, I primarily focus on framing strategies and techniques used by the Tulsa race riot 
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survivors and their representatives.  To do this, I used several sources.  First, I considered 
the most current legal attempt made in order to obtain reparations, which involves a 
lawsuit filed with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Ogletree 2005).  In 
addition, local press coverage is examined, particularly the Tulsa World, 1997-2007.  The 
year 1997 was selected because it marked the beginning of an investigatory commission 
formed to study the riot, which eventually led to recommendations for reparations in 
2001, and soon thereafter, more formal attempts to garner reparations by the survivors 
themselves.   
Stage 3: Analytic Strategy 
 Data analysis consists of the examination and categorization of evidence (Tellis 
1997).  This research consists of a methodological approach known as grounded theory.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 204-205) state: 
“Grounded theory…is a necessary consequence of the naturalistic 
paradigm that posits multiple realities and makes transferability dependent 
on local contextual factors.  No a priori theory could anticipate the many 
realities that the inquirer will inevitably encounter in the field, nor 
encompass the many factors that make a difference at the micro (local) 
level”.   
Though the first stage of the analysis, determining the causes of the Tulsa riot, utilizes an 
integrative approach that involves previous theoretical frameworks, I have also argued 
that by themselves, these theories are inadequate in getting at the complexity of riots, 
particularly at the local level.  Therefore, this is a grounded theory approach because it 
integrates not only previous research, but also considers the effect of emergent themes in 
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the stage of data collection and analysis.  More accurately, themes emerged from the 
analysis and these were then compared and contrasted to alternative theoretical 
frameworks. 
A chief concern in using a ground theory approach consists of coding data, which 
entails constructing categories after locating emergent themes (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  
Within these categories, subcategories may also be necessary.  In addition, it is also 
imperative to offer the properties and dimensions of these categories.  A grounded theory 
approach can consist of two types of coding: axial and selective.  Axial coding involves 
making connections between a category and subcategories once open coding has been 
completed.  At a more abstract level of coding, selective coding integrates the emergent 
categories while deciding what categories are most important in explicating the storyline.  
Both axial and selective coding procedures were used. 
 Grounded theory approaches further consist of four stages: (1) comparing 
incidents in each category; (2) integrating categories and their properties; (3) delimiting 
the theory, in which some concepts can be ignored; and (4) writing the theory, or 
adequately communicating one’s findings.  The first phase of this project – determining 
what caused the Tulsa riot – resulted in the development of three particular and broad 
categories: contextual factors, structural factors, cultural factors, and triggering events.  
These categories and their associated themes are interrelated.  “Contextual factors” was 
developed as a category to discuss numerous themes relating to factors which contributed 
to the riot and embedded within the particular historical context.  These included riot 
diffusion, migration, segregation, lynching, and economic advancement of the Black 
community.   
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“Structural factors” is a category that includes several patterned features which 
had at least some role in the riot including population changes, population characteristics, 
and municipal functioning.   “Cultural factors” categorizes themes of the local media’s 
portrayal of race, and the manifestation of culture.  Here, specific attention is given to 
portrayals of blacks as socially and politically inferior, criminality-prone, and more 
generally, as a social problem to control.  Finally, “triggering events” categorizes the 
various factors which directly and immediately contributed to the riot.  
At times, these themes were consistent with theory, although some themes also 
emerged which have been somewhat neglected in previous sociological research, 
particularly issues at the more micro or local level.  Within these categories are 
interrelated themes.  The thematic categorizations emerged from the examination of the 
numerous sources listed above and include both quantitative and qualitative data, though 
they were largely derived through the latter.  
 The second stage of the analysis, which is concerned with the response stage of 
the riot as well as resultant frames, utilized a framing perspective to identify themes 
consistent within the theoretical framework.  While examining resultant frames 
immediately after the riot, I particularly gave attention to both diagnostic and prognostic 
framing, which refers to assessing the problem and determining viable solutions.  I look 
at both how the city of Tulsa framed the riot as well as how black survivors immediately 
responded to the riot from a prognostic standpoint.  However, when examining the more 
recent move for reparations, I offered a more holistic approach to the framing strategies 
and techniques used by Tulsa race riot survivors and representatives.  By adopting the 
categories previously theorized by various researchers, particularly Snow and Benford, I 
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located themes consistent with these categories.  This approach was used because a more 
formal movement for reparations has emerged in conjunction with less biased journalism, 
which has provided a better opportunity to understand its intricacies.  In addition, I have 
offered emergent themes not previously addressed in research.  Together, themes relating 
to frame transformation, frame bridging and extension, frame revolution, diagnostic and 
prognostic framing, and themes associated with frame resonance were identified.    
Reliability and Validity 
 Reliability involves the evaluation of the methods and techniques used in research 
(Denscombe 2002).  At each stage of the research, the methods primarily involve 
historical sociology.  The use of census records would appear to offer reliability due to its 
consistency of data.  However, these census records were produced in a manner that 
leaves some of the information illegible.  To deal with this issue, those variables affected 
were coded as such unless this information could be clearly understood through the 
patterns of other variables.  For instance, if the race of a child is illegible it is logical to 
assume that if the parents of the child were black, then the child was as well.   
More important is the reliability associated with using a content analysis 
approach.  Consistent classification is imperative to content analysis (Weber 1990).  That 
is, the coder must use the same classification of textual material throughout the analysis.  
To enhance reliability, Weber suggests the researcher should use an additional coder(s).  
Therefore, I have utilized the assistance of another coder to ensure the text is consistently 
coded throughout the stage of data analysis.  Furthermore, there are three types of 
reliability: stability, reproducibility, and accuracy.  That is, coding should be consistent, 
reproducible, and it should correspond to an established norm.  Because a grounded 
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theory approach was used, the categories developed were emergent.  Moreover, they 
emerged from using each type of reliability criteria.   
 Validity involves the data and analysis in the research.  Primary concerns are 
associated with whether the right questions have been asked and if the data and 
explanations are accurate (Denscombe 2002).  This investigation is strong in criterion-
related validity in that the findings should be strongly related to previous theoretical 
considerations.  For instance, in the stage of examining the causes of the Tulsa riot, I 
considered, in part, previous theoretical approaches such as political opportunity theory, 
competition theory, breakdown theories of collective behavior and so on.  Thus, while the 
categories developed were emergent, they were then integrated with previous theoretical 
frameworks.  In addition, while looking at framing processes, the categories developed 
were consistent with previous literature, though some were emergent.   
Finally, this research has content validity due to the range of possible meanings 
covered through the use of not only previous theoretical considerations, but also the 
triangulation of sources as well.  However, the use of historical documents also poses a 
challenge.  There is a high degree of interpretation involved in studying an era long 
passed.  One particularly interesting note relevant for the discussion at hand relates to the 
census data.  Many extant narratives from African American survivors of the riot 
provided certain background information such as parent’s name, place of residence prior 
to the riot, place of birth, occupation, etc.  The census data confirmed most of the stories, 
which adds much legitimacy to the statements proffered by the survivors.  Nevertheless, 
it was expected that through the triangulation of sources that interpretation is less 
problematic, or less questionable.   
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6 
Causes of the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 
 
 The cause of the Tulsa race riot can be attributed to much more than a 
precipitating factor.  An integrative approach allows for a much more complex and 
accurate understanding of these causative factors.  This chapter focuses on the causes by 
looking at the relationship between structure, culture, contextual factors, the portrayal of 
these issues in the media, the triggering events, and how each of these factors were 
interconnected and led to the Tulsa riot of 1921.  One suggestion offered in 1921 is 
similar to the conclusion reached at the end of this research, albeit summarized more 
succinctly:  
“The causes behind the Tulsa explosion and similar outbreaks of the last 
few years, editorial observers tell us, are the lynch-law spirit, peonage, 
race prejudice, economic rivalry between blacks and whites, radical 
propaganda, unemployment, corrupt politics, and the new negro spirit of 
self-assertion” (Literary Digest 1921: 7).   
I begin by discussing each of the primary factors associated with the riot separately and 
then move to a presentation of how these issues affected and were affected by each other.  
In so doing, these issues are incorporated within a model that integrates structural, 
cultural, and contextual factors as well as triggering events.  Finally, it is argued that 
these causes are not consistent with only one previous theoretical perspective, but several.
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It is important to provide a brief overview of Oklahoma’s unique origins of 
statehood so that the context and structure of the black population in Tulsa prior to the 
riot can be better understood.  Some key elements of this historical juncture include 
migration patterns, segregation, lynching, and economic advancement among the black 
community in Tulsa.  Before the local context of the riot is addressed however, it is 
necessary to discuss first the rash of riots throughout this era. 
A Diffusion of Riots 
 The Tulsa riot was only one of many that swept the nation throughout the time 
period.  Race riots broke out in Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraksa, Washington D.C., 
and numerous other places.  Many of these riots were caused by similar processes such as 
problems emerging as a result of segregation, heavily biased police responses to potential 
interracial conflicts, and threats of – and sometimes the administering of – lynching.  In 
addition, blacks increasingly fought back.  It is for a reason 1919 was known as the Red 
Summer.  As Lovelace (2000) explains, the fear of communism and racial matters were 
interconnected.            
“The real agitators…were the Bolsheviks, or Reds, especially those 
leading labor strikes.  Following the founding of the Communist party, 
individuals accused of being ‘Reds’ were rounded up and tried for sedition 
in secret court hearings and then deported.  Because the issues of race and 
economics are entwined, wherever you find one, you will find the other.  
The riots against African American economic progress and the deportation 
of those agitating for improvements in wages and working conditions, 
both became symbolized by the color red” (Lovelace 2000: 5).   
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According to Waskow (1966), the plethora of riots in 1919 marked the beginning of a 
new era in race relations as blacks increasingly fought to end their subordination.  It was 
also host to the emergence of more private collective violence, which in turn led to the 
use of “legitimate violence” by police to quell conflict.  However, this violence was most 
often one-sided; police responded according to white needs and desires.  Waskow (1966: 
8) summarized this idea: 
“In the postwar atmosphere of 1919, under the pressures of fear of radical 
social upheaval and in the consciousness that it actually possessed enough 
armed forces to effect its will, the federal government acted not only to 
monopolize violence but to use its monopoly to take one side in conflicts 
that had not yet become violent.” 
Although Tulsa’s episode of conflict occurred two years after this rash of riots, many 
characteristics presented above were contributing factors – including a biased police 
response.  
Local Contextual Factors 
Oklahoma gained official statehood in 1907.  Prior to this, the area was set aside 
by the federal government as “Indian Territory” (Johnson 1998).  However, Native 
Americans were not the only race present prior to statehood.  Duncan (1933) reported 
that blacks also lived in the area as slaves for various tribes including the Choctaws, 
Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, and Seminoles.  Then, in 1889, the Great Land Run 
sparked a rapid influx of whites (Lamar 1993).  The Land Run had significant and lasting 
implications for blacks.  Some of these implications were positive such as enhanced 
opportunities for blacks (Gates 1997), enhanced racial solidarity in the development of 
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all-black towns (Johnson 1998), and opportunities for entrepreneurial development 
seldom found among black populations throughout the Progressive Period (Butler 1991).  
But other consequences resembled those across the South.  Laws of segregation stripped 
away many human rights and were immediately established after statehood (Brophy 
2002).  Racist ideologies and actions left blacks in a subordinate state.  These issues are 
addressed next. 
Migration 
The state of Oklahoma was certainly affected by the larger migration patterns of 
blacks throughout the late part of the nineteenth century and thereafter.  Smallwood and 
Phillips (1993: 48-67) provide a larger account of black migration into Oklahoma.  When 
Benjamin Harrison declared the land once reserved for Indians open for settlement on 
April 22, 1889, blacks increasingly came to acquire property.  This settlement arrived 
from both the North and South.  As blacks arrived, propaganda was spread calling for 
more blacks to move into the area by leaders such as W.L. Eagleson, a black politician 
from Kansas.  By 1890, nearly 19,000 blacks lived in former Indian Territory.  Nearly 
one-third of this population settled in Logan County.  Within 10 years, this population 
had increased to approximately 37,000.  In 1910, the black population had skyrocketed to 
over 137,000 and by 1920, the figure was around 149,000.  The increase in the white 
population of Oklahoma was also dramatic.  Of primary importance for the population 
boom in the early 1900s was the discovery of oil and the increasing opportunities for fast 
money (Ellsworth 1982).   
An example of this population boom occurred in the city of Tulsa, which was 
incorporated in 1908.  Ellsworth (1982) noted that in 1900, the estimated population was 
 64
around 1,390.  By 1910, this figure had increased to 18,182 and in 1920 the population 
was 72,075.  Tulsa was never the site of oil production, but neighboring towns were.  In 
1904, a toll bridge was constructed across the Arkansas River that allowed for easier 
access to Red Fork, which supplied Oklahoma’s first heavy load of oil.  A year later, oil 
was struck in another neighboring town, Glen Pool, which at one point produced over 
2,000 barrels a day.  In 1907, Oklahoma led all states in oil production and Tulsa itself 
became promoted as the “Magic City” (Dunn 1979).  Tulsa became one the richest per-
capita cities in the United States nearly overnight (Ellsworth 1982).  But Tulsa was not 
confined to a white population; blacks also moved in and, as will be demonstrated later, 
developed a self-sustaining and thriving economic community.  Unfortunately, while 
economic opportunities were available to blacks, improved race relations were not.  
Segregation and discrimination were central features of the newly-formed state of 
Oklahoma. 
Segregation 
The issue of segregation could have been addressed as both a contextual or 
structural factor.  Certainly, legal segregation was historically situated, but its structure 
contributed to the manifestation of Tulsa’s Greenwood community.  Thus, it is addressed 
in both discussions, albeit with a different focus in each.  Even before Oklahoma became 
a state, blacks experienced the discrimination of Jim Crow laws beginning in the 1890’s 
(Smallwood 1981; Ellsworth 1982).  When Oklahoma gained statehood, these laws were 
some of the first steps taken by the legislature to ensure white supremacy.  Oklahoma 
even became the first state to segregate phone booths (Brophy 2002).  Prior to 1910, 
blacks still had the right to vote, but this was defeated as well.  The Grandfather Clause 
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that spread throughout many other states made its way to Oklahoma in 1910 and 
remained intact over the next five years.  This law called for general educational 
requirements in order to become eligible to vote unless the person’s grandfather had been 
a qualified voter in 1866, thus severely restricting the black vote (Smallwood 1981).  
However, this was overturned through Guinn v. United States in 1915 (Brophy 2002).  
But the legislature was determined to limit the black vote, so brief registration periods 
were constructed for those who were not already eligible (Ellsworth 1982).  Other rights 
limited by Jim Crow laws in Oklahoma included a prohibition of intermarriage, school 
segregation, and segregated public transportation (Smallwood 1981).  A.J. Smitherman, 
editor of the Tulsa Star, was baffled by the paradox of segregation blacks experienced in 
a country which they had fought and died for.  In one editorial, he stated: 
“American negro.  He is born into the world in a country almost wholly 
developed by the labor of his ancestors and passes through a life of 
ostracism which he is yet a supposed citizen, he is denied most of the 
rights of a citizen however, and when his country is engaged in deadly 
conflict on the battle field the Negro’s blood mingles freely with that of 
the white soldiers who give all that they have for the glory of their 
country.  When these black boys return home they find foreigners of 
almost every nationality enjoying the rights and freedom of the country for 
which they have fought and died, while they, their wives and children are 
denied, debarred and discriminated against in every manner.  Surely there 
is no greater patriot than the Negroes of America” (Negro Patriotism 
1914: 4). 
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Racist laws are a product of racist ideologies and this was the case in Oklahoma 
before, throughout, and beyond the Progressive Era.  Segregation was not enough for 
many whites – blacks in cities such as Lawton and Okmulgee were issued warnings by 
whites to leave their cities and to find their own place to live (Franklin 1966; Smallwood 
1981; Ellsworth 1982).    Some of them did; all-black towns were developed throughout 
the state during the mid-nineteenth century.  A few examples of these towns include Taft, 
Langston, Redbird, and possibly the most famous, Boley (O’Dell available online).  Over 
50 all-black towns existed at one point in time within Oklahoma.  The populations of 
these towns often had an intimidating effect on whites.  For instance, whites in Okfuskee 
County were determined to block the immigration of blacks because they feared the 
possible consequences of black self-support (O’Dell available online).  O’Dell noted that 
several of these all-black towns would ultimately fall apart because of their dependence 
on agriculture, primarily cotton, for economic gain.  The Great Depression served a 
devastating blow to these communities.  Despite the existence of these all-black towns, 
many blacks increasingly chose to dwell in other mixed, but still segregated towns.   
Lynching 
In the analysis of local newspapers, much front-page material consisted on 
lynching.  Racial violence was a significant force during the Progressive Era and 
permeated the state and southern region in general.  Between 1907 and 1921, thirty-two 
individuals were lynched in Oklahoma.  Of these, twenty-six were black (Franklin and 
Ellsworth 2001).  In addition to reporting most acts of lynching, the local papers often 
recounted episodes of lynching across the United States (for example, Mob Lynching 
1920; Carolina Negro 1920; Mob 1000 1920; Mob Lynches 1920; White Man 1921).  
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Moreover, press coverage of lynchings very often provided the gruesome details of the 
violence.  In one local lynching, the Tulsa World graphically rehashed the results (Mob 
Lynches 1920: 1): 
“Hundreds rushed over the prostrate form to get bits of the clothing.  The 
rope was cut into bits for souvenirs.  His trousers and shoes were torn into 
bits and the mob fairly fought over gruesome souvenirs…The body was 
carried to the car, late arrivals still grabbing for bits of clothing on the now 
almost nude form.”  
The fact that lynchings flourished throughout this period, coupled with their lack 
of prosecution, understandably contributed to the riot.  Lynching was part of a larger 
“culture of vigilantism” in which citizens took matters into their own hands, bypassing 
legitimate governmental procedures of due process.  The media perpetuated the portrayal 
of these events as a justified response to episodes of moral mishaps by blacks.  In 
addition to offering the details of the lynching through graphic and sarcastic details, by 
providing accounts of lynchings across the nation, the media sent the message to both 
blacks and whites that such events would be left unpunished.   
Such violence was not an unfamiliar event in the city of Tulsa either.  According 
to Ellsworth (1982), in October of 1917, the home of a wealthy oilman was bombed and 
the local papers immediately attributed the destruction to a group known as the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW).  Within two weeks, members of the party were found 
guilty.  While being transported by the police to the local jail, around 50 members of the 
Knights of Liberty halted the group and took them to a ravine in the western part of the 
city where seventeen members of the IWW were tied to a tree and whipped.  
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A similar event occurred in 1920 which illustrated the hostility among some 
whites when their way of life was threatened.  On August 21, three “bandits” shot a taxi 
driver and stole his cab (Victim May 1920).  Five days later, the driver died.  In the 
meantime, the Tulsa World continued to provide details of the crime and the three 
suspects (First Degree 1920).  Then, on August 27th, one of the two captured suspects 
was taken from the local jail to the outskirts of the city by a mob and was lynched (Mob 
Lynches 1920).  The Tulsa World also reported that pieces of the suspect’s clothing were 
distributed as souvenirs.  In addition, the local police followed the mob to the scene and 
served as spectators to the lynching (Probe Belton 1920).   
The events which directly led to the Tulsa riot were similar.  Black Tulsans 
gathered at the courthouse to protect a member of their own community accused of 
raping a white woman.  The justice system was perceived among many blacks to be 
inadequate in its capability of offering due process to a black man accused of such a 
crime.  For instance, one narrative offered after the riot stated,  
“This lack of confidence in law enforcement causes the Negro to feel that 
it is necessary to protect himself in most cases of threatened lynching.  If 
the party is a member of our group, he is most generally lynched, even 
though promised the assurance of protection by law” (Parrish 1998 [1923]: 
45). 
Despite social and political subordination, some black Tulsans thrived economically.  
This is evidenced through the ensuing discussion of “Black Wall Street” (Johnson 1998).   
The Black Community and Economic Advancement 
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Like other cities in the South, segregation had a dramatic impact on the social life 
of blacks in Oklahoma.  It forced many black communities in the state, including all-
black towns, to develop their own economic strategies.  Franklin (1980: 26) stated, 
“Segregation (and an economic detour) gave to the black professional a 
virtually protected market, but that represented a mixed blessing.  If they 
profited economically by avoiding intense competition from their white 
counterparts, which was not always the case, they also suffered from being 
unable to practice their professions in the best institutions and in the best 
atmosphere.” 
The structure and context of segregation thus served as both an advantage and 
detriment to entrepreneurialism.  Through maintaining the legal separation of race in 
sociality, businesses, education, residential areas, and so on, the structure of segregation 
encouraged initiative, but it also placed parameters.  Tulsa was no exception; it served as 
a model for economic achievement during the time period.  The Tulsa Star called for 
financial autonomy in order to avoid being dependent on a white community that Jim 
Crowed the black community: 
“Let us make employment for our own.  To do so means race 
independence and progress.  Not to do so means race dependence and 
wealth for others who would segregate you and covenant against you by 
means of your own money…Keep as much wealth as possible within the 
race.  The future will take care of itself” (Insure Race’s 1918: 4). 
Thus, segregation would assist in lessening dependency on the white community and the 
inevitable exploitation that would ensue.  Because agriculture had declined, blacks 
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increasingly moved to urban areas to find work and new ways of life.  The black 
community of Tulsa provided such a place.  In one of the only articles addressing this 
growth and casting the black community in a positive light, the Tulsa World reported, 
“Residents in the Negro section of the city have proven themselves no less enterprising 
than the white people.  In all of the Negro additions numerous dwellings are to be seen” 
(Fastest Growing 1920: 5).   
A plethora of narratives offer some insight as to why Tulsa lured many blacks into 
the city prior to 1920.  One of these reasons was the perception of increased financial 
opportunities for blacks.  Black entrepreneurship increased in each sector throughout the 
1907-1923 era.  Mabel Little (1992) wrote that she arrived from Boley, a famous all-
black town, because she wanted to earn enough money to go to Langston for a college 
education.  She noted the town was booming during this period and mentioned several 
businesses that flourished during this period such as Huff’s café, Tipton’s and Uncle 
Steve’s (barbecue), J.D. Mann’s grocery store, barbershops, theatres, medical and dental 
offices, dance halls, and two funeral parlors.  After arriving, she quickly met her future 
husband, Pressley.  Later, he opened a shoeshine parlor and she operated a beauty parlor.  
LaVerne Davis and Wilhelmina Guess Powell also contend that the financial 
opportunities were the prime motivators for their families to move into Tulsa (Gates 
1997).  W.D. Williams’ parents, John and Loula, moved into Tulsa prior to the rapid 
influx of other blacks.  The Williams’ were a model for other black families.  They were 
the first black family to own a car in Tulsa and John later owned and operated a garage, 
while Loula did the same with a confectionary.  Together, they also opened the 
Dreamland Theatre in 1914.  Other examples of economic achievement were J.B. 
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Stradford, the proprietor of the Stradford Hotel, along with O.W. and Emma Gurley, 
owners of the Gurley Building and several rental properties (Ellsworth 1982).   
Other narratives have been offered that describe some of the accumulated wealth 
within various households.  One of the recurrent themes in regard to the riot offered 
through various narratives related to personal losses incurred.  Muriel Mignon Lilly 
Cabell (Gates 2003: 60), referring to the destruction experienced by her family during the 
riot, recalled: “We lost everything, and we had some nice things including a Kimball 
piano, photographic equipment, tools, furnishings, one Ford sedan car, one Ford coupe 
car, and miscellaneous things”.  In his recollection of the Greenwood community and its 
subsequent destruction, James Durant stated,  
“Some of the finest black homes that were burned on the second day of the 
riot, June 1, 1921, were on Detroit Avenue.  The site of these elegant 
homes, magnificently furnished, so infuriated white mobsters that they 
smashed fine dishes, hacked up valuable pianos, victrolas, musical 
instruments, tore down fancy lace curtains from Europe” (Gates 2003: 66) 
The narratives of black Tulsans who survived the 1921 riot recalled not only the violence, 
but the prosperous conditions they experienced similar to those mentioned above.  
Moreover, these narratives provide a glimpse of the everyday life that could not be 
captured through census records.  For instance, Jimmie Lilly Franklin remembers, 
“My sisters…and I lived with our parents… in a beautiful home on North 
Elgin Street at the time of the Tulsa race riot.  It was a large home with 
four bedrooms, one bath, living room, dining room, and an office which 
was used by Papa, who was a photographer.  The house was furnished 
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with beautiful things, including a living room which had a Kimball piano, 
two sofas, two upholstered chairs, a setee, and four bedrooms full of oak 
furniture, and a dining room which contained an oak dining room set.  
Papa had a photographic studio, a darkroom, and several large cameras.  
Papa also had numerous household, carpentry, and plumbing tools which 
the mobsters took” (Gates 2003: 68) 
Table 1: Black Business Establishments in Tulsa, 1907, 1909-1914, and 1916-1923 
Establishments 07 09 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
Bath parlors        1        
Billiard Halls   2 1 3 3 3 6 5 4 5 6 9 4 6 
Cigars and tobacco       1 2    2    
Clothing, dry goods, 
racket, second-hand, 
music, furniture, 
paints and oils, shoes 
  1 1 3 1   2 2 2 1 2 2 2 
Confectionary, soft 
drinks 
  1 2 1 1 3 4 5 7 16 2 4 6 6 
Feed and Grain           1 1 1 1 1 
Furnished rooms, 
boarding and rooming 
houses 
3  2 3 2 1 4 3 1 6 5 9 11  3 
Garages, auto repair 
and filling stations 
      1 1 1   1 2  3 
Grocers, meat markets 3 3 2 5 8 10 9 7 18 11 21 23 41 34 31 
Hotels   1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 5 4 9 
Restaurants 1 1  5 3 13 17 15 11 17 21 20 30 29 19 
Theatres        1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Undertakers’ parlors        1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 
 
Sources: Ellsworth (1982) and 1920 Census 
 
Quantitative evidence supports these narratives.  Table 1 demonstrates the many 
businesses and trades that were offered throughout this period.  This has been offered 
previously by both Ellsworth (1982) and Butler (1991) and includes information retrieved 
from city directories for the years 1907, 1909-1914, and 1916-1923.  However, for the 
year 1920, I have adjusted the list of professionals and skilled crafts persons from the 
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census that were not included in the city directory for that year.  The adjusted figures are 
highlighted in bold.  
Table 2: Black Business Persons in Tulsa, 1907, 1909-1914, and 1916-1923 
 
Professionals 1907 09 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1923 
Dentists    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 
Druggists and 
medicine 
manufacturers 
 1   1 2 1 1 4 3 3 6 4 3 3 
Jewelers          1 1 1 1   
Lawyers 1 1 3 4 2 1 5 6 4 4 5 8 3 4 6 
Nurses            2  1  
Photographers           1 1 2 1 2 
Physicians and 
surgeons 
2 2 2 3 4 7 5 3 4 10 12 19 15 10 10 
Real estate, loans, 
and insurance 
agents 
2      1 2 4 4 3 6 6 4 5 
Private detectives            
 
  1 
Skilled Crafts 
Persons 
07 09 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
Bakers            8    
Blacksmiths  1    1 1 1 1 1 1 5  3 2 
Contractors, 
carpenters, builders, 
house and sign 
painters 
       1  2 7 48 5 6 2 
Dressmakers     1   1 1 3 4 7 2 1 1 
Milliners            1   1 
Plumbers          2  6 1   
Printers       1   1 1 1 1 1  
Shoemakers and 
shoe repairers 
  2 2  1 2 1 1 1 3 4 4 6 3 
Tailors    1  1 2 3 2 5 6 22 10 6 9 
Upholsterers            
 
1 1  
Service Workers 07 09 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
Barbers 1 2 2 4 3 3 5 7 6 10 11 36 12 11 13 
Cleaners, hatters, 
dyers, and pressers 
  2 2 1 6 4 4 7 10 7 13 5 5 6 
Hairdressers        1  3 3 14 3  1 
Launderers       1  1   291  2 1 
Shoe shiners       2 2 5 4 6 18 6 6 1 
Semi-skilled 
workers 
07 09 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
Expressmen and 
messengers 
      2 1    2    
Housemovers     1       1    
News dealers           1 1   1 
 
Source: Ellsworth (1982) and 1920 Census 
 
Table 2 demonstrates that the majority of the workers were employed primarily 
through professional and service sectors.  A close examination of the data suggests that 
the city directories containing information on black employment had rather grossly 
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underestimated several occupations.  Many of the occupations listed in the directory had 
fewer than 10 individuals, but when compared to the census data, the number of 
individuals working was much larger.  For instance, according to the city directory of 
1920, there were 6 contractors, carpenters, builders, and house and sign painters.  
However, the census lists 48 individuals with these occupations.  Thus, city directory 
figures underrepresented the economic conditions in the Greenwood area.  Also 
noteworthy is the steady increase of business establishments and professional/skilled 
craftsmen workers throughout the period.  For instance, in 1907, one lawyer was 
available.  By 1920, this number had increased to eight.  Similarly, there were two 
physicians/surgeons in 1907 compared to nineteen by 1920.  In 1907, there was one 
restaurant in Greenwood, compared to 30 dining options by 1921.  This rather dramatic 
increase is illustrative of the economic strides accompanying a rapid population growth. 
Previous work offered by White (1921, 909-10) and Ellsworth (1982) have shown 
that there were a few blacks in the Greenwood area who had accumulated fortunes over a 
brief period of time.  Specifically, White (1921) noted that two blacks were worth 
$150,000, two worth $100,000, three worth $50,000 and four valued at $25,000.  If this 
holds true, then it can be accurately argued that the fortunes of these people would rely 
upon more than the economic conditions than the tables suggest.  Nevertheless, these data 
demonstrate that blacks began to develop their own trades and skills that were distinct 
from the agricultural skills developed in neighboring communities. 
 Greenwood was largely portrayed as an area of poverty and social problems by 
the local white media.  Like any other city, the Greenwood section did include levels of 
poverty.  For instance, according to 1920 census records, nearly 10 percent of the black 
 75
population worked in the private family industry.  This typically involved black servants 
who worked for white households doing housecleaning, driving, cooking, etc.  
Presumably, these were not high-paying jobs.  In addition, nearly 1,000 workers were 
deemed “laborers” in the “general labor” industry, which included those individuals who 
found work as it was made available.  In all, the top five occupations held by blacks in 
Tulsa consisted of laborers, cooks, launderers, maids, and porters.  However, some 
research contends that even these jobs would have offered higher wages to blacks in 
Tulsa than in other cities due to the prosperity of the white community.  Madigan (2002: 
44) stated, 
“Oil money did flow into Greenwood through the wages that the rich 
whites paid their black domestic workers, wages previously unheard of in 
the South.  Maids received $20 to $25 a week; chauffeurs and gardeners, 
$15 to $20.  Porters and janitors also made good money; black shoeshine 
boys could pocket $10 a day.” 
Regardless, it was the economic success and value of land in which they inhabited 
that served as an economic threat.  The idea that economic success among blacks 
contributed to the riot was expressed shortly after when Walter White of the NAACP 
investigated the riot’s causes. 
“First, the Negro in Oklahoma has shared in the sudden prosperity that has 
come to many of his white brothers, and there are some colored men there 
who are wealthy.  This fact has caused a bitter resentment on the part of 
the lower order of whites, who feel that these colored men, members of an 
‘inferior race,’ are exceedingly presumptuous in achieving greater 
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economic prosperity than they who are members of a divinely ordered 
superior race” (White 1921: 909). 
Thus, there is little evidence to suggest the plausibility of deprivation arguments 
concerning the causes of the Tulsa riot.  Deprivation arguments assume that racial and 
ethnic minorities riot out of collective frustrations.  Certainly, poverty was 
disproportionately situated within the segregated Greenwood district, but contrary to 
beliefs immediately following the riot, the true “rioters” were not the African-American 
citizens of Greenwood.  Rather, the rioters consisted of white citizens who entered the 
black district to torch each household and business establishment.  The only evidence 
pointing to any sort of deprivation refers to the point at which blacks appeared at the 
courthouse armed, with the goal of protecting the black suspect accused of rape.  
However, this involved political deprivation.  That is, the armed groups of blacks 
believed the suspect would be lynched and that police procedures would not effectively 
protect him.  Nevertheless, the actual direction the riot would take indicts white rioters 
rather than those who appeared at the courthouse armed.  Indeed, it is more likely the 
Tulsa race riot was, in part, a product of a larger economic threat.  As Butler (1991:221-
222) states: 
“Afro-Americans in Tulsa were victims because of their own economic 
success.  When reports of the alleged assault by a black man on a white 
woman reached the white community, blacks had already been warned to 
leave…In short, blacks were considered to be an economic problem.  This 
helps to explain the fact that, when the riot started, white men and boys 
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from every part of the city armed themselves, raided hardware stores for 
arms and ammunition, and burned the Greenwood section to the ground.” 
As shown later, organizational responses to the riot also provide evidence of an economic 
threat.  For instance, within a week of the destruction resulting from the riot, plans were 
made to industrialize that portion of the city and to move black Tulsans to a place less 
desirable for white Tulsa businessmen.  Nevertheless, now that the more local, and 
somewhat national, context has been outlined, it is necessary to move into a discussion of 
the various structural conditions present in Tulsa. 
Structural Factors 
To introduce an analysis of the structural contributors to the riot, it is necessary to 
first address the demographic changes Tulsa experienced between 1910 and 1920, which 
was a rather dramatic population boom.  To do so, it is also useful to compare and 
contrast these changes with the larger state of Oklahoma throughout this period. 
Population Changes 
Table 3:  Population Change From 1910 to 1920 
 Year Total 
Population 
Total Black 
Population 
Percent Blacks 
Oklahoma 1910 1,657,155 137,612 8.30 
 1920 2,028,283 149,408 7.37 
Tulsa City 1910 18,182 1,959 10.77 
 1920 72,075 8,878 12.32 
 
Source: 1910 and 1920 U.S. Census 
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Table 3 illustrates the changes which occurred in the black population of 
Oklahoma throughout the decade (U.S. Bureau of Census 1910, 1920).  In 1910, blacks 
comprised 8.3 percent of the population in Oklahoma in 1910.  In the city of Tulsa, 
blacks constituted 10.8 percent of the city’s population.  By 1920, these figures took on a 
significant change.  The overall percentage of the black population in the state of 
Oklahoma decreased to 7.4 percent, but blacks living in Tulsa increased to 12.3 percent 
of the population.  The decrease in the overall black population throughout the decade 
can be explained by northern migration patterns (Gregory 2005), and the increase in the 
city of Tulsa can be explained, in part, by the migration of blacks to urban dwellings.    
In 1910, Tulsa County ranked sixteenth out of seventy-six Oklahoma counties in 
total black population.  By 1920, Tulsa County ranked third.   Further, in 1920 the city of 
Tulsa hosted a higher black population than any other city or town in the state.  Forty-
seven Oklahoma counties decreased in their overall black population throughout the ten-
year period.  Counties that did experience a growth in their black composition came 
nowhere near the population growth that Tulsa witnessed.  It is also important to note that 
those counties with the largest number and percentage of persons of African descent were 
located adjacent to the Tulsa area.  Table 4 shows Tulsa’s black population growth in 
comparison to the other fifteen counties that exceeded its population in 1910 (U.S. 
Bureau of Census 1910, 1920).  The table shows the total black population and 
percentage of population by county and by year.  Note that the percent change reflects the 
overall change of the black population relative to the total population of the county.     
This shift in population is explained, in part, by the pattern of overall migration of blacks 
to northern cities, but certainly part of the explanation might be intrastate migration.  The 
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all-black towns that had developed in the late nineteenth century in Oklahoma relied on 
agriculture as its chief source of economy.  During the latter part of the Progressive Era, 
particularly the years between 1910 and 1920, agricultural production began to decline 
(O’Dell available online).  This decline forced many blacks to seek alternative sources of 
income.  Tulsa offered opportunities for new migrants.   
Table 4: Population Growth or Decline for Selected Counties 1910 and 1920 
 
County Black 
Population 
in 1920 
Black 
Population 
in 1910 
Percent Change 
 
Muskogee 15310 16454 -6.9 
Oklahoma 11401 9227 +23.6 
Tulsa 10903 2754 +295.9 
Okmulgee 9791 5933 +63.4 
Okfuskee 8617 8073 +6.7 
Wagoner 7093 8761 -19.0 
McCurtain 6914 4576 +51.1 
Creek 6794 2778 +144.6 
Logan 6422 8196 -21.7 
McIntosh 5950 5283 +12.6 
Choctaw 5242 4303 +21.8 
Seminole 4517 4081 +10.7 
Carter 4257 4315 -1.3 
Pittsburg 4005 5244 -23.6 
Lincoln 3955 3945 +.3 
Sequoyah 2766 3178 -13 
 
Source: 1910 and 1920 U.S. Census 
 
Population Characteristics 
As previously mentioned, Tulsa was a distinct city in Oklahoma.  It boasted of 
one of the most rapid population growths in the state between 1910 and 1920 (Ellsworth 
1982).  Blacks were part of this growth.  Moreover, some unique population 
characteristics regarding age and sex existed in Tulsa that made the city distinct from the 
nation as a whole.   
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Table 5 shows the sex ratio of the entire country as it compares to the city of  
 
Tulsa (U.S. Bureau of Census 1920). 
 
Table 5: Comparative Sex Ratios, 1920 
 
 
Sex Ratio 
United States 
(all races) 
104.0 
Tulsa city 
(all races) 
109.3 
Whites in Tulsa 111.1 
Blacks in Tulsa 96.8 
 
Source: 1920 U.S. Census 
 
This table shows that the sex ratio was 104 males to every 100 females for the 
entire country.  But the sex ratio of the city of Tulsa, particularly in regard to the white 
population, is very high at over 111.  This can largely be explained by the attractiveness 
of the oil industry to young, white males.  Indeed, the age distribution of Tulsa in 1920 
shown in Table 6 further demonstrates this point (U.S. Bureau of Census 1920). 
Table 6 shows that a large percentage of those living in Tulsa in 1920 were 
relatively young, specifically males in the 25-34 cohort.  This would support Ellsworth’s 
(1982) contention that the migration into Tulsa just prior to 1920 brought large waves of 
young workers.  He also holds that the young, white population can be explained by the 
oil boom in surrounding areas, but this doesn’t explain the expansion of the young black 
population; other forces, such as racial solidarity and better opportunities explain the 
latter.  
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Table 6: Age Distribution by Race and Gender in Tulsa 1920 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 1920 U.S. Census 
 
Population characteristics have been shown in previous research to be important 
to riots.  In cities with virtually no minority population, a race riot is highly unlikely.  
However, cities with a larger proportion of minorities are at the very least more 
susceptible to experiencing racial disorders.  In Tulsa, population growth was both 
dramatic and rapid.  This fact alone however does not explain why the riot occurred.  It 
only helps to show that the city was more conducive to riots than others may have been.  
Later, I will discuss more fully the role of population structures and its contribution to the 
Tulsa riot.  Other factors contributed as well, including Tulsa’s municipality. 
Inadequate Municipal Functioning  
Many problems associated with Tulsa’s municipality prior to the riot, of which 
many were structurally-oriented, were present.  However, these problems were also 
Age White    
Male % 
White 
Female % 
Black 
Male % 
Black 
Female % 
0-5 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.2 
5-9 4.2 4.1 5.2 5.5 
10-14 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.3 
15-19 3.8 4.3 3.8 5.1 
20-24 5.9 6.3 5.3 7.2 
25-34 12.7 11.4 11.0 12.2 
35-44 8.8 6.7 8.7 7.5 
45-64 7.5 5.3 6.3 4.3 
65+ 1.2 1.1 .7 .7 
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affected by and affected the cultural context as well.  Moreover, they contributed to the 
riot.  For instance, in 1909, shortly after the city became incorporated, a commission 
system replaced the city’s aldermanic system.  Mitchell (1950: 47) described the new 
charter: 
“Under the charter a mayor, city auditor, and four commissioners were to 
be elective, with other administrative officials appointed by the board of 
commissioners.  The four commissioners and the mayor made up the 
commission board.  The mayor as a member of the board had all the 
rights, powers and duties that other members possessed.  He was 
designated as the chief executive officer of the city, which placed upon 
him the responsibility of seeing that all laws were enforced, franchises 
complied with, contracts executed, and appointive officers nominated” 
The goal of this charter was to implement a system in which nonpartisan politics would 
prevail.  However, inherent in a system in which one individual has overriding power is 
partisanship.  An ongoing debate in the city of Tulsa revolved around whether it should 
be an open or closed town.  In an open town, it was said that lawlessness could prevail in 
contrast to a closed town, which would be much less permitting of the vice that affected 
Tulsa (Mitchell 1950; Tracy 1996).  Recall again the structure of the population of Tulsa 
in 1920, which was abnormally male and young.  Many had moved to the city for 
instantaneous wealth.  With this migration came a “frontier culture.”  The issue of 
lawlessness proved to be a predominant theme in every election thereafter for some time.  
In 1916, a mayor was ousted for his role in permitting lax law enforcement.  Over the 
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years, several changes would be made to this system, but not until the mayor’s role would 
present major obstacles for black survivors in 1921, which is discussed at length later.     
Nevertheless, complaints of lawlessness persisted and many pointed to police 
corruption.  These allegations came to the forefront in Tulsa only two months before the 
riot.  In March of 1921, a ministerial alliance was formed to investigate possible lax law 
enforcement (Enforce Law 1921:1).  Days after this alliance was formed, suspiciously a 
reverend was beat up by a police officer after he was accused of driving recklessly and 
refused to admit that he was doing so (Attack Crum 1921:1).  Due to criticisms published 
in the newspapers from the editor and also from citizens, the Mayor and Police 
Commissioner of Tulsa requested that all complaints be voiced during a hearing which 
was held beginning on May 20, 1921 (No Proof 1921:1).   After many testimonies, they 
decided that there was no proof of corruption by city officials.  This was mostly because 
the people who claimed to have sufficient evidence did not want to testify under a city 
meeting, but rather in a court of law where legal actions were most likely to be taken (No 
Proof 1921:1).  Several examples of these criticisms emerged, however.  An editorial on 
May 18 argued that the police department often overlooked bootlegging, prostitution, and 
gambling (City Calls 1921:1).   
Nevertheless, this was an important aspect of Tulsa just prior to the riot.  The 
structure of the commission system provided the mayor and city commissioners with a 
great deal of authority in the city (Mitchell 1950).  It is not coincidental their 
investigation did not turn up evidence of lax law enforcement, because in essence, the 
administration was investigating itself.  This is why many refused to testify (No Proof 
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1921).  As will be shown, existent crime was attributed largely to the black community 
and whites who were engaging in interracial contact.   
In addition to the corrupt nature of the police prior to the riot, the police were 
certainly direct contributors to the magnitude of the riot as well through a variety of 
means.  First, they failed to implement any structural tactics to prevent such a large 
gathering at the courthouse.  Moreover, there were few steps taken to protect Rowland, 
the black man accused of assault.  However, evidence of steps which could be taken to 
protect a prisoner was provided by other cities’ approaches.  Importantly, the local media 
prior to the riot often included stories which referred to mob-related activity and how it 
could be quelled and averted.  For instance, in the neighboring town of Okmulgee nearly 
three months before the Tulsa riot, a potential lynching was prevented: 
“Deputy sheriffs, having in custody Charlie Clark and E.G. Wallace, 
negroes, accused of shooting to death William Deathridge, a white man, at 
Beggs last night, left Okmulgee this morning for another county, the name 
of which they refused to divulge, in order to prevent a possible lynching.” 
(Hide Black 1921). 
By taking the suspect out of the local jail and escorting him to another undisclosed site, 
the officers in Okmulgee potentially prevented a lynching.  Similar steps were taken in 
other places.  This is important because had the Tulsa police used similar measures to 
protect Rowland, arguably the riot would have not broken out.  Instead, the police merely 
moved Rowland from the local jail to the courthouse, which was thought to be safer.  
Without taking any other precautions, this strategy allowed the crowd gathered outside 
the courthouse to increase and intensify.  Moreover, it was hours before they sought any 
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outside assistance.  Shortly after the riot, one journalist attributed its direct cause to the 
inadequacy of police response to lynching threats: 
“In recent years there have been many lynchings in Oklahoma.  There has 
yet to be chronicled the instance where any individual has paid a legal 
penalty for participating in murder as part of a mob.  There is yet to be 
chronicled the first instance where in Oklahoma an officer has been 
removed from office for failure to perform his most primary duty of an 
officer, to wit; to protect the life of his prisoner from criminal violence” 
(Let Us 1921). 
Thus, a more systemic problem was perceived in which blacks throughout the South 
could not experience due process.   
A second way in which law enforcement practices fueled the riot was through the 
issuance of police commissions to white civilians during the riot without discretion.  It 
took orders from the Adjutant General for these commissions to be recalled.  The 
following article states the obvious – the commissions were not used for legal purposes, 
but rather for legitimation techniques, “Frequent reports have been received by officials 
that these special commission cards have been used for questionable purposes by the 
holders and that a few have even used them in violating the law under the pretense of 
enforcing it” (Commissions Invalid 1921: 3).  In addition to becoming deputized, guns 
were also administered to white civilians.  This is illustrated in a statement released by 
the Chief of Police, which requests that the guns be returned to the police.   
“‘These guns were only loaned,’ the chief explained, ‘and were loaned 
with the understanding they would be returned as soon as the situation had 
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improved to a point sufficient to justify their return.  We expected all the 
guns would be returned within two or three days after the city had become 
quiet, but there are yet a number of guns out’” (Guns Taken 1921: 2). 
A third way in which police practices contributed to the riot was through the 
active, but biased participation by law enforcement.  In its response to the riot, police 
officers did not seek to arrest white civilians involved in the disturbance.  In addition, 
violent social control methods were only employed against the black community.  The 
African Blood Brotherhood issued the following statement after the riot,  
“As at Washington, D.C. so at Tulsa, Okla.  The entire power of the State, 
all of the forces of capitalist ‘law and order,’ were turned upon the Negro 
in the process of ‘putting down’ race riots that were started and most 
actively prosecuted by white mobs.  All the deputies sworn in Tulsa 
authorities during the recent race riot were white.  All the prisoners taken 
up and sent into concentration camps by these deputies, the Tulsa city 
police and the Oklahoma State militia were colored.” (Commander, Tulsa 
Post, African American Blood Brotherhood 1921: 8). 
 Municipal characteristics and conditions contributed to the riot through a variety 
of ways.  This is consistent with the findings of Lieberson and Silverman (1965) that 
local governmental conditions are important in explaining riots.  For Tulsa, these 
conditions were explained in terms of the political structure where the mayor was given 
full authority over the city.  Though this structure was developed in order to prevent 
partisanship, it led to distinct interests being served, particularly in the mayoral position.  
Lawlessness prevailed in a young, booming city and this was in part due to laxity in law 
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enforcement.  Finally, at an even more micro-level, police failed to implement procedures 
in which a prisoner could be protected and decidedly fueled the violence which took 
place during the riot.  However, the tactics used were a reflection of the white hegemony 
that controlled social, cultural, political, and economic life for blacks.  That is, the 
practices were part of a larger systemic racism (Feagin 2006) that subordinated and 
oppressed blacks during this era. 
Cultural Factors 
 Two factors, or themes, point to the cultural underpinnings which contributed to 
the Tulsa riot: the local media portrayal of race and the manifestation of racial issues.  
Within these themes, both of which are related strictly to race relations, are aspects 
related to perceptions about race. 
Local Media’s Portrayal of Race 
The media’s portrayal of race continues to both mold and reinforce dominant ideologies 
and perceptions of race within society (Oliver and Fonash 2002).  One example of the 
racial frame in media accounts involves crime in the United States.  Media depictions 
disproportionately present crimes committed by African Americans, resulting in 
reinforced stereotypes among the public regarding serious crime and its most likely 
offenders (Entman 1992, 1994; Dixon & Linz 2000).  In turn, an increased level of fear 
and demands for social control among the public occurs as a result of these media efforts 
(Scheingold 1975; Surette 2007). 
Locally-owned and white Tulsa newspapers provide illustrative evidence that 
contemporary disparities in positive press coverage between racial groups have been 
persistent media phenomena for some time.  I also argue that negative portrayals of 
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Tulsans during the era under consideration were an abetting contributor to the riot by 
reinforcing dominant ideologies about issues pertaining to race, particularly stereotypes 
of race and crime.  Moreover, the portrayal of racial issues was a reflection of white 
superiority and racism, which is discussed further.  It is important to note, once again, 
that each of these factors are interconnected in their contribution to the Tulsa race riot.  
The Tulsa World and Tulsa Tribune seldom mentioned black life in Tulsa.  City and 
world politics, social events, sports, business, and sensationalism mixed within, 
comprised the papers, but rarely were the everyday lives and contributions of Black 
Tulsans an issue.  Though blacks made up over 12% of the city’s population and 
displayed glaring evidence of entrepreneurship, newspaper accounts offered primarily 
evidence of criminality and immorality among blacks.  To illustrate the ways in which 
blacks were portrayed, consider the following excerpt from an article published near 
Christmas, 1920.  Here, in an article titled, “Samaritans Want Genuine Poverty,” the 
author discussed holiday donations that could be given to needy families.  However, 
“Everybody always refuses to take a Christmas basket to a negro family, and nowadays 
the humane society workers do not even suggest such a move” (Samaritans Want 1920: 
20).  Thus, not only did whites not want to donate money to blacks, but organizations 
perceivably dissuaded anyone from doing so.  The title of this article is telling in itself; it 
suggests that black poverty was not genuine poverty and that any sort of interracial 
contact, even if it involved benevolence, should be discouraged – and once again, no 
reference is given to some of the wealth stored in the black community. 
Specifically, two themes emerged through examining the local portrayal of race:  
one of inferior intelligence and one of black proneness to criminality.  Often blended into 
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these articles was a heavy dose of sarcasm.  The following examples provide ample 
evidence of the discrepancy between perceptions and portrayals of race and reality. 
Intelligence. Several narratives included themes of better education for black children.  
Indeed, Ellsworth (1982) notes that the illiteracy rate among blacks in Tulsa county 
during 1920 was the second lowest in Oklahoma.  Robert Fairchild was one example of 
those who valued learning.  During the period under consideration, Robert was a teenager 
who graduated from Booker T. Washington High School.  Later, he would go on to 
attend and graduate from the University of Nebraska.  Ernestine Gibbs recalled that 
Booker T. Washington provided kids with an excellent education via principal Ellis 
Woods.  She also remembered that this education remained superior despite inadequate 
supplies, such as books (Gates 1997).  The belief that education for blacks was superior 
in Tulsa compared to other cities was not limited to Tulsans.  Carter Woodson (1933), the 
second black to graduate with a Ph.D. from Harvard, demanded that black Tulsa schools 
were among a select group of schools which adequately taught black history and its 
contributions.   
However, it should be recalled that state laws mandated segregated schooling.  
According to the Department of Education in Oklahoma, “The public schools of the state 
of Oklahoma shall be organized and maintained upon a complete plan of separation 
between the white and the colored races, with impartial facilities for both races” 
(Department of Education 1921: Section 280).  To make a clearer distinction, it added, 
“The term colored as used in the preceding section shall be construed to mean all persons 
of African descent who possess any quantum of negro blood, and the term of white shall 
include all other persons” (Department of Education 1921: 281).  Despite institutional 
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discrimination in the form of unequal educational materials (Gates 1997), which was 
contrary to the goals of the Department of Education, other data suggest that black 
Tulsans were indeed educated.  
Quantitative evidence supports the notion that education was of importance to the 
black community in Tulsa.  For instance, among blacks and mulattos in Tulsa who were 
ten years of age or older, nearly 95% could read and write in 1920.  This is compared to 
the national illiteracy rate among blacks ten years and older of 23%.  In addition, 89 % of 
those who were between the ages of 7 and 17 were enrolled in school (U.S. Bureau of 
Census 1920). 
There is little evidence, however, that a much larger, white portion of Tulsa was 
aware of educational achievements among black Tulsans.  In fact, newspaper accounts 
seemingly suggested otherwise.  A close examination of articles shows that most blacks 
were portrayed through their language to show a level of intellectual inferiority.  This can 
be seen through statements they included from blacks.  For instance, Tucker Gilbert, a 
black porter who worked at a local white bank was described as “an old fashioned ‘befo’ 
de wah’ darkie’” (Faithful Negro 1920: 9).  Or consider a quote provided from a black 
woman after being asked if she lost something: “Los’ somethin’?  You ax me has ah los’ 
somethin’?  Ah done los’ mah home and ah done los’ mah close, ‘ceptin these heah on 
mah back, and mah shoes is burned” (Negroes Gladly 1921:1).  Another example offers 
the interconnected portrayal of blacks as not only unintelligent and criminal, but people 
not to be taken seriously. 
“Commodore Polk, colored, residing at 207 N. Hartford av., is learning. 
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It is alleged that Commodore, early last night, belted his wife over the eye 
with his fist and his wife, retaliating, whaled him across the head with a 
pop bottle, cutting a slight gash from which blood trickled.  That was 
enough, Commodore called the ‘law’…‘I jus wants you gentlemen to 
make wife subside.’  Commodore said, when the officers arrived.  ‘She’s 
got rampageous in my house and is smacking me wif bottles.  All is wants 
is for you to make her cam herself…Here I is, 21 years old.  I’ve been 
somewhere.  What I mean is that I’ve been everywhere and I never been in 
no jail house.  Never in my life was I even threatened with a jail house.  
Then I gets myself married and the fust thing I knows Ise right here in the 
police station and the jailer is rattling the keys” (Negro Dead 1921: 2). 
This particular article suggests that the accused offender was “learning.”  The patriarchal 
character of a white racial frame provides a discourse full of stereotypes and organized 
beliefs which legitimizes the discrimination of blacks, even in contemporary society 
(Feagin 2006).  One such stereotype is the perception of a lack of intelligence among 
blacks, as is evidenced in the article above.  However, another recurrent stereotype 
associates blacks with crime. 
Crime.  Tulsa had a national reputation for its lawlessness.  In his nationwide 
study of prostitution, for example, Howard Brown Woolston in 1917 determined Tulsa to 
be one of forty cities most noted for vice (Woolston cited in Lemons 2004:23).  Prior to 
the riot, most portrayals of the segregated Black community were of a crime-infested 
district labeled as “Niggertown” or “Little Africa” by editors.  Indeed, a reader would be 
led to believe that crime was primarily a black problem.  The Tulsa Star, a local black 
 92
publication, was aware of this tendency and its ramifications.  In one article, a journalist 
stated, 
“The World-Sun have at least 500 subscribers among the Negroes of this 
city, which amounts to $3,900.00 per year.  Quite a fat sum to pay to be 
insulted and outraged at frequent intervals, eh?...A paper which will not 
publish their social news, but take a keen delight in publishing any article 
calculated to discredit the Negro in any way and to stir up prejudice 
against him” (Would Bar 1914: 1). 
When a crime was committed by a black, not only was their color identified, but their 
residential address was offered as well.  Though numerous studies have documented the 
persistence of crime within Tulsa prior to the riot, fewer studies have shown that crime 
was not attributed to all of Tulsa, but rather criminality was a problem among blacks.  
This problem was made manifest through not only the identification of one’s race (so 
long as the accused was black), but also through lengthier, and more sarcastic, portrayals 
of black crime.  Moreover, the portrayal of criminality among blacks was not restricted to 
the city of Tulsa.  Consider the following account of a fight that broke out in the 
neighboring city of Muskogee, Oklahoma between what at first appeared to be a white 
man against a black man: 
“Two revolver shots, only a few minutes apart, in the heart of the 
downtown district here today sent crowds of shoppers scattering helter 
skelter, and brought a large crowd of white men to police headquarters in 
the belief that a negro had attempted to take the life of a white man.  One 
of the negroes is of such fair skin that the crowd, thinking him white, 
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followed to headquarters.  When told that both men are negroes the throng 
dispersed” (Downtown Shooting 1921). 
Interracial violence warranted white concern, but when the discovery was made that the 
altercation involved black citizens, whites seemingly reacted to the violence as merely an 
everyday occurrence.  However, the white press in Tulsa often confined their presentation 
of crime to the city itself, most often involving blacks.  The following excerpt from Tulsa 
World is offered as an illustration. 
“Somebody’s perfectly good clothes are now hanging in the boiler room 
of the city police station, drying as peacefully as if they had been hung 
there by their owner, but they are not.  Marie Dasher, negro woman dope 
addict and familiar police character was picked up Thursday on West First 
street in possession of the clothes, which were very bulky and soaking 
wet, wrapped in a large sheet” (Negro Steals 1921). 
The woman accused of stealing the clothes was considered a drug addict and no stranger 
to the police.  This type of reporting continued and became more extreme in the days and 
months leading to the riot.  In fact, reporters at times attempted to add a touch of humor 
to instances of black crimes.  This humor was typically directed at black intelligence.  
Another article sarcastically points to a murder of another man: 
“Choc beer and a woman have surely brought Dock Adams, negro, a lot of 
trouble.  Anyway that is what he blames.  Dock was arraigned Monday 
before Justice H.J. Gray, on a charge of murder for the death of Fletcher 
Hamilton, another negro early Monday morning, when the two blacks 
engaged in an altercation over ‘love’” (Women and Beer 1921 ).   
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Black crime became of utmost importance shortly before rioting broke out.  Amidst an 
investigation into the local police and potential law enforcement laxity, city 
representatives focused on existing vice in the city, particularly the black community and 
their alleged involvement in prostitution rings.  One biased Judge argued that certain 
black porters were to blame, suggesting, “the negro porters be taken out and killed” (City 
Not 1921: 1).  In addition, immediately after the riot, many would contend that black 
crime ultimately caused the devastation to Greenwood.  One journalist stated, 
“It was in the sordid and neglected ‘Niggertown’ that the crooks found 
their hiding place.  It was a cesspool of crime.  There were the low 
brothels where the low whites mixed with the low blacks.  There were the 
dope venders and the dope consumers.  There crimes were plotted and loot 
hidden.  One city administration after another looked after the ‘uptown’ 
traffic regulations, saw to it that you did not park your auto where you 
should not, but let ‘Niggertown’ pretty much alone.  There, for months 
past, the bad ‘niggers,’ the silk-shirted parasites of society, had been 
collecting guns and munitions” (Comstock 1921: 460). 
This type of literature exemplifies the cruel nature of racism that existed within Tulsa 
before and after the riot.  The editor contends that police administration continuously 
turned a blind eye to black crime.  Numerous local editorials made a similar argument.  
However, Tulsa police clearly did not ignore crimes committed by blacks.  At a daily 
rate, local white papers repeatedly reported black crimes, enough to lead a reader to 
perceive that white crime was nonexistent.  
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 This is not to suggest that black crime itself was nonexistent.  Indeed, even the 
editor of Tulsa Star was concerned that black crime, which he perceived to be situated in 
the “East End” of the Greenwood community, caused harm to the Black race as a whole.  
In one editorial, he stated: 
“And so it continues, and the people of Tulsa, the best as well as the rest, 
are suffering because of the reputation thus being made.  We can do 
nothing to undo any of the murders and other crimes already committed, 
but there is much we can do to lower the percentage of crime by bettering 
our social conditions” (Another Murder 1918: 4). 
Despite Smitherman’s admittance that crime was a problem within the black community, 
he continually maintained that the white press in Tulsa dramatically overrepresented this 
crime.  It is also important to note a tendency for the local white press to blame white 
crime on black criminality.  That is, crimes committed by whites, (which were 
presumably the same as those committed by blacks) such as drug use, prostitution, 
bootlegging, and gambling were often attributed to the black section.  So when whites 
engaged in these activities, the local press had a tendency to blame it on race 
intermingling.  For example, one article pointed to the criminality of whites who dared to 
be entertained in the black neighborhood of a small Oklahoma town.  After the article 
points to the names of whites who appeared in court on charges of drunkenness and lewd 
conduct while at the home of a black citizen, the author offers the following details: 
“During police court this morning, Mayor Bone warned taxi drivers about 
driving white persons to the negro section.  He instructed the police to 
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shoot the tires off of every taxi found hauling white men or women to the 
negro district” (Cops Break 1920). 
The issues of crime portrayed in the local white papers served as an impetus to the riots.  
In both cases, blacks were perceived to be overstepping their boundaries.  Indeed, 
following the riots, a plethora of city of leaders would frame the riot as an uprising 
stemming from a set of blacks whose expectations for racial equality exceeded those 
acceptable to the white majority.  This will be amply evidenced later. 
The Manifestation of Culture 
Mary Jones Parrish (1998) recalled that she did not necessarily come to Tulsa 
because of the opportunities for economic advancement like many others did, but rather 
she arrived because she was aware of the great racial solidarity that existed in Tulsa 
among blacks.  Wilhelmina Guess Powell also recalls that her family decided to come to 
Tulsa not only because of the economic opportunities, but also to escape the racism of the 
deeper South.  LaVerne Davis also hoped that social conditions would be better (Gates 
1997).   
However, upon their arrival they discovered their hope for social equality could 
not be found in Tulsa.  Segregation and discrimination were complete in Tulsa.  With the 
usual segregation laws in place, other forms of institutional discrimination also took 
form.  Evidence of absolute deprivation, black schools received less supplies, and 
moreover, old supplies.  Black streets were not paved, so when it rained, people such as 
LaVerne Davis were forced to walk through piles of mud to get anywhere.  Blacks also 
experienced inadequate water and sanitation that whites enjoyed.   
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According to Wilson (1973: 32), racism is “an ideology of racial domination or 
exploitation that (1) incorporates beliefs in a particular race’s cultural and / or inherent 
biological inferiority and (2) uses such beliefs to justify and prescribe inferior or unequal 
treatment for that group.”  As noted before, old-fashioned racism flourished throughout 
the nation during the period under consideration.  In conjunction with old-fashioned 
racism, there is ample evidence of aversive, laissez-faire, and institutional racism existing 
in Tulsa prior to the riot.  Moreover, it certainly and directly contributed to the riot’s 
outbreak.  Two manifestations of this racism were discussed at length above.  First, the 
racism built into the social structure, which resulted in the development of Jim Crow 
laws, forced Greenwood to develop its own means of living.  Second, the media both 
portrayed and reinforced dominant ideologies about race through its vivid illustrations of 
blacks as uneducated and criminally-prone.  In addition, Tulsa society clearly frowned 
upon episodes of interracial contact.  In essence, white racism framed blacks in Tulsa as a 
social, political, and economical problem.   
An important emerging theme during this stage of the analysis was the attempts 
by white Tulsans to maintain the status quo, or the extant power differentials within the 
city.  For instance, articles suggested organizations, be they Ku Klux Klan-affiliated 
(KKK) or some other type of reactionary group, could form to prevent episodes of 
lawlessness.  One article, referring to a prior event involving the Knights of Liberty, 
illuminated not only on what these self-preserving organizations aimed to achieve, but 
also the types of people associated with them:  
“But it was generally rumored that they were prominent business men who 
decided their own brand of punishment in times of emergency.  Since then 
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no more has been heard of the secret organization, but a number of 
persons have said they believe it could be quickly called together if 
services were considered necessary for the preservation of patriotic 
harmony” (Tulsans Discuss 1921: 16). 
This article refers to one of the first recorded instances of lynching within Tulsa, 
which occurred in 1917.  Importantly, less than a week before the Tulsa riot would 
virtually destroy the African-American district, the editor of the Tulsa World laid aside 
the paper’s comical approach to race relations and inserted an article referring to the 
KKK.  Prior to the article, there had been no recent mention of the organization 
whatsoever.  However, the editor noted that recent periods of lawlessness may necessitate 
the organization’s formation, though he also noted that the KKK may have already been 
established in Tulsa.  He later added: 
“It would be easy enough to indulge in academics against such a 
movement, but strange enough, we feel a thrill of hope instead.  Possibly it 
will prove the balance wheel in every great community which will hold 
society together” (No Longer 1921). 
Similarly, the Tulsa Tribune addressed the possibility of the KKK the next day by noting 
“Tulsa has had a pretty exhibit of the sort of thing that brings such as the Ku-Klux into a 
town.  The purpose of any such organization might be as much to put the fear of God into 
the hearts of derelict officials as the fear of death into the hearts of criminals” (Not 
Courageous 1921).  Importantly, the editor noted that the actual presence of the KKK is 
not the issue at bay inasmuch as the effectiveness of police in upholding the dominant 
perception of morality. 
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 In sum, cultural factors of white superiority and privilege contributed to the riot in 
several ways.  Black citizens were portrayed through the media as being collectively 
uneducated and criminal while enough evidence refutes this picture.  Perceptions of white 
superiority flourished not only within the media, but ordinary citizens as well.  Moreover, 
racist organizations such as the Knights of Liberty existed to ensure white domination.  
As will be shown next, these issues came to the forefront when a black man was accused 
of assaulting a white woman.  The prevailing racist tone of Tulsa became much more 
overt overnight. 
Triggering Events of the Tulsa Race Riot 
The altercation between Dick Rowland and Sarah Page certainly served as a 
triggering event for the riot of May 31 and June 1.  This is also consistent with the 
findings of Lieberson and Silverman (1965: 887) who noted that precipitating events tend 
to be “highly charged violations of one racial group by the other.”  A closer review, 
however, shows that more insight may be gleaned into this triggering event.  The article 
produced in the Tulsa Tribune that reported this altercation had a much larger impact on 
triggering the advent of the riots.  The article, though non-existent today, was previously 
made available by Gill (1946: 22): 
“A negro delivery boy who gave his name to the public as ‘Diamond 
Dick’ but who has been identified as Dick Rowland, was arrested on 
South Greenwood avenue this morning by Officers Carmichael and Pack, 
charged with attempting to assault the 17-year-old white elevator girl in 
the Drexel building early yesterday…The girl said she noticed the negro a 
few minutes before the attempted assault looking up and down the hallway 
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on the third floor of the Drexel building as if to see if there was anyone in 
sight but thought nothing of it at the time.  A few minutes later he entered 
the elevator she claimed, and attacked her, scratching her hands and face 
and tearing her clothes…He was captured and identified this morning by 
both the girl and clerk, police say…Tenants of the Drexel building said the 
girl is an orphan who works as an elevator operator to pay her way 
through business college.” 
The finding that this inflammatory article served as a triggering event is consistent 
with previous research showing the importance of the social phenomena of rumors 
directly leading up to riots (Knopf 1975).  The explanation behind this argument lies 
behind the idea that Rowland was relieved of all charges, casting suspicion on the idea 
that Rowland was actually guilty.  However, as a result of the article published in the 
Tulsa Tribune, numerous citizens of Tulsa believed that Rowland had committed the 
crime.  For instance, following the riots, the Adjutant General blamed the events on “an 
insolent Negro, a hysterical girl, and a yellow journal reporter” (Officials Under 1921:1).  
While the Adjutant General placed the blame on three people, there was already prior 
evidence that the altercation between Rowland and Page had been misinterpreted.  One of 
the officers during the riots, Sheriff McCullough, stated that Page told the police that 
Rowland had merely grabbed her arm.  Rowland provided the same account (Story 
Attack 1921:14).  Nevertheless, the article had a tremendous impact on the perceptions of 
many citizens in regard to what events took place.  As a result, many people believed that 
an attempted sexual assault had taken place.   
 101 
Regardless, hundreds were gathered at the courthouse immediately following the 
periodical’s distribution (When Riot 1921:7).  As a protective measure, two different 
black groups, one of nearly 25, and later another estimated at 75, appeared at the 
courthouse armed in order to ensure Rowland would not be lynched.  These groups were 
perhaps composed of at least some members of the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB), 
an organization which aimed to advance the black race through preaching self-protection 
at all costs.  Responding to reports that some of its members were responsible for the riot, 
the organization stated:  “As to whether the Tulsa Post of the A.B.B. had any part in 
organizing and directing Negro defense once the riot had started – that is another matter, 
and something that the Oklahoma authorities can find out for themselves” (Commander, 
Tulsa Post, African Blood Brotherhood 1921: 10). 
Because the ABB also stated that a chapter did indeed exist at the time of the riot, 
a brief note should be presented on their core principles and characteristics.  With 
headquarters located in New York, the ABB was:  
“founded in response to the bloody race riots during the Red Summer of 
1919 and drew its name from the symbolic blood sharing ceremony 
performed by some African tribes.  The ABB credo, largely manifested 
from articles within the Crusader, merged black nationalism with 
Marxism, espousing workers’ rights, black liberation, and anti-
imperialism.  Perhaps its most distinctive characteristic was its support for 
armed black self-defense.” (Parascandola 2006: 7). 
The armed black men, whether ABB-affiliated or part of a smaller informal network, 
served as a mobilizing structure, or a collective unit engaged in protest responding to a 
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perceived injustice.  Importantly, the editor of the Tulsa Star urged black Tulsans to make 
such a response if threats of lynching occurred.  One article, referring to a lynching that 
had recently occurred in Eufaula, Oklahoma, pointed to the importance of upholding law 
and order even if it meant gathering arms to do so: 
“We believe in upholding the law at all times even if to do so means 
death…These lynchings are getting to be far too common in Oklahoma, 
and something must be done to stop it.  There is no hope of protection 
from the State authorities, and the federal government is silent on the 
question.  Women and children have been lynched in Oklahoma, to say 
nothing of the scores of negro men who have been murdered, and not a 
single man of these infernal mobs has been punished – nor have the 
officers of the law made any effort to suppress the crime or punish the 
criminals.  Negro men, it’s up to us to act.  We must have justice!  Let us 
respect the law and enforce it at the point of guns…If bloodshed must 
come, let us welcome it, and die if need be in defense of the law and 
justice” (Another Man 1914: 1). 
In summary, this research emphasizes three different triggering events involved in 
the Tulsa Race Riots of 1921.  First, the altercation between Page and Rowland impacted 
what would lead to the race riot.  Second, the article produced that reported this 
altercation triggered hundreds of people, both black and white, to gather at the 
courthouse.  Third, the gathering of these people had the final triggering effect of 
producing the gunshot that led to the beginning of the riots (When Riot 1921:7).  Perhaps 
the article that presented the Rowland-Page encounter actually had a much larger impact 
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on triggering the riots.  Without such an article and its dangerous implications, there 
would have presumably been no such gathering of large groups of citizens.   
Nevertheless, these triggering events are very similar to those that have 
precipitated many other riots throughout U.S. history (Lieberson and Silverman 1965).  
Moreover, these were symbolic of much larger issues of race surrounding this era.  It 
should be recalled that attacks against white women by black men often served as an 
impetus for lynching, which went unpunished throughout this period.  Though the alleged 
crime might not elicit feelings of lynching among many today, there are certainly crimes 
that occur today that leave many individuals demanding the death penalty, or at least 
harsh penalties.  Some of these crimes include torturous forms of murders and various 
crimes against children.  In 1921, one of those crimes was an assault upon a white woman 
by African-American man.  
Conclusion: An Integration of the Factors Contributing to the Riot 
 Clearly, the Tulsa race riot was not caused by some simplistic issue such as the 
reported rape of a white woman by a black man.  Nor was it caused solely by the 
presence of other riots across the nation throughout the era.  Rather, it was caused by a 
complex set of forces that must be understood in relation to one another.  Furthermore, 
structural and cultural characteristics fueled the riot.  This summary is aimed towards 
such a synthesis.  Figure 2 provides an integrative model with the particular factors which 
were important contributors to the Tulsa riot of 1921.  It is important to note that this 
model attempts to grasp the interconnectedness of structures, culture, context, and 
triggering events.   
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Figure 2: Key Characteristics of an Integrative Approach 
 
 
 
 First, structural conditions within Tulsa were conducive to riotous conditions, of 
which there is ample evidence.  The structure of segregation, rooted in white racism and 
premises of superiority, created a complete separation of the races.  Segregation served to 
isolate the Greenwood community, which encouraged black entrepreneurialism.  Rapid 
strides were made, which resulted in largely successful business ventures.  This, in turn, 
created animosity between the black community and local white Tulsa business leaders, 
who desired the land on which blacks resided.  This land was situated in a place white 
Tulsa deemed desirable for industrial purposes, largely because of its precise location.  
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Many would presumably argue that segregation cannot be considered an underlying 
cause of race riots because it could be found everywhere throughout this period.  
However, I maintain that segregation certainly did play a role, but not merely in an 
isolated fashion.  Rather, it is how the issue of segregation was made manifest and was 
interconnected to the issues below that contributed most strongly to the riot.   
 Municipal characteristics also contributed to the riot as both an underlying and 
immediate factor.  First, a city charter drafted during Tulsa’s inception ruled that power 
in the city lied disproportionately in the hands of the mayor.  Second, police and 
municipal characteristics fueled the onset of the riot.  Though previous research has 
focused on issues such as police composition, I have focused more on their practices.  At 
a general level, the police had consistently been accused of, at the very least, negligence 
and, at the very most, corruption prior to the riot.  This was largely evidenced by the 
state’s involvement in an investigation into accusations of lax law enforcement of 
bootlegging, prostitution, and gambling – problems which were, for the most part, 
attributed to the black community.  At a more immediate level, the Tulsa police had no 
structural procedures in place to ensure the protection of its prisoners.   This was 
evidenced by the fact that a lynching occurred nearly nine months prior to the riot in the 
city of Tulsa.  Moreover, their response to the growing mob hours before the riot actually 
started was less than adequate.  Neighboring cities provided examples of procedures to 
follow for not only escorting prisoners away from mob threats, but also ways in which 
mobs could be dispersed.  Instead, they merely waited patiently as if the white mob 
would evacuate on its own.  At the riot’s onset, police were further detrimental to the 
black community through the issuance of commissions to white civilians, essentially 
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deputizing untrained and unsympathetic individuals.  This, in turn, led to the immediate 
destruction of the Greenwood community.   
 Population characteristics arguably impacted the riot as well, which is consistent 
with previous theoretical statements concerning riots.  Many of the aforementioned 
studies argue that the proportion of blacks in a given community can influence the 
probability of the riot.  By 1920, Tulsa’s blacks comprised over 12% of the city’s 
population, or close to 9,000 people.  This increase was rather dramatic considering that 
fewer than 2,000 resided in the city in 1910.  Moreover, this entire population was 
segregated.  Arguably, this led to a strong sense of solidarity among members of each 
community.  Numerous narratives (Parrish 1998; Gates 2003) pointed to the strong social 
bonds between black members of the Greenwood community.  Thus, when an immediate 
threat of lynching occurred involving one of its own members, black Tulsans were 
unwilling to be bystanders.  Without the political opportunity among blacks to receive 
due process procedures, members of the black community were aware that his protection 
was in their hands.  Thus, a network of individuals, perhaps members of the ABB, 
formed to ensure their brother’s safety.  Without these population characteristics, the 
severity of the riot simply would have been lessened.  Moreover, it was argued that in 
towns with a lesser proportion of blacks, social control mechanisms could be 
strengthened (Race Riot 1921).   
 Cultural factors also contributed to the Tulsa riot of 1921, particularly ideological 
factors such as white racism and a tendency toward vigilantism.  Perceptions of white 
superiority overtly flourished across the nation throughout the era.  Structural conditions 
conducive to race riots were merely a reflection of this racism.  Black Tulsans were 
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expected to know their place, which was designated as a small section in the northern part 
of the city.  This racism was particularly evident in local journalistic portrayals of racial 
issues, most notably crime.  Sarcastic and overrepresented accounts of criminal offenses 
committed by blacks were made available to the local public daily.  Arguably, many 
white Tulsans knew nothing about the everyday social activities of their black neighbors 
due to strictly enforced segregation laws and discouraged interracial contact.  Therefore, 
the only understanding they had of black life would presumably result from what they 
read in the local papers, which had cast anything linked to black a social problem.  
Moreover, as illustrated later, whites immediately and predominately blamed Tulsa 
blacks for not only the riot itself, but also for their demands of social equality and justice. 
 The riot also needs to be understood in terms of how it was historically situated.  
Perhaps there was a diffusion factor.  Indeed, the Tulsa riot was only one of many that 
swept the nation throughout the time period.  Riots broke out in Arkansas, Illinois, 
Missouri, Nebraksa, Washington D.C., and numerous other places.  Many of these riots 
were caused, in part, by similar processes such as problems emerging as a result of 
segregation, heavily biased police responses to potential interracial conflicts, and threats 
of – and sometimes the administration of – lynching.  In addition, blacks increasingly 
fought back.   
This era also bore witness to the first World War, which resulted in thousands of 
blacks, including many in Tulsa, fighting for their country, while their country would not 
fight for them.  Indeed, much evidence suggests that the original groups of armed blacks 
gathered at the courthouse, were also war veterans (Ellsworth 1982; Gates 2003).  The 
link between being a war veteran and also a member of the ABB should not be 
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considered coincidental.  The United States sought to fight human atrocities abroad and 
the war was also a measure of self-protection.  Similarly, the ABB preached self-
protection through arms if necessary in order to prevent racial injustices at home.   
 Finally, there were triggering, or precipitating, events which directly contributed 
to the riot.  These processes were merely microcosms of the larger underlying factors 
discussed at length above.  The accused assault of a white woman by a black man served 
as a blatant symbol – a black man had not only overstepped the boundaries of his white 
counterparts, but he was a disgrace to white purity.  The response was unsurprisingly 
symbolic of a vigilante culture, in which white citizens intended to ensure the accused 
black man was dealt with harshly.  Moreover, it cannot be ignored the media’s influence 
on the circumstances surrounding the riot.  A story informed the uninformed white 
community in an exaggerated fashion of the events that had supposedly occurred.  Like 
many episodes of collective behavior, rumors quickly permeated Tulsa followed by the 
ensuing formation of a massive white mob.  Black men arrived at the courthouse because 
they were well aware of the possibility of a lynching.  Furthermore, they came with guns 
as a result of an increased encouragement among black leaders to do whatever was 
necessary to prevent racial injustices.  Even this was not enough to cause the riot, though.  
The immediate tactics of the police, or lack thereof, permitted the mob to swell, burst, 
and destroy the Greenwood community. 
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7 
Resultant Frames and Responses 
 
 Despite ample evidence which suggests black citizens were victims of a pogrom, 
immediately after the riot most accounts, especially local Tulsa reports, framed the riot as 
a “negro uprising.”  A key theme emerging from this analysis is that the group of armed 
black men were viewed as militants and blamed for the riot.  The interpretation of the riot 
as an uprising is evidenced in a formal report prepared by Charles Bates of the Oklahoma 
National Guard prepared for the Chief of the Militia Bureau (Special Report 1921).  In 
this report, Bates refers to the event as an “uprising” and provides a justification: “The 
word uprising is used everywhere instead of riot because the colored element seemed to 
have prepared for some time an effort of this kin to maintain and assert their alleged 
rights.”  The diagnostic frames extended by media and city officials and leaders 
immediately after the riot are offered.  Later, I illustrate how local responses, or 
prognostic solutions, were merely a reflection of diagnostic claims. 
Diagnostic Frames 
 Two sets of actors were largely blamed for the riot within Tulsa: militant blacks 
and inadequate local law enforcement.  However, a closer analysis suggests that claims of 
lax law enforcement were centered on the Black community.   
Black Militancy 
By most accounts, the entire black population was not blamed for the riot, but 
rather a group of black individuals who arrived armed at the courthouse (Black Agitators 
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1921).  It was the ideology of these “militant” individuals which concerned white leaders 
of Tulsa.  A critical actor associated with the riot was the city mayor, who situated the 
blame on the shoulders of militant blacks.  Evans offered an extensive assessment of his 
diagnosis of the riot: 
“Let the blame for this negro uprising lie right where it belongs – on those 
armed negroes and their followers who started this trouble and who 
instigated it and any persons who seek to put half the blame on the white 
people are wrong and should be told so in no uncertain language…It is the 
judgment of many wise heads in Tulsa, based upon observation of a 
number of years, that this uprising was inevitable.  If that be true and this 
judgment had to come upon us, then I say it was good generalship to let 
the destruction come to that section where the trouble was hatched up, put 
in motion and where it had its inception” (Riot Statement 1921: 7). 
Actors such as the mayor felt the black district had its victims, but overall, because the 
riot was inevitable, at least it happened in the “problem area.” Others made similar 
comments.  The Police Commissioner added: 
“Chief Gustafson and I have made several trips into ‘Little Africa,’ and on 
those occasions we told the Negroes that if there ever was an uprising we 
would hold them responsible.  We told them to talk down the possibility of 
a race riot.  They promised they would, and they said they would hold 
weekly meetings to try to dissuade the other Negroes from ever taking part 
in a race riot if it should be started” (Warning Against 1921:11).  
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The mayor added that there were black victims, but that in warfare, the innocent suffer 
with the guilty.  Importantly, the mayor not only described the violence as an uprising, 
but was relieved that the destruction occurred in the Black community.  This proffered 
frame considers the white reaction to militancy as natural and necessary.  Referring to 
gun battles during the riot, one national guardsman reported, “The most visible point 
from which enemy shots came was the tower of the new brick negro church” (Lt. Col. 
L.J.F. Rooney to Adjutant General Charles F. Barrett, 3 June 1921).  Thus, the Black 
community was considered the “enemy.”  Clearly, a frame had been articulated which 
exonerated whites.   
 Other city leaders offered similar assessments.  The Police Commissioner stated, 
“Chief Gustafson and I have made several trips into ‘Little Africa,’ and on those 
occasions we told the Negroes that if there ever was an uprising we would hold them 
responsible” (Warning Against 1921:11).  Thus, blacks were warned of such an 
impending frame.   
Perhaps the most detrimental diagnosis came from the jury formed to study the 
causes of the riot.  The verdict provides a telling account of opinions within the city of 
Tulsa regarding who was to blame for the riot:  “We find that the recent race riot was the 
direct result of an effort on the part of a certain group of colored men who appeared at the 
courthouse on the night of May 31, 1921, for the purpose of protecting one Dick 
Rowland” (Grand Jury 1921: 1).  The actions of the armed blacks were thus interpreted 
by law enforcement, city officials and the grand jury as an “uprising.”   
However, to more fully understand the context of such accusations, it is important 
to draw upon the larger white racial frame which characterized U.S. society, particularly 
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during the Jim Crow Era.  Despite the elimination of slavery, blacks endured legal 
segregation, which, for whites, was employed to maintain racial purity and superiority 
(Feagin 2006).  The emergence of Black Nationalist groups can be explained as a 
response to such subordination.  These groups, in turn, were viewed as a threat to such 
goals.  Thus, African Americans had to be socially controlled.  Segregation, lynchings, 
and pogroms were such mechanisms.  Indeed, white Tulsans borrowed from some of the 
core facets of the white racial frame.  The violence on May 31, 1921 was not merely 
about a potential lynching, but about perceptions of social injustice in the minds of a 
subordinated group, and the subsequent social control thereof.  The grand jury 
emphasized the demands for equality among blacks,   
“We find that certain propaganda and more or less agitation had been 
going on among the colored population for some time.  This agitation 
resulted in the accumulation of firearms among the people and the storage 
of ammunition, all of which was accumulative in the minds of the negro 
which led them as a people to believe in equal rights, social equality and 
their ability to demand the same” (Grand Jury 1921: 1). 
White religious leaders concurred (Vice Bottom 1921).  Many blamed the same 
small group of blacks and pointed to the larger problem of demanding equality.  Bishop 
Mouzon of Boston Avenue Methodist Church, referring to desires among blacks for 
equality, told his congregation, “This is something that the negroes should be told very 
plainly.  Steps toward social equality are the worst possible thing for the negro man and 
the white thing” (Causes Riots 1921: 1).  Later, the finger was pointed more directly at 
W.E.B. Dubois.  In an era characterized by the emergence of Black Nationalism, Dubois 
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extended an ideology aimed at improving the status of blacks through self-sufficient 
means.  One minister, referring to a recent visit from Dubois just prior to the riot, stated, 
“I knew at the time that Dubois was here, and I very keenly regret now, in view of the 
events of the past week, that I did not take advantage of that knowledge, and inquire into 
the purpose of his visit” (Causes Riot 1921: 1).  Nevertheless, blacks were not the only 
group blamed for the riot.  Local accounts also pointed the finger at the Tulsa police 
department for their entire handling of the events occurring throughout the riotous period.   
Inept Law Enforcement 
Several practices directly contributed to the progression of the riot including 
deputizing white civilians, administering guns to whites, and few efforts made to disperse 
the white mob in the first place.  In fact, the sheriff in charge of protecting the prisoner 
admitted to taking a nap while the mob intensified (End Argonaut 1921).  Many 
individuals saw the police department as a direct problem associated with the riot rather 
than a solution.  One editorial stated: “It is a fundamental fact that the agencies of 
government broke down in Tulsa very early in the proceedings Tuesday evening and 
either stood helpless when needed most or deliberately joined in the mob enterprise” 
(Martial Law 1921: 4).  However, a white racial frame contributed to the white definition 
of the situation.  Many whites believed that the role of law enforcement perpetuated the 
underlying problems in Tulsa, which they believed was situated in the Black district.  
More specifically, similar to the white racial frame that stereotypes blacks as 
disproportionately criminal, media accounts in 1921 Tulsa provide insight into the long 
history this frame has endured.  One editor wrote, 
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“Gambling and bootlegging and hi-jacking have gone on little molested.  
And some of the time protected by the police.  This has developed a 
lawless element.  Lack of law enforcement has permitted a bad negro 
element to develop a disrespect both for county and city officials and a 
lack of fear of all officers of the law” (End Argonaut 1921: 10). 
The grand jury also blamed “little molested” vice.  However, in an article aptly 
titled, “Grand Jury Blames Negroes for Race Rioting: Whites Clearly Exonerated,” the 
jury concluded that lax law enforcement could be attributed to a few black police 
officers.  They offered, 
“We find that police protection with negro policemen as officers has been 
inefficient; that violations of law have been condoned and while raids 
have been made and also some arrests, the same offense by the same 
offenders was repeated almost immediately.  We therefore recommend 
that ‘colored town’ be policed by white officers” (Grand Jury 1921: 8). 
Victim Frames 
Another important theme which emerged from the analysis of local newspapers 
was that black survivors agreed with the diagnostic assessment which framed the riot as a 
militant uprising.  For instance, the Tulsa World included a quote from William Cherry, a 
black “refugee”:  “That fellow Dick Rowland should have been taken out to the edge of 
town and horsewhipped, tarred and feathered.  He is one of the same bunch that started 
this awful thing” (When Riot 1921: 7).  Similarly, another article included interviews 
with several of the survivors then being held at detention camps.  One woman stated, 
“We’ll all come clear in the judgment day.  That niggah that done wrong, he cain’t come 
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clear” (Negroes Gladly 1921: 7).  Likewise, Barney Cleaver, a black officer, was quoted: 
“I am going to do everything I can to bring the negroes responsible for the outrage to the 
bars of justice.  They caused me to lose everything that I have been years in accumulating 
and I intend to get them” (Negro Deputy 1921: 1).  Though local media portrayals 
suggested the larger majority of blacks agreed with the jury and other local leaders as to 
the riot’s causative factors, it is logical to assume that these quotes were not 
representative of the larger black community; after all, their entire district was torched to 
the ground by whites. 
A review of the narratives cited in Parrish (1998) suggests there was indeed 
disagreement among blacks with the media over the issue of blame.  Importantly, these 
narratives were given to Parrish immediately after the riot.  The book was originally 
published in 1923 and then republished in 1998.  Some narratives argued that the black 
community had been mischaracterized as radical.  M.D. Russell stated, “We do not wish 
to be radical, as a large number of white dailies and pulpits have been placing in blame.  
They have based their argument on racial equality, which the Negro has never hoped for 
nor worked for” (Parrish 1998: 59).  This is an important statement because it symbolizes 
the fear and subordination black citizens experienced during the era.  Laws, attitudes, 
practices, and acceptable lifestyles were in line with white hegemony.  Therefore, this 
statement should be understood within the context it was presented, which was only 
decades after slavery, the very epitome of hegemonic power, had been abolished.   
 Many narratives emphasized the unjust administration of law enforcement.  R.T. 
Bridgewater, a prominent physician within the Black community, argued that the riot 
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resulted from a lack of police protection and an unwillingness to offer due process.  He 
stated: 
“Causes: Race prejudices and the national lack of confidence in law 
enforcement.  This lack of confidence in law enforcement causes the 
Negro to feel that it is necessary to protect himself in most cases of 
threatened lynching.  If the party is a member of our group, he is most 
generally lynched, even though promised the assurance of protection by 
law” (Parrish 1998: 45). 
C. L. Netherland, a barber shop owner at the time agreed that the lack of police protection 
leading up to the riot fueled its onset:  “I feel that corrupt politics is the cause of the 
whole affair, for if the authorities had taken the proper steps in time the whole matter 
could have been prevented” (Parrish 1998: 57).   
E.A. Loupe, a plumber in Tulsa at the time, argued that even after the inept police 
response, the local National Guard unit made matters worse for black citizens:  “Most 
people, like myself, stayed in their homes, expecting momentarily to be given protection 
by the Home Guards or State Troops, but instead of protection by the Home Guards they 
(the Home Guards) joined in with the hoodlums in shooting at good citizens’ homes” 
(Parrish 1998: 49).  Similarly, A.J. Newman stated, “But instead of protection, it was 
seemingly a matter of destroy and abolish all Negro businesses and nice residences” 
(Parrish 1998: 54). 
These frames are important because they call attention to biased police response 
in favor of whites, which the local media had ultimately neglected to assess.  Instead, the 
media focused on police actions in terms failure to enforce the law prior the riot.  In 
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addition, local media members argued that lax law enforcement was only present within 
the patrolling of the black community.  Prognostic assessments within the local white 
community were a reflection of the blame it had placed on black shoulders. 
Immediate Responses and Prognostic Solutions 
A universal response to episodes of collective behavior is the operation of social 
control (Smelser 1962).  Following the arrival of National Guard units from Oklahoma 
City, numerous social control mechanisms were put into place, which effectively served 
to subjugate black victims.  Ample evidence exists to suggest the black community was 
considered a social problem to remedy.  One exception to this pattern involved the work 
of the Red Cross, whose work during the riot is the focus of a book previously offered by 
Hower (1993).  However, an array of local organizational responses served to be merely a 
microcosm of the forces contributing to the riot in the first place.  In addition, local 
reactions provide strong evidence of the attempt by white Tulsa leaders to maintain the 
status quo, particularly in the form of white superiority.  One particular response involved 
the placement of black survivors in detention camps. 
Detention Camps 
Throughout the course of the riot, black rioters were arrested and placed into 
various detention camps where they were held until given permission by White 
authorities to leave (5000 Negro 1921).  Two camps, located at McNulty Park and 
Convention Hall in North Tulsa, reportedly held nearly six thousand blacks (Martial Law 
1921).  By June 2, the four thousand who remained interned were moved to the 
fairgrounds (Ellsworth 1982).  Some of the arrests were far from traditional.  One article 
stated, 
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“Six blacks roped together in a line, were hauled into Convention Hall 
early this morning by Leo Irish, motorcycle officer, who held up and 
corralled the band on the outskirts of the North Greenwood district.  He 
tied them together with a line and led them a hot pace behind his 
motorcycle on the return trip” (Blacks Tied 1921: 2). 
At detention camps, blacks were placed into forced labor.  After declaring martial law 
and issuing a number of policies and procedures, the Adjutant General issued Field Order 
No. 4, which stated, 
“All the able-bodied negro men remaining in detention camp at the Fair 
Grounds and other places in the city of Tulsa will be required to render 
such service and perform such labor as is required by the military 
commission and the Red Cross in making the proper sanitary provisions 
for the care of the refugees.  Able-bodied women, not having the care of 
children, will also be required to perform such service as may be required 
by the care of the refugees” (Barrett 1941: 216).   
Thus, the Red Cross and black civilians were held responsible for the relief work which 
was made necessary by whites.  Another order, issued by Mayor Evans warned of 
impending arrests as a result of refusing to work, “All men who have no jobs and who 
refuse to work will be arrested as vagrants” (Must Work 1921: 1). 
The length of stay at detention camps varied, with nearly four hundred and fifty 
citizens remaining one week after the riot.  By the second week, all detainees were 
released.  Lengths of stay varied because blacks could leave the premises only if vouched 
for by white employers.  After their release, blacks were issued green cards, which had 
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“to be signed by the employer or employers of such negroes to show that such negroes 
are employed either temporarily or permanently” (All Blacks 1921: 9).  However, the 
release of interned blacks did not come without disapproval.  One minister stated, 
“Negroes held in the detention camps have been turned loose 
indiscriminately.  There is a general feeling in the city that Tulsa is no 
safer tonight than it was Tuesday night.  Without proper police protection, 
with the negroes resentful over the loss of their property, there is an 
increasingly apprehensive feeling that something else is going to happen” 
(Warning Against 1921: 1). 
Thus, despite many claims that blacks were held in detention camps for their own 
protection, some were fearful of black retaliation.  With no possessions, no place to live, 
and newly-formed bans on gun possession among blacks, whites were somehow still 
concerned for their own safety.  Decisions were rapidly made concerning what to do, at 
least with the destroyed land. 
Competing Prognoses 
Following the riot, two suggested solutions regarding the devastated area were 
debated: rebuilding the destroyed community or moving the black population elsewhere 
to make way for an industrial zone.  Before I turn to these opposing options, however, it 
is important to note an important commonality and area of agreement among city leaders 
and officials: the desire to maintain the status quo.  Some were concerned with the future 
behavior of the black community, which was framed as a problem before the riot.  
Following the disorder, the editor of the Tulsa World stressed a few “bad niggers” had to 
be dealt with.  Referring to the law-abiding blacks of the community, he wrote, “The time 
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is here for the colored citizens of the city, who work for their living and render a 
substantial service to the community, to band themselves together for their own 
protection against this element of non-working, worthless Negroes” (Bad Niggers 1921: 
4).  In another editorial, more specific suggestions were offered: 
“School yourselves to a becoming attitude in your associations.  Exert 
yourselves to bring to justice criminals and law violators of your own 
color.  Be respectful.  You have leaders of your own race who are safe and 
sane.  Hear them.  Avoid the boastful intriguers who prate to you of race 
equality.  There has never been such a thing in the history of the world.  
Nor will there ever be” (Which Is 1921: 4). 
Another example of this general theme was made manifest in a description of an 
inter-racial committee, which was formed immediately after the riot.  Its mission: 
“To recognize and by its conduct, exemplify, a superior dominant white 
citizenship in government, and in all the social relations of life, and while 
observing with gratification the remarkable progress of the American 
negro since slavery, to recognize also his immaturity as a race and the 
hopeful possibilities and opportunities for development…” (Good May 
1921: 7). 
Indeed, the chief concern among city leaders related to the black community.  
Some believed that it should be redeemed through public assistance and city-wide efforts 
to help the community rebuild.  The Public Welfare Board, which was formed by private 
citizens after the riot upon the advice of the Adjutant General, unanimously decided to 
assist the destitute.  The organization stated, “It is the committee’s contention that those 
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who lost their homes lost virtually all they possessed, and as a result were the worst 
sufferers from the mob’s depredations” (Citizens Help 1921: 8).  One member, a former 
Tulsa mayor, stated,  
“Tulsa can only redeem herself from the country-wide shame and 
humiliation in which she is today plunged by complete restitution of the 
destroyed black belt.  The rest of the United States must know that the real 
citizenship of Tulsa weeps at this unspeakable crime and will make good 
the damage, so far as it can be done, to the last penny” (Tulsa Race 1921: 
647). 
Another editor concurred with calls for restitution by stating that relief efforts should, at 
the least, consist of private financial contributions.  Despite offering a markedly different 
opinion a few days later, the immediate concern for the black community was evident: 
“The innocent homeless must be sheltered and fed and cared for.  That is 
not merely a today and a tomorrow duty…If this cannot be done through 
public funds it must be done by private contributions of those who love 
justice and who love the fair name of our fair city and who take pride in 
our growing prosperity and who are jealous of our growing greatness.  
This is not only Tulsa’s chance, but Tulsa’s duty to itself – and TULSA 
WILL” (Tulsa Will 1921: 5). 
This Tulsa Tribune editorial argued that the larger white community of Tulsa should 
assist Greenwood in rebuilding; however, within a few days, the same editor based his 
opinion on his idea that the white community now had to portray concretely their 
superiority over the black race:  “It is a cross that must be shouldered willingly and 
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heroically.  This restitution, not because of affectionate regard for the colored man, but 
because of an honorable and intense regard for the white race whose boast of superiority 
must now be justified by concrete acts” (Disgrace Tulsa 1921: 4).  However, not 
everyone supported the idea of rebuilding.  The editor of the Tulsa Tribune stated,  
“Such a district as the old ‘Niggertown’ must never be allowed in Tulsa 
again.  It was a cesspool of iniquity and corruption…In this old 
‘Niggertown’ were a lot of bad niggers and a bad nigger is the lowest 
thing that walks on two feet.  Give a bad nigger his booze and his dope 
and a gun and he thinks he can shoot up the world.  And all these things 
were to be found in ‘Niggertown’ – booze, dope, bad niggers and guns” (It 
Must 1921: 8). 
The racism in this statement is powerful, regardless of the context in which it was issued.  
The editorial points once again to the perception among many of Greenwood as a crime-
infested district which did not deserve a second chance.  However, other responses 
reflected aims of institutional discrimination.   
The mayor soon disbanded the Public Welfare Board, which had called for 
rebuilding and restitution and replaced it with a Reconstruction Committee.  The mayor 
clearly recognized the economic impact an industrial zone would have for white Tulsa.  
The Reconstruction Committee quickly suggested the development of an industrial zone, 
including a union depot.  Several organizations offered their own details of turning the 
torched area into an industrial zone.  Though these plans may have developed solely out 
of economic interests, there was also a desire for a more expanded version of segregation 
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between the races.  In justifying these decisions, city leaders pointed to the economic and 
social benefits,  
“We do this for the reason that the area is accessible to all railroads at a 
small cost …We believe by converting this area into property for the 
purposes suggested, that it would add much to our city both from a 
business and a civic standpoint.  You must realize that the first impression 
of men entering our city is lasting” (Plan Move 1921: 1). 
In particular, these plans, which were more fully and clearly detailed, point to several 
issues.  First, they were suggestive of the desirability the area presented to local white 
economic interests.  These plans were made only two days after the riot ended.  Second, 
the recommendations offer insight into the living conditions of blacks prior to the riot, 
which were characterized by inadequate sewerage systems, water supplies, gas, and 
electricity.  Importantly then, business leaders determined that the area was worthy of 
improvements only if an industrial zone was completed.  Third, it was argued that an 
industrial zone would benefit white Tulsa from an impression management standpoint; 
that is, visitors to Tulsa wouldn’t have to come into contact with the Black community.   
In addition, other organizations attempted to persuade the Black community to 
move elsewhere.  Local railroads began to offer discounts to black citizens who wished to 
leave the city:  “Effective June 10 the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway company will 
put into effect for Tulsa charity half-fare rates to negroes who desire to leave the city” 
(Half Fare 1921: 10).  Thus, a plethora of individuals and organizations would benefit 
from the placement of the black population elsewhere.   
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Plans to industrialize the destroyed area became much more specific.  In fact, the 
city proposed to extend fire ordinances (Burned District 1921).  By requiring certain 
fireproof material and buildings to be at least two stories high, these policies essentially 
would have forced black citizens to incur too many financial costs associated with 
rebuilding.  In the meantime, local whites who perceived a degree of vulnerability among 
blacks provided financial offers to property-holders:  
“It has reached the ears of those in control of affairs that several white 
men have made offers to negro property owners, believing they will accept 
almost any price for their property in Little Africa, not only because they 
are hard pressed for money, but because they fear to rebuild in Tulsa” 
(Militia’s Reign 1921: 1). 
The media offered little evidence to suggest any sort of black resentment or disagreement 
about the plans; this is evidenced in an article concerning the response among blacks to 
the industrial plans:  
“Negro property owners are in complete harmony with the plans of the 
reconstruction committee to rebuild the burned district of Little Africa as 
an industrial section; they also agree with the committee that the proposed 
union station project as outlined is both feasible and desirable, from their 
viewpoint as well as from the viewpoint of the whites” (Reconstruction 
Plans 1921: 2). 
However, this account exaggerated the extent to which black survivors were willing to 
simply move their entire community.  Instead, black lawyers quickly responded in 
opposition to the plans.  The law firm of P.A. Chappelle, I.H. Spears, and B.C. Franklin 
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successfully argued to the district court in the case of Joe Lockett v. The City of Tulsa that 
the fire ordinance proposal would take away land without due process (Ellsworth 1982).  
However, this success did not result in financial assistance from the city to rebuild the 
black community.  Property damage was estimated to be at least $1.8 million.  However, 
the city ultimately would cover less than $100,000 of the cost (Oklahoma Commission to 
Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 (2001)).  Perhaps even more importantly, the city 
refused offers of financial assistance from other cities (Dallas Offers 1921).  The 
justification for this decision was that “this is strictly a Tulsa affair and that the work of 
restoration and charity would be taken care of by Tulsa people” (Dallas Offers 1921: 4).  
However, Tulsa did not rebuild and restore, but rather only accepted local donations 
given to the Red Cross for relief work.  Furthermore, insurance companies refused to 
cover any costs incurred from damages during the riot by citing a riot clause.  
Importantly, this lack of justice not only is explained in terms of race relations, but also 
they way in which the riot had been framed.   
Community Formations 
 In most natural disasters, a therapeutic community often emerges and is 
characterized by strength, coordination, assistance, and widespread concern for the 
affected.  Man-made disasters, in contrast, are often marked by conflict, litigation, and 
interests.  The Tulsa race riot was man-made and a corrosive community resulted.  Two 
conflicting communities emerged: a white, business-minded community and a black 
community of victims.  The competing prognostic assessments outlined above provide 
evidence of this type of community formation.  Litigation provides more evidence.  
Beyond the attempt to prevent the city of Tulsa from expanding fire zones, black 
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survivors of the riot repeatedly attempted through legal means to be given financial 
assistance, though no claims were ever supported within the city of Tulsa or the state of 
Oklahoma.  Moreover, historical records suggest that these claims were given little 
attention through the media.  Instead, documented accounts of the riot in history books of 
Oklahoma for decades merely stated that a riot occurred and that the city had rebuilt what 
it destroyed (Ellsworth 1982).  However, these interpretations of the riot would later 
change. 
Most white frames regarded the Tulsa race riot of 1921 as an “uprising.”  Only a 
few years after the riot, scholarly activity on the history of Oklahoma would provide a 
misleading account of the events and aftermaths.  For instance, Thoburn (1929: 694) 
wrote: 
“On the evening of June 1, 1921, there occurred a disgraceful race riot at 
Tulsa.  At least one hundred people were killed and property to the value 
of approximately one and one-half million dollars was destroyed.  Three 
hundred officers and men of the Oklahoma National Guard were placed 
under arms and ordered to the scene of the disturbance, Adjutant General 
Charles F. Barrett personally taking charge.  As soon as the militia had 
restored order, the civil authorities at Tulsa and in Tulsa County, exerted 
themselves to the utmost to alleviate the suffering and distress of the negro 
people whose homes and other property had been destroyed.  The city of 
Tulsa promptly announced that it would rebuild their homes.” 
This account ignored official death counts and decided on “at least one hundred” among 
those killed.  Also, this statement led readers to believe the National Guard helped quell 
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the situation, when, in fact, the local chapter actually fueled the riot.  In addition, the 
author noted the city’s intention to rebuild the community, despite minimal follow-
through on that promise.   Another account, in addition to framing the detention camp 
experiences of riot survivors as a protective measure, went further and contended that the 
city of Tulsa had rebuilt Greenwood by stating: 
“In 1921, 31 persons were killed in a race war that broke out in Tulsa.  A 
reign of terror existed that did not subside until state troops took charge of 
the situation.  The negroes, for their own protection, were concentrated in 
a camp under guard, and were kept there until order was restored.  The 
negro section of the town was set afire and wiped out during the rioting.  
The citizens of Tulsa later restored and rebuilt the devastated section” 
(Thompson 1921: n.p.)   
These types of frames, which suggest repentance and reconciliation, lasted for 
decades, until the 1970s and 1980s bore witness to new scholarly investigations of the 
riot.  One article in 1971 emphasized a theme of Tulsa blacks as victims, which was 
markedly different from previous accounts (Wheeler 1971).  Later works expanded upon 
the victimization of the black community and also began to examine the unfulfilled 
promises made by the city to rebuild the Greenwood community.  Finally, in January of 
1997, Don Ross, a state representative and former resident of the Greenwood community, 
put forward a proposal that reparations be granted to riot survivors and descendents.    
Following his suggestion of reparations, a commission was established to determine the 
events of the riot and to make recommendations for reparations.  Nevertheless, national 
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attention given to the Tulsa race riot of 1921 increased significantly, and a frame was 
successfully transformed. 
Frame Transformation 
 Frames are fluid and are often subject to change.  A host of factors can produce a 
frame transformation.  First, survivors actively altered preexisting ideas and notions 
concerning the perceived causes of the riot.  It is important to recall that a group of armed 
black men were initially blamed for the riot in 1921.  This was even the conclusion of a 
grand jury created to investigate the direct causes of the riot.  Therefore, black survivors 
of the riot had to alter this frame to one that establishes victimization rather than guilt.  In 
fact, in the most current legal case, the constituents were referred to as “victims” rather 
than survivors (Ogletree 2005).  One reparations supporter stated “The real victims were 
my entire community.  My community had to start again with no help, by borrowing 
money and going into debt” (Latham 1997: A9).  To establish victimization, 
representatives have provided accounts of blacks who had lost property, family members, 
and hope as a result of white citizen and governmental riotous actions.     
Attributing Blame 
 Another daunting and challenging task is to diagnostically frame an issue, or to 
establish blame or causality.  Unique to the Tulsa reparations movement, constituents 
have focused on an injustice that occurred over eighty years ago, which includes 
survivors who were barely children at the time.  Nevertheless, blame has been attributed 
to three particular areas: actors, context, and a conspiracy.   
 This link between actors, context, and conspiracy can be seen in the following 
statement included in the most recent legal case brought to the Inter-American 
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Commission on Human Rights.  In a statement of facts pertaining to the riot, legal 
representatives stated: 
“Victims brought suit in a timely manner with respect to personal safety, 
the revelation of critical information held in secret to evade accountability, 
and the viability of resorting to the courts.  The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma dismissed Victims’ claims on 
March 19, 2004, saying that the statute of limitations on these crimes had 
run; in so doing they furthered a longstanding injustice that was racially 
discriminatory in intent and effect” (Ogletree 2005: 1). 
This statement includes each of the primary justifications for reparations offered by race 
riot survivors and their representatives.  I will examine more fully each of these areas, 
which are labeled as actors, context, and conspiracy. 
Actors 
Tulsa race riot survivors and their representatives and supporters have been 
careful in placing blame.  One stated, “We’re not blaming the living individuals.  But, 
you do need to recognize who put this into place – European-Americans” (Espinosa 
1997: A1).  Importantly, the more recent narratives of survivors make no mention of 
“black militants” when the issue of blame has been addressed.  Instead, they transferred 
responsibility to the hundreds of whites who were involved in destroying the Greenwood 
community.  In addition, survivors claim that issues of race and power played a pivotal 
role in the riot and that the riot needs to be readdressed.   
Others have directly blamed government officials for their lack of duty during the 
riot.  In fact, the laxity in assistance given to blacks by police officers, firefighters and 
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national guardsmen has been repeatedly emphasized by survivors (Espinosa 1997; Gates 
2003; Tiernan 1998; Krehbiel 2000 a, b; Ogletree 2005).  One survivor stated, “It’s time 
for the world to acknowledge the suffering of Tulsa’s riot victims and for those in the 
U.S., the state of Oklahoma, and the city and county of Tulsa, who were culpable for the 
riot to acknowledge their wrongdoing and to rectify the damages done.  It is long past 
time for healing and justice” (Gates 2003: 60).  
Survivors have also targeted recent court decisions (Ogletree 2005).  That is, they 
contend that recent decisions to not hear the case because of a statute of limitations are 
unfair considering the unsuccessful attempts by riot survivors to obtain compensation 
immediately following the riot.  Indeed, a plethora of cases were dismissed in which 
compensation was sought on behalf of blacks who had lost property as a result of the riot.  
It has been further argued the statute of limitations itself is a form of racial 
discrimination, which is an argument centered on the context of the riot, a second theme.   
Context 
A second frame target is context, or the general climate in which the riot took 
place.  It is argued among reparation supporters that an understanding of the context is an 
imperative consideration concerning reparations.  Survivors and representatives point to a 
an era of racism and discrimination that prevailed during the time of the riot.  
Specifically, survivors’ representatives point to slavery (which had only ended less than 
sixty years before the riot) and lynchings, a common occurrence at the time of the riot.  It 
is stated: 
“During this time, city and state officials engaged in official policy, 
practice, custom, habit, and usage of denying African-Americans their 
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equal rights under the law.  City and state officials created and condoned a 
climate of racial hatred that presented a clear and present danger, led to 
tragedy, and contributed to the environment of racially motivated 
suppression…This climate of racial hatred prevented the riot’s victims 
from obtaining redress for the harms they suffered and from rebuilding 
their community” (Ogletree 2005: 9). 
Importantly, the riot is not only about a destroyed community, but also about blackness 
and what its consequences were in 1921.   
A diffusion of riots characterized this historical juncture.  Furthermore, in 1997, 
reparations were given to black survivors of the Rosewood, Florida riot of 1923.  A 
similar event in which black homes were torched, representatives of Tulsa survivors have 
used this case as a legitimation technique.  In sum, lawyers for black riot survivors have 
argued that they could not have succeeded in being granted reparations during the era in 
which the riot occurred (Gates 2003; Harper 2003; Krehbiel 2003; Myers 2005; Ogletree 
2005).   
Conspiracy of silence 
Finally, another common target of blame was a “conspiracy of silence” (for 
example, Underwood 1997; Gates 2003; Krehbiel 2004; Ogletree 2005).  That is, riot 
survivors and supporters have claimed that the city and state deliberately tried to hide the 
fact that the riot ever happened.  One supporter stated, “The 1921 Tulsa Race Riot has 
been a victim of a conspiracy of silence for 75 years.  This is the first year the city has 
stepped forward and admitted it happened (Underwood 1997: 1).  They support this 
contention by noting that certain key newspaper articles have disappeared from files and 
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that bodies were unsystematically buried in order to prevent an adequate knowledge of 
how many people actually died.  Referring to the immediate aftermaths of the riot, 
lawyers have stated,  
“At the same time, the city and state quickly took steps to hide the truth 
about the Riot.  Victims were buried in unmarked graves, neither the state 
nor the city took any investigations or prosecutions into their murders, and 
documents relating to the riot vanished from state archives” (Ogletree 
2005: 12).   
Furthermore, “This ‘conspiracy of silence’ surrounding the Riot fell particularly hard on 
African-Americans, who believed it would not be safe to speak of their experiences” 
(Ogletree 2005: 13).  In fact, representatives demanded that this “conspiracy” was not 
terminated until the commission was established to study the riot.  Others simply stated 
that the city had not paid enough attention to the riot (Krehbiel 2003).  Survivors and 
their representatives have maintained that actors, context, and conspiracy are interrelated 
factors that have operated to produce racism and discrimination toward themselves and 
other blacks. 
Justifications 
 Prognostic framing consists of remedial techniques and strategies used by SMOs.  
Since the establishment of the commission to study the riot, one remedy has gained 
primacy over all others – reparations.  Though this research is not concerned here with 
the legality of reparations, Brophy (2002) provides an excellent source for future 
research.  My research is concerned with the subjective reasons that survivors and others 
have aimed for reparations.  In other words, why did the survivors and supporters strive 
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for reparations above all other possible solutions?  A review of the reparations movement 
led to the construction of three themes relating to justifications made for reparations: 
impact, culpability, and reconciliation.   
Impact 
An emergent theme pertaining to justifications for reparations is impact, which 
refers to short- and long-term ramifications of the riot.  One survivor stated: 
“We did go on with our lives after the riot, but the memories of what 
happened to us then will never go away.  The injustices we suffered the 
two days of the riot, and the injustices we suffered after the riot when 
insurance companies failed to pay riot victims for their losses, and when 
court officials summarily threw out all riot victims’ cases between 1926 
and 1936, are blots on Tulsa’s image that have not been erased to this day” 
(Gates 2003: 77).   
Other survivors and supporters often point to human and financial losses incurred from 
the riot, which they argue directly affected their future (Latham 1997; Underwood 1997; 
Espinosa 1999a; Gates 2003).  One survivor stated:  “That is why I believe I am owed 
reparations.  My family lost a lot.  Things might have been different for me had the riot 
not happened” (Gates 2003:67).  Others have focused on the larger devastation to the 
entire community brought upon by the riot.  One supporter stated, “The real victims were 
my entire community.  My community had to start again with no help, by borrowing and 
going into debt” (Latham 1997: A9).  Another community member stated, “One of the 
most devastating effects of the riot is it stopped the potential for accumulated wealth.  
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Once prosperous families were reduced to poverty” (Underwood 1997:1).  Beyond the 
economic impact was the loss of human life.  One descendent stated,  
“I can never replace my grandfather.  I’d like to see it forgotten if I could.  
We’re too well-educated to go through that kind of drama again, but I 
think reparations should continue.  I think they’ve apologized, but 
apologies won’t bring back people who were killed and property that was 
destroyed” (Bryant 1999:17). 
This recollection points to the impact the riot had on individuals and families.  More 
narratives not only pointed to the personal devastation experienced, but also the broader 
community effects as well.  One supporter believed that the deceit associated with the riot 
had devastating effects on the community, 
“One of the most profound effects in the long run is what it did to the city.  
It robbed the city of its honesty, and it sentenced it to 75 years of 
denial…The actual amount of dollars – that is mere pittance compared to 
the three-quarters of a century of suffering the victims of the looting, 
burning, and killing and bombing, as so many endured” (Espinosa 1999a: 
1).   
Finally, others have stated that an important effect of the riot was the fear it fostered 
among victims.  Indeed, the most current lawsuit filed against the federal government 
contends that black residents in Tulsa lived in perpetual fear after the riot, causing them 
to remain silent in order to avoid the potential repercussions.  In their representation of 
the survivors, the legal firm stated, 
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“These effects included persistent and deeply felt fear, reluctance and 
suppression regarding subjects related to the Riot, reluctance and fear 
regarding contact with whites and a pervasive compulsion to avoid 
‘stepping out of line’ in general, and additional persistent fear of 
unpredictable disaster” (Ogletree 2005: 19). 
Survivors have elaborated on this fear.  One resident recounted the nightmares which the 
riot would produce for years after and the loss of security.  This survivor stated, 
“The worst thing about the riot wasn’t the loss of those beautiful material 
possessions, though, no matter how much we love them.  The worst thing 
lost was my peace of mind.  For many years after the riot, I suffered 
horrific nightmares of the bloody killings, the strewn, mutilated injured, 
the dead bodies, and of the searing-hot blazing fires that burned our homes 
to the ground” (Gates 2003: 68). 
Culpability 
A second theme related to the justifications for reparations was state and city 
culpability.  Many point to the actions of governmental figures.  One reparations 
supporter stated that the evidence “shows the city of Tulsa has its fingerprints all over the 
riot” (Espinosa 1999b: 1).  Another supporter stated, “When the state was called, the 
National guard quelled the riot but most of the burning and looting happened after the 
riot.  What they did was arrest all the blacks and left the whites to roam freely.  We have 
photos documenting this fact” (Underwood 1997:1).  In addition, another citizen made 
the full link between reparations and culpability: “If you look at the factors typically used 
to determine reparations, it’s still possible to identity direct victims and their 
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descendents…Also, there’s a great deal of credible evidence of complicity – particularly 
acts of omission by failure of the government to stop the riot once it got under way” 
(Tiernan 1998: 1).  Others maintain that reparations involve accountability and admitting 
culpability.  One supporter stated, “I think it is time that Tulsa and the state of Oklahoma 
seriously consider reparations for victims of the race riot.  I think we have to be held 
accountable for the sins of our fathers, not only in race but in all things” (Latham 1997: 
A1). 
Finally, another representative pointed to the admission among city leaders that 
retribution would be given.  He stated:  
“The city of Tulsa and the Chamber of Commerce promised reparations 
for rebuilding down to the penny.  After the riot, the nation was in shock.  
People offered money to help, but the mayor said, ‘No, we will rebuild the 
city.’  But they didn’t…What the city did was try to steal the land for use 
as an industrial park.  Blacks from the Greenwood areas rebuilt their 
property without any assistance, and in fact, all their claims to the city 
were rejected” (Underwood 1997:1).    
Reconciliation 
 
A third type of justification is “reconciliation.”  The lead attorney representing the 
survivors stated, “In talking about reparations, I’m talking about repairing.  I’m talking 
about reconciliation.  This is not just financial” (Krehbiel 2002: A13).  Many survivors 
and supporters believe that race relations can improve through reparations (“Horner 
Calls” 2001; Krehbiel 2002).  One supportive minister offered the following argument: 
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“Reparations can be a way to recognize the injustice and suffering that the 
race riot perpetrated on this community.  Reparations can be a significant 
investment in the restoration of good will and trust.  Reparations can move 
us toward reconciliation.  Reparations are the manifestation of our genuine 
desire to be in a righteous relationship with our neighbors of color” 
(Blaine 2000:2). 
Senator Maxine Horner stated, “I hear many people say that we should not be blamed for 
the past, but there are some things that we have to correct.  Reparations would be a start” 
(Latham 1997:A9). 
 Finally, the issue of symbolism was a common theme regarding reparations and 
reconciliation.  One community member stated, “It’s a powerful symbolic gesture of 
trying to right a horrible wrong” (Tiernan 1998: 1).  Another supporter stated, “Money is 
a magnificent healer…My community is bleeding economically, and money is a hell of 
an elixir…You know that they mean forgiveness when they are willing to pay” (Latham 
1997:A9).  Julian Bond, former chairman of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), stated, “The general idea of reparations is to 
somehow make whole.  There is no way that money can make whole such a grievous 
wrong.  It is more the acknowledgment that some wrong has been done” (Dean 2000:7).     
Resonance 
 Making a frame resonate is imperative to the level of support that will be given to 
SMOs.  Benford and Snow (2000) propose that frame resonation has two requirements.  
First, the constructed frame must be credible.  To be considered credible, Benford and 
Snow argue that frames must have consistency, empirical credibility, and credible 
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articulators.  In terms of frame consistency, reparation movements once again provide a 
unique case.  An analysis of the frames offered within the reparations movement reveal 
that successful movements benefit from both expressive consistency and instrumental 
consistency.  Expressive consistency can be described as congruent claims concerning the 
overall injustice that has been incurred.  On the other hand, instrumental consistency 
refers to the degree to which frame intricacies are congruent.  The Tulsa riot survivors are 
unified in terms of the overall injustice that they have claimed to experience and thus 
have expressive consistency.  However, they do not have instrumental consistency.  That 
is, there is evidence that survivors and supporters of the reparations movement have not 
all offered the same narratives, claims, actions, etc. (Gates 2003).  This is important 
because the framing of the riot is a pivotal component to any legal case as well as to 
public support.  These instrumental inconsistencies relate specifically to various features 
of the riot such as means of assault, culpable actors, death totals, burial procedures, and 
so on.  For instance, some survivors maintain that airplanes were used to shoot at victims, 
while others suggest that planes were used for protection purposes.  Yet other accounts 
hold that planes were never used at all (Ellsworth 1982; Gates 2003).  In addition, there is 
no consensus as to how many people lost their lives during the riot.  Official reports hold 
that the number was around 36.  However, the most recent legal case only mentions 
estimated deaths of 100-300 victims (Ogletree 2005).  Though there is understandably no 
agreed-upon number, the persistence of such large discrepancies leaves frame 
inconsistency and thus affects the degree to which the proffered frame resonates.   
 Empirical credibility signifies that the frame can be tested and verified.  Once 
again, survivors and supporters have encountered a variety of challenges.  First, the 
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primary historical sources of data paint a slightly different picture of the riot than 
survivors have today.  This mainly refers to the experiences that survivors claim to have 
been a part of.  Though their reported experiences are by all means plausible, a lack of 
official documentation which verifies these reports is detrimental to the movement’s 
success.  Second, and arguably more important, the blame that has been attributed, to a 
certain extent, has not been verified.  It was discussed earlier that there are primarily four 
areas in which blame has been attributed: white rioters, government officials, the culture 
of the time, and a conspiracy of silence.  There is little doubt that white rioters and 
government officials were directly responsible for the magnitude of destruction that took 
place in the riot of 1921, at least among those who have previously studied the riot.  
Moreover, few disagree that the historical context played at least some role.  There were 
a plethora of riots that broke out within a very similar period.  Cities such as Omaha, East 
St. Louis, and Chicago all experienced them.  Indeed, a period of overt racism and 
discrimination is often cited as being the cause of many riots (for example, see Waskow 
1966; Williams and Williams 1972; Tuttle 1978).  However, a “conspiracy of silence” is 
not so verifiable.  Nevertheless, the idea has been expressed in numerous articles as well 
as the most current legal case itself (Ogletree 2005).  Certainly the riot was publicly 
ignored for decades, but whether this was a conspiracy among city and state officials is 
another matter that has not been verified with strong evidence.  For instance, 
representatives in the most recent legal case have not identified specifically how the riot 
was silenced, or who was responsible for the perceived cover-up.  However, it is an 
important strategy because if the riot and response was proven to involve a “conspiracy 
of silence,” perhaps the preexisting statute of limitations could be circumevented.  
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 A particular strength of those pursuing reparations for survivors and descendants 
involves those who have helped create and extend frames to the public, or frame 
articulators.  Numerous people have been used to garner further support, or to aid in 
establishing frame legitimacy.  Though these were not always the articulators themselves, 
they were nevertheless important to the movement.  For instance, the late Johnny 
Cochrane, a lawyer for the survivors, certainly had a reputation for selling his frames.  
John Hope Franklin, a distinguished historian and former advisor on race relations to 
President Clinton, was the son of a riot survivor and Greenwood lawyer.  The reparations 
movement was largely initiated by a state representative, Don Ross.  In addition, a 
meeting organized to discuss the progress of the movement featured a speech presented 
by Chicago Alderwoman Dorothy Tillman, a leading advocate for slave reparations.  
However, despite the support of a vast array of widely known public figures, the 
reparations movement continues to encounter other barriers.   
 Another requirement for frame resonance proposed by Benford and Snow (2000) 
is salience.  They further contend that three elements are associated with establishing 
salience: centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity.  Centrality 
means that the frame must be associated with values and beliefs that are central to the 
lives of its potential adherents.  Benford and Snow (2000:621) state that “Hypothetically, 
the more central or salient the espoused beliefs, ideas, and values of a movement to the 
targets of mobilization, the greater the probability of their mobilization.”  In order to 
establish centrality, supporters of the reparations movement often make comparisons to 
other injustices or larger societal values in general.  For instance, one supporter stated, 
“We are on the side of righteousness” (Krehbiel 2005:A1).  Another proponent stressed 
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the value of justice by noting, “We live in a society built on justice and that’s the 
cornerstone of Anglo-American civil justice that we expect to have justice.  I think we 
can all look at the riot and say that justice was probably not served” (Espinosa 1999b:1).  
Others made more specific comparisons between the response to the riot and other 
current events such as the war in Iraq.  One supporter stated, “If we can rebuild Iraq, we 
can rebuild Tulsa” (Krehbiel 2005:A1). 
 Experiential commensurability refers to the degree to which the frame directly 
affects people (Benford and Snow 2000).  Another problem which reparation movements 
encounter is the difficulty in making a link between the current state of affairs and an 
injustice that occurred long ago (Howard-Hassmann 2004).  The Tulsa reparations 
movement presents a unique case because nearly a quarter of those that initially filed for 
reparations directly survived the riot.  However, a larger portion of those filing were not 
yet alive during the time in which the riot took place.  Nevertheless, it is the survivors 
who have been given the most media attention.  The survivors have used these 
opportunities to give their personal experiences in the riot, many of which have been 
repeated in articles, books, discussions, and legal testimonies.  These testimonies are 
given to show that their experiences were real and that they were directly affected by the 
riot.  A second challenge facing the movement is that the frame has the potential to affect 
the pocketbooks of a larger set of citizens who had no direct association with the riot and 
feel no personal responsibility for the acts of others, which will be further addressed later.   
 The final variable associated with frame resonance is narrative fidelity.   That is, 
the frame must take into account the “culture out there” (Benford and Snow 2000:622).  
To attain this level of narrative fidelity, survivors and supporters of the Tulsa reparations 
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movement have pointed to other reparation movements as well, such as those 
surrounding slavery (Underwood 1997).  Indeed, the Tulsa reparations movement is one 
of several attempts aimed at gaining repayment for past injustices.  Thus, there has 
emerged a reparations boom, or a culture of reparations.  However, as Howard-Hassmann 
(2004) notes, reparation movements among African-Americans have been largely 
unsuccessful because they typically involve actions that have long since passed and 
victims that are no longer living, such as those stemming from slavery or the Jim Crow 
era.  Nevertheless, it should not be considered coincidental that the Tulsa reparations 
movement emerged when it did.    
Public Framing of Reparations 
 
 It has been established that framing is an integral part of the current move for 
reparations among survivors, representatives, and their supporters.  Though reparations 
remain to be granted, the master frame has unarguably transformed from an uprising to a 
social and racial injustice.  The “victims” have gone from being white to black.  
Nevertheless, the very idea of reparations, or any policy or procedure that requires money 
funneling from one racial group to another, can cause a certain level of resentment (Omi 
and Winant 1994).  So, how about the general public?  Do they support reparations?  
Why or why not?  These are important questions because too often social movement 
analysis is constrained to only the perceptions and experiences of key leaders on each 
side of an issue (Benford and Snow 2000).  In fact, one poll found that 62% of Tulsans 
were opposed to reparations.  This figure was slightly smaller across the state of 
Oklahoma at 57% (Martindale 2000: 1).  Though support for reparations is low, it is 
important to understand the reasons why there is such minimal support.  In this section, I 
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explain the key ideas and themes resulting from a content analysis of opinions sent into 
and published by the Tulsa World from 1997-2007, each of which are concerned with the 
very issue of reparations.  1997 was selected as the starting date because it marked the 
beginning of reparation discourse for the riot survivors. 
 Throughout the ten-year period under consideration, forty-five statements of 
opinion were sent into the Tulsa World and published.  Among these, thirteen (30.9%) 
clearly supported the idea of reparations, in some form or another.  However, thirty-two 
(71.1%) clearly did not support any form of reparations.  These statistics are not given to 
generalize public opinion, but only to provide an account on the background of the 
statements offered below.  Another important qualifier is necessary.  Many of these 
opinions were clearly in response to statements issued by political leaders or 
representatives of the reparations movement concerned with the reparations case.  This 
could help to explain the large degree to which these ensuing opinions are unsupportive 
of reparations – because they were in reaction to those who do support reparations.  
Moreover, these statements were temporally clustered.  That is, opinions were offered at 
times when important decisions were in the process of being made or were very recently 
decided upon relating to the reparations case.  Finally, another important qualifier relates 
to the issue of race.  Because these statements were submitted to the newspaper, the race 
of the issuer was unavailable, which could be considered a very important limitation.  
However, I maintain for this stage of the analysis that reasons cited for support or 
nonsupport for reparations are important regardless of race, though they are certainly 
interconnected issues.  I will begin by looking at supportive opinions. 
Public Support for Reparations 
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 Those who supported reparations were citizens who believed that an injustice 
occurred long ago that needs to be reconciled.  Though there was slight disagreement 
over how reparations should be distributed and to whom, the consensus among these 
opinions were that reparations in some form or another should be granted.  Responding to 
the formation of a commission to study the riot, one wrote:  
“Once the commission has determined to the best of its ability the number 
of dead and all other historical detail surrounding this tragedy, amends 
must be made.  We Tulsans – as a city, as a county and as a state – must 
take the next and final step: Make reparations to the black community and 
specifically the known survivors and family members of those harmed and 
killed” (Tulsa Time 1999: 18). 
This individual argued that reparations should be granted to the survivors and their 
descendants.  Another respondent concurred, but encouraged others to take on the 
generalized other by stating: 
“Had members of either of our families been physically injured or killed 
as a result of the riot, or had they lost all of their property and possessions, 
we would be adamant in our claims for reparations.  It would be right and 
just that our families be compensated for their losses due to societal and 
governmentally sanctioned violence.  If it is fair for our families to be 
compensated, then it is fair that other families be compensated” (Pay Up 
2000: 2). 
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Specifically, two themes emerged from reviewing claims supporting: one related to an 
opportunity to rewrite history and a second associated with the beneficiaries of 
reparations.   
Rewriting History 
Rewriting history was a dominant theme in many of the responses associated with 
the support for reparations.  This theme relates to the belief that history is best served by 
being confronted, handled, and modified, if possible.  Recall that one of the justifications 
for reparation requests by riot survivors, descendants, and their representatives is the 
notion of reconciliation.  Among the public, some agreed a potential outcome of 
reparations would be more social cohesion that surpassed the issue of money.  One 
individual stated:  “At the heart of the reparations debate is not money…At issue is the 
acknowledgment by white Tulsans that a grievous wrong was done to the black 
community…We all want to move on, but not at the expense of ignoring the past; 
otherwise we cannot learn from it” (Heart Debate: 2007: 20). 
Others made similar statements.  A key aspect of these positions was linking 
history to reparations and reconciliation.  That is, these individuals argued that although 
the Tulsa riot was a dated fragment of history, scars from the riot still remain and there 
are lessons left to be learned.  One individual offered: 
“Money will never undo the sufferings that were endured, but it will do 
something and that is surely better than nothing.  We are dealing with 
emotions, and emotions cannot be exchanged for money; but time is also a 
factor and money can make time more endurable.  As a city we all need to 
heal from this dark chapter of our history.  I commend the commission on 
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its perseverance, and pray, hope and encourage us as a city of people to 
embrace this opportunity of true brother-sisterhood that can be our future” 
(Reparations Better 2000: 18). 
The Beneficiaries of Reparations  
A second theme related to the beneficiaries of reparations, or who or what would 
receive restitution.  Importantly, respondents who supported reparations felt the issue was 
about a community rather than a few isolated individuals who lost homes and 
possessions.  Indeed, the concept of community was emphasized in the content of these 
opinions.  One excerpt reads, “What was taken from the black community was far more 
than just of life.  It was the loss of future.  I would like to see Tulsa raise the money to 
rebuilt the Greenwood district back to its past glory” (Community’s Future 1999: 18).  
From this perspective, reparations would be a win-win situation; that is, the entire Tulsa 
economy would be impacted positively through reparations.  Another respondent stated, 
“To me, it’s all about the black people and business owners in the Greenwood 
area…Let’s give them the opportunity to rebuild what they lost – the opportunity for a 
growing business nestled inside a growing community” (Right Thing 2000: 2).  Here, the 
individual contends that reparations would best be served if they were funneled into the 
entire community rather than solely direct survivors and their descendants.  Another 
individual argued that the primary beneficiary should be victims themselves: 
“Before building a museum or a memorial to remember the 1921 Tulsa 
race riot…Tulsa must make right the horrendous wrongs that were 
inflicted by this riot on its black victims and their families…I am not sure 
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that Tulsa needs to be known for a riot.  I am sure, however, that it needs 
to be known for helping its own” (Help People 2006: G2).    
Some respondents did draw a line between those who they perceived to deserve 
reparations and those who did not.  Referring to reparations for descendants, an 
individual stated, “Those younger know only what was told to them.  Only the ones who 
were born before the 1921 riot deserve any compensation” (Forgive Forget 2005: A16).  
Still, others argued that reparations would best be served in the form of educational 
scholarships (Look Future 2000: 7) or building a memorial to commemorate the riot 
(Objective Memorials 2002: 2).   
Public Opposition to Reparations 
 The majority of public opinion offered in the Tulsa World was unsupportive to 
potential taxpayer dollars being earmarked for reparations.  One individual, apparently 
deeming reparations unimportant, stated, “Let’s forget about the race riot memorial, 
museum, and put that money to good use.  Let’s put water in the pools for the kids” 
(Let’s Put 2003: A2).  Another wrote, “I would be in favor of reparations to people who 
lost their businesses in the north Tulsa riots if the black community made restitution to 
the federal government for what they destroyed in the Watts and Detroit riots in the ‘60s” 
(Blacks Should 1997: A2).   
One interesting theme relating to the opinions of those against paying reparations 
was their interpretation of the riot, which has been clearly impacted by once prevailing 
frames of the riot as a black uprising, or, at the very least, a battle between two races.  
One individual, comparing black survivors of the riot to the Japanese interned during 
World War II, stated: 
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“The latter clearly was an action for which our government was 
responsible, whereas the race riot was touched off by the confrontation of 
two angry, hostile groups – one black, one white – all private citizens.  
The then-governing body of Oklahoma moved immediately to quell the 
rioting by sending in the National Guard to restore order.  Within hours, 
the looting, burning, and shootings ceased and homeless and frightened 
blacks were placed willingly into protective custody” (Cows Different 
1999: 24). 
Research now suggests the local chapter of the National Guard itself contributed to the 
riot’s intensity and there is also little evidence that blacks were “willingly” arrested and 
placed into detention camps (Ellsworth 1982; Gates 2003).  Others were under an 
impression that the “truth” of the riot has never been established.  Despite unquestionable 
historical evidence that Greenwood was torched to the ground by white rioters, some still 
remain skeptical.  Many legends persist today within the city of Tulsa through stories 
handed down over generations that relate to riot events.  One individual wrote, “I’ve seen 
a lot of innuendo, a lot of supposition and a lot of people saying things that just aren’t 
true.  According to people I know, the area in question was no mecca.  Who started the 
fires?  Do we know that?  Do we know who started the shooting?” (No Tax 1997: A2).  
Nevertheless, three categories emerged from the analysis of citizens’ statements, 
signifying their opposition to reparations: avoiding history, an “us” and “them” ideology, 
and denial of responsibility. 
Avoiding History 
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 It was noted above that a key theme associated with support for reparations is the 
belief among some that pursuance of history is important in order to make amends and 
the ability to rewrite history, or at least edit it.  However, many statements associated 
with those unsupportive of reparations argued that bad history should be ignored.  As 
noted earlier, research suggests that, in some cases, disastrous events can enhance social 
solidarity (for example, Webb 2002).  Pertaining to the riot, however, a corrosive 
community was formed and many believe the event should be forgotten.  One individual 
believed that such history is better left alone by stating, “Modern psychology tells us that 
reopening old wounds is counterproductive; so why celebrate a painful event like the 
Tulsa race riot or the Oklahoma City bombing?  Focusing on past acts of horror certainly 
doesn’t prevent similar acts in the future.  It may even encourage them” (Let Painful 
1998: 16).  In fact, a number of statements were thematically similar.  Another person 
added, “Someday we have got to try to get past all of this racial positioning and we do 
not need to pay for a constant reminder…We should put the past behind and move 
ahead” (Let’s Move 2004: G2).  Indeed, “moving ahead” was a common statement 
among several citizens.   
 In addition to ignoring events associated with the riot, many felt that current 
attempts to garner reparations would only cause more racial animosity.  One person 
wrote, “The 1921 riot is an embarrassing episode in Tulsa’s history and should not be 
commemorated…Let’s quit mending fences between the races and start tearing them 
down.  Let’s learn from the past and move on” (Tear Down 1997: A16).  Similarly, 
another asked, “Why are we spending so much money to investigate this when we need 
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to move forward instead of backward?  This brings up hard feelings with everyone” 
(Race Riot Study 1997: A2). 
“Us” and “Them” 
 A second emergent category was an “us” and “them” mentality among some 
individuals opposed to reparations.  Cornell and Hartmann (2007) note that an “us” and 
“them” ideology involves creating and maintaining racial boundaries.  Recall that many 
of those in support of reparations emphasized reconciliation and group cohesion as 
potential consequences.  However, for many opposed to them, reparations were perceived 
to be unjust and biased toward blacks.  For instance, one person vehemently opposed to 
reparations wrote, “Taxpayers have in effect been paying reparations to blacks for many 
years in the form of welfare and various government subsidies” (Welfare Form 1997: 
A2).  Another stated, “They want us to pay not because we are guilty but because we are 
white” (Tulsa Race 1999: 18).  
 Adding to this mentality, some citizens have questioned why it is only blacks who 
are seeking reparations when whites were among the dead as well.  One respondent said, 
“I have read and reread many articles and not one has mentioned the dozen or more 
whites who lost their lives, some of them policemen and firemen.  Where are the 
reparations and memorials for them and their surviving families?  Doesn’t this seem to be 
one dimensional?” (Something Seems 2002: 14).  Once again, many remain unaware of 
evidence that whites entered the black district to torch, loot, and destroy.  Moreover, 
some have failed to discover that police officers participated in the rioting and firefighters 
did not fight fires.  Nevertheless, many statements revolved around the theme of 
reparations as being one dimensional or historically inaccurate. 
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 Finally, a few linked survivors’ claims for reparations stemming from the riot to 
reparation movements for slavery, which suggests some may currently perceive that 
reparations themselves are strictly a black phenomenon.  Unsupportive of providing 
reparations to survivors, one person offered,  
“I don’t believe that the taxpayers of Tulsa – the vast majority of them 
totally unrelated to the events of the race riot or slavery – should make 
reparations for a minority of evil people.  Concerning the slavery issue, 
every black should have the chance to go to Africa and see the culture they 
were robbed of.  I believe they would then see the many opportunities they 
have in America, even if slavery was the vicious way their ancestors 
arrived” (Money Won’t 1997: A16). 
Interestingly, just as the interracial committee was formed in 1921 after the Tulsa riot to 
show the “remarkable progress” of blacks since slavery, this individual evoked precisely 
the same argument in 1997.  This individual’s statement also addresses a third theme 
related to anti-reparation opinions, which is the denial of personal responsibility. 
Denial of Responsibility 
 The most cited reason for opposing reparations among those who offered 
statements to the Tulsa World was associated with the denial of responsibility, or the 
perception that current citizens of Tulsa should not have to pay for “sins of the past.”  
Referring to his extended family, which was located in Kentucky at the time of the riot, 
one respondent stated,  
“They paid their debts, carried their grudges, forgave their enemies and 
were beholden to no one.  I am the same.  Now strangers have come to 
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Tulsa saying that I am responsible for paying the debts of whites, living 
states away, just because we now live in Tulsa.  I will protest if allowed.  
This is not my debt!” (Correcting Some 2003: A9).   
Many respondents argued that the riot was indeed devastating and an atrocious act that 
was committed long ago.  However, crucial to this argument is that, unlike the 
aforementioned proponents of reparations who argued history should be acknowledged 
and reconciled, anti-reparation citizens merely acknowledge the riot, but deny being 
personally responsible, and are thus not obligated to pay reparations.   
In addition, a small portion of adherents to these positions actually did favor 
reparations, but with restrictions.  For instance, another citizen maintained, “I think the 
only people who should voluntarily contribute to that are families who were residents of 
that date.  I moved here 15 years ago, and I sure don’t want to pay for it” (Tulsan Not 
1997: A2).  Indeed, this was the most frequently cited reason concerning the opposition 
of reparations, or the belief that reparations are not justified in situations where the 
reparation-seekers are attempting to gain compensation from those not associated with 
the riot.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153 
 
 
 
 
8 
Conclusions 
 
Final Comments 
 This chapter provides some concluding comments pertaining to this research.  In 
addition, I offer some implications for future research and limitations to the study.  In the 
first stage of this project, the research examined forces which contributed to the Tulsa 
Race Riot.  An integrative model was introduced which synthesized various structural, 
cultural, and contextual factors in addition to triggering events.  It is proposed that this is 
a more appropriate model for studying race riots because it takes into account a variety of 
factors that have been identified in previous research as important contributors.  
However, this research also diverges in some important respects from seminal works 
which focus on the causative factors associated with riots (for example, Lieberson and 
Silverman 1965; Spilerman 1970, 1971).  That is, the central question(s) presented in this 
research did not focus on accounting for why some cities with certain conditions 
experience riots while other cities with similar conditions do not.  Moreover, the study 
went beyond Smelser’s (1962) theory of collective behavior by showing that the context 
of riots are just as important as, for example, structural conduciveness and the formation 
of generalized beliefs.  Instead, this research utilized a grounded theoretical perspective 
to develop themes that actually complement and integrate various factors previously 
argued to be important factors associated with riots.  Moreover, it begins to offer reasons 
 154 
why these factors are important and why they cannot be understood without also 
considering how they interact with other contributors.  
Though certain aspects of the Tulsa riot will remain unknown, such as the amount 
of deaths or the role of airplanes throughout, a rich amount of data exist that allow for 
better understanding of the complexity associated with forces that cause episodes of 
collective racial violence.  Many studies seeking to generalize various aspects of riots 
have been hindered by the absence of extensive data concerning one riot.  It is 
maintained, therefore, that before we can better understand race riots from a broader 
perspective, research must take into account their complexity essentially by using more 
data to interpret them.   
 In addition, this research introduced the social movement perspective of framing 
into the analysis of race riots, again focusing on the Tulsa riot.  It is argued that framing 
riots is a crucial aspect of outcomes from racial disorders.  Frames affect not only 
governmental responses, but social interpretations of the causes, events, and aftermaths of 
riots.  I first examined framing as it related to 1921 interpretations of the riot.  The 
analysis of this frame was actually made easier due to the absence of racial codes in the 
various documents examined (Gilens 1996; Wheelock and Hartmann 2007).  In other 
words, little was held back in terms of attitudes and perceptions related to race.  In 
contrast, today there exist a plethora of racial codes.   
Despite ample historical evidence suggesting a different reality, it was shown that 
a small group comprised of “black agitators” was initially blamed.  This leads one to 
question, why blacks were blamed for the riot when white rioters destroyed thirty-five 
city blocks of black homes, institutions, and businesses?  This, I believe, is where the 
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causes of the riot can be linked to the framing of riots.  That is, to understand why riots 
are framed in certain ways also requires an understanding of structural, cultural, and 
contextual factors and triggering events.   
 Indeed, a group of perceived “black agitators” were blamed for the riot by local 
press and the grand jury.  It took place in a structure of segregation based upon overt 
perceptions of biological, social, and economical, and political white superiority.  A 
triggering event, in the form of an alleged assault by a black male upon a white female, 
served to provide direct and immediate conducive conditions for a riot.  In 1921, this type 
of allegation was often followed by a lynching.  In the case of Tulsa, however, the key 
difference was that a group of blacks were determined to prevent a lynching from 
occurring by gathering arms to protect the accused.  Furthermore, in 1921, such protest 
was perceived to be blacks “not knowing their place.”  Black men and women were 
expected to be subservient.  Therefore, as white frames began emerging about the riot 
immediately afterward, the event was framed as black militancy.  However, this frame 
alone was not enough to justify the destruction of the black community and resultant 
plans to permanently remove them.  Thus, another frame emerged that interpreted the 
black community in whole as a social problem, uneducated and prone to criminality.  It is 
also argued that these frames emerged, in part, due to misperceptions among the public 
about issues related to the black community in Tulsa.  
 The second phase of this framing analysis examined its current frame, as it has 
been established through black riot survivors, representatives, and supporters.  Currently, 
frame articulators have sought to replace beliefs and interpretations of the riot that stress 
black culpability with one that emphasizes black victimization.  As legal battles persist, 
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framing issues related to the riot remain crucial to the process.  Thus, framing is never 
static, but always dynamic.  Social changes, recent legal decisions, and even personal 
experiences have implications for framing.  Competing SMOs have not emerged despite 
the framing alignment of those involved in the Tulsa reparations movement.  Constituents 
of the current movement have successfully transformed the frame of the riot with 
minimal resistance.  However, in drawing upon the larger frames proffered by African 
Americans in their pursuit of reparations for slavery, Tulsa constituents have encountered 
resonance problems among governmental leaders and public citizens who feel that 
injustices incurred decades, even centuries, ago are not deserving of contemporary 
financial compensation.  In addition to the framing tasks and processes, I offered 
justifications given by frame articulators for reparations.  Finally, with a focus on 
reparations, I also examined some of the reasons cited by Tulsans for supporting or not 
supporting reparations for black survivors.  Certainly, the degree of support is deeply 
impacted by the very frames that have been established and their respective saliency and 
potency, and thus resonance among the public.        
Implications for Future Research 
 The first stage of analysis utilized an integrative approach to understanding the 
causes of the Tulsa race riot of 1921.  To a large extent, sociological research on race 
riots has focused on locating distinct characteristics, often structural, that are common 
patterns or processes in all riots.  I have maintained that these approaches somewhat limit 
our understanding of riots because they ignore the complexity of riots.  Riots take place 
throughout distinct sociohistorical periods where different structures, cultures, and 
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contexts interact.  However, I have also argued that the macro-orientation of these factors 
have to be linked to triggering events and other micro-level issues. 
 Thus, there are implications for future research.  First, future work on riots should 
consist of not only further case studies to better understand the complexity of riots, but 
also more comparative approaches.  For instance, further research that compares much 
older riots such as Tulsa’s or Chicago’s with more contemporary riots such as the Los 
Angeles riots in the 1990s would be advantageous.  Perhaps more importantly, research 
should consider the global persistence of episodes involving interracial and interethnic 
conflict.  I further suggest that these involve in-depth case study analyses to better 
understand the similarities and differences between these types of riots. 
 Second, future research concerned with the cause(s) of race riots should use 
integrative approaches to studying their spatial and temporal persistence.  I have argued 
that riots should be considered more holistically.  Thus, future research should focus on 
arriving at generalizations through integrating more micro- and macro-level factors.  My 
research on the Tulsa riot of 1921 does not necessarily refute the importance of findings 
from previous research on the causative factors associated with race riots, but rather it 
integrates some of these debates.  Part of the purpose of this study was not to generalize 
the Tulsa conflict to all episodes of racial rioting, but rather to better understand not only 
the Tulsa situation itself, but the complexity involved in riots.  Therefore, I have 
developed an integrative model that could be utilized in future research. 
 Third, future research should begin to look at how riots are framed.  Little 
research has been concerned with the sociopolitical dynamics involved in framing riots.  
However, it was argued that framing is a very important dimension of riots.  Frames help 
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others to interpret, and thus develop an understanding of, many aspects of riots such as 
what causes them, who or what is to blame, and steps which should be taken to alleviate 
their future occurrences.  Moreover, this work suggests that community formation is an 
extremely important dimension of riots both immediately and long after they have 
concluded.  It is argued that media outlets play an extremely important role in how riots 
are interpreted and understood.   
A fourth important implication for future research is to examine the framing of 
reparation movements in general.  Though this has been initiated, the work is purely 
theoretical with little empirical evidence of the different framing strategies and 
techniques that are used (Howard-Hessmann 2004).  For instance, research should 
consider how reparation attempts have attributed blame diagnostically and the various 
legitimation techniques that have been used to prognostically frame reparations.  Future 
research should also focus on contestant frames to reparations.  These arguably have a 
large impact on the unsuccessful attempts for African-American reparation movements, 
but this needs to be laid out empirically.   
Limitations 
 This research also consists of several limitations that need to be addressed.  First, 
even an extensive case study such as this cannot possibly get at the entirety of riots.  In 
other words, there are arguably other important factors associated with riots that have not 
been examined in the current research.  For instance, when considering cultural factors 
that contributed to the riot, this research primarily focused on ideologies concerning race.  
Another factor that might contribute to riots is the degree of individualism in a society or 
even a community.  For example, while researching the Tulsa riot, it appeared that both 
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the white and black community each had a strong sense of solidarity, only somewhat in 
opposition to one another, which suggests that the degree of individualism was rather 
low.  Today, race riots in which one racial group is violent against another, with vast 
amounts of participation from both races, are virtually nonexistent in the United States.  
However, this hypothesis is empirically unsubstantiated.  Similarly, other contextual or 
structural factors may contribute to riots that were neglected in this research.   
 A second limitation is methodological.  The reliance on archival data created a 
major dependency on governmental and media representations, which were certainly 
biased, and at times, lacking in relevant information.  This research did not consist of any 
interviews.  It is argued that interviews with those involved in riots or their aftermaths are 
important to understanding racial disorders.  This limitation certainly applies to the 
reparations movement.  Empirical data would be perhaps much richer if interviews were 
conducted with riot survivors, representatives, and supporters.  To alleviate the 
magnitude of this limitation, this research considered interviews conducted by other 
researchers in the past.  However, these interviews were not directly considered with 
framing issues, and therefore, serves as a limitation. 
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